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听听El presidente. 鈥� El punto siguiente en el orden del d铆a es el debate a partir de las declaraciones del Consejo y de la Comisi贸n sobre la necesidad de detectar y luchar contra los actos de sabotaje de la flota clandestina rusa que da帽an infraestructuras submarinas cr铆ticas en el mar B谩ltico ().

听听Adam Sz艂apka, President-in-Office of the Council. 鈥� Mr听President, honourable Members, Madam Commissioner, lately we have seen a troubling increase of hybrid activities attributed or connected to Russia. These include instrumentalisation of migrants, sabotage, arson, and the jamming and spoofing on the global navigation satellite system. We have also seen physical attacks on individuals, cyberattacks and disinformation. All these actions are aimed at challenging our democracy, sovereignty and security, as well as the cohesion of our societies and the rule of law.

When it comes to the sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and the Russian shadow fleet, allow me to stress three main points.

First, we strongly condemn any deliberate destruction of Europe's critical infrastructure and recent attempts to menace the undersea cables in the Baltic. The investigation is still ongoing and the suspected vessels is once again part of Russia's shadow fleet. Safeguarding undersea infrastructure is critical not only for regional security. These cables are vital for communication and data flow, and their disruption jeopardises our security and economic interests. I would like to commend the Finnish authorities for their swift reaction and express full solidarity with the affected Member States.

Secondly, I would like to emphasise that Russia's shadow fleet does not only fuel Russia's war machine against Ukraine, but, by circumventing the oil price cap, it also poses significant risk to the environment and maritime safety in Europe and globally with its inadequately maintained and poorly insured vessels.

Thirdly, and the most important, the EU is taking measures to address these incidents and safeguard undersea cables. We do this by improving information sharing, advancing detection system, bolstering undersea repair capabilities and deepening international partnership. We work closely, especially with NATO, to safeguard our critical infrastructure. We are also targeting the root cause of the problem by using sanctions.

In December, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the 15th package of sanctions on Russia, targeting, among others, the shadow fleet. The Council added 52 vessels to the list of those subject to a port access ban and ban on provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport, bringing the total of EU-designated vessels to 71.

On the same day, the Council also adopted the first set of listing under the newly established regime on Russia's destabilising activities. While any decision on further measures is to be taken by unanimity by EU Member States,听we will continue exploring ways to increase pressure on Russia and its shadow fleet, including through further restrictive measures.

We will continue to engage with our partners and in international fora, such as in International Maritime Organization.

听听Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Mr President, honourable Members, in recent months we have seen a series of further incidents affecting sub-sea critical infrastructure. The latest was on Christmas Day and resulted in damage to an undersea power transmission cable between Finland and Estonia and four undersea data cables.

First of all let me commend the swift action taken by Finland and Estonia, as well as their transparency in sharing information with the Commission and the Member States. We strongly condemn any deliberate destruction of Europe's critical infrastructure, including damage to energy infrastructure and undersea cables. These events demonstrate the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure which we rely on for carrying data, gas and electricity.

This must be seen against a backdrop of geopolitical tension and Russia's hybrid attacks against the EU. The damage of one single cable may not necessarily have a big impact on our telecommunications. However, systemic disruption may cause severe consequences for the affected regions and also the Union as a whole. Such damage could also entail significant risks for the environment and maritime safety in Europe.

We can best respond to these challenges if we act together, combining civil and military responses. The joint statement of the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit of 14听January shows the value of cooperation in tackling hybrid threats. Together we are stronger. Against this background, we must prepare for the worst鈥慶ase scenario and take a whole鈥憃f鈥慻overnment approach to deal with actors who are prepared to use an array of tools while trying to destabilise democratic societies.

Let me explain how the EU Commission is working on three fronts. We are improving coordination, we are enhancing governance and we are also increasing funding.

On coordination, the legal instruments we need when it comes to prevention and preparedness are already in place. The directive on the resilience of critical entities 鈥� the so-called CER Directive 鈥� and the directive on a high level of cybersecurity across the Union 鈥� the so-called NIS听2 Directive 鈥� entered into application in October 2024. These two sister directives are the basis for coordination and preparedness against threats and disruption. The CER Directive improves the physical security and resilience of critical entities. The NIS听2 Directive improves the overall cybersecurity and digital resilience of critical infrastructure from cyber-, physical and environmental threats. This means that the providers of digital and critical infrastructure must also ensure protection against unauthorised physical access, damage, sabotage and interference. The necessary rules are in place, but we need more efforts on transportation. We continue to support Member States and call on them to transpose both directives as soon as possible.

Last week we also published the Cyber Solidarity Act. It provides coordinated digital preparedness testing in highly critical sectors, including digital infrastructure and 鈥� also related 鈥� cables. The Act also creates the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, which can respond to significant or large鈥憇cale cybersecurity incidents.

Following the explosions along the Nord Stream听2 gas pipeline, the Council recommendation on critical infrastructure resilience addressed preparedness, response and international cooperation, with concrete measures. Member States have also conducted voluntary stress tests of critical infrastructure in the energy sector to identify vulnerabilities, and these pilot initiatives should be expanded to further sectors.

The Commission is also working with Member States and ENISA under the recommendation from February 2024 on secure and resilient submarine cable infrastructures to perform a mapping of cables and assess related risks, develop a cable鈥憇ecurity toolbox of mitigating measures, and also draw up a list of cable projects of European interest.

These measures all focus on prevention and preparedness, yet we also need to hold actors accountable for sabotage and other attacks. For this, our coordinated action using sanctions is worth mentioning. In December 2024, the Council adopted its 15th sanctions package against Russia, focusing, among other aspects, on the shadow fleet. As part of these sanctions, 52听additional vessels were added to the list of those banned from accessing ports and from receiving a wide range of maritime transport services.

Second, on governance, in the EU we are lacking a common governance of cable technologies and cable鈥憀aying services to ensure rapid and secure repair and maintenance of cables. We need to work in concert with NATO, which is a key actor when it comes to deterrence in the high seas. At the recent summit of Baltic Sea nations' governments, the Commission and NATO outlined concrete and very coordinated action to address the challenges in cable resilience, protection and repair. We welcome the actions launched by the NATO allies, such as new patrol and surveillance operations, to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The European Commission is ready to do more and better in our prevention, early detection, as well as response and recovery capabilities. We are currently working on identifying concrete actions and steps to be taken 鈥� and some more structurally 鈥� to improve the resilience and security of the undersea cables.

And third, on funding, this includes our already substantial investments in the security and resilience of submarine cables through the Connecting Europe Facility digital programme, including in the Baltic Sea, where we are currently financing eight projects. In addition, there is more than EUR听5 million earmarked for connectivity infrastructure in the CEF digital work programme in the coming years. The first call is ongoing. Furthermore, under the CEF, we are supporting the deployment of smart cable systems that can be used to monitor nearby activities and anticipate threats and vulnerabilities, acting as an early鈥憌arning system. We are also looking into how to further reinforce our ability to deploy and repair cables so that we are equipped with the necessary fleet able to rapidly intervene in all EU regions.

Keeping Europe safe is my priority, including safeguarding our critical infrastructure on sea, on land and in space. Now I'm looking forward to hearing your views, so thank you for your attention.

听听Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group. 鈥� Mr听President, colleagues, Council Presidency, Commissioner, among the multifold wake-up calls that we are getting to assess the Russian threat to our countries 鈥� the Presidency alluded to some others 鈥� the demolition of critical infrastructure such as sea cables is just one further example.

I think Putin would be disappointed if we discussed whether that was accidental or who was responsible. He wants us to know that he is able to exploit and test our vulnerabilities.

In these circumstances, it is good to see that we are increasingly prepared, and I am happy to learn that 52 additional vessels were added to a list of those who have no access to our ports, and I am grateful to the Commissioner that you listed all the measures that we are working on or already implementing in this regard.

I think that is yet another example where we see only together we are strong and only together can we represent and defend our interests.

听听Hel茅ne Fritzon, f枚r S&D gruppen. 鈥� Herr talman! Kommissionen och r氓det! Under de senaste m氓naderna har vi sett ett v盲xande hot och skador p氓 undervattenskablar i 脰stersj枚n.

Jag kommer fr氓n Sverige, och jag bor med min familj vid 脰stersj枚ns kust. Vi vet att vi 盲r s盲rskilt utsatta f枚r den ryska skuggflottan, f枚r ungef盲r h盲lften av all rysk oljeexport passerar genom v氓ra vatten. Det skapar stora milj枚risker och det hotar v氓r s盲kerhet och v氓r infrastruktur.

Det 盲r ocks氓 ett tydligt exempel p氓 hur Ryssland f枚rs枚ker kringg氓 de internationella sanktionerna. Vi m氓ste d盲rf枚r s盲tta stopp f枚r import av rysk olja och rysk gas som g氓r till v氓ra medlemsstater. Vi har ju fattat ett beslut h盲r, och det g盲ller att vi s盲tter stopp nu. Avslutningsvis v盲lkomnar jag ocks氓 氓tg盲rder f枚r 枚kat samarbete runt 脰stersj枚n. Det handlar om v氓r s盲kerhet och v氓r milj枚.

听听Anders Vistisen, for PfE-Gruppen. 鈥� Hr. formand! Situationen i 脴sters酶en er ganske alvorlig. Vi har set alt fra spr忙ngningen af Nord Stream 2-ledningen til de skader, der nu er sket p氓 kritisk infrastruktur og s酶kabler, at vi som europ忙iske NATO-allierede har v忙ret fuldst忙ndig ude af stand til at overv氓ge og forsvare vores interesser i netop 脴sters酶en. Det er desv忙rre en lang r忙kke katastrofale milit忙re beslutninger, der g酶r, at vi er s氓 hj忙lpel酶se i den situation, der i 酶jeblikket foreg氓r. S忙rligt kan vi fra dansk side pege p氓, at det var en monumental fejl at sk忙re ned b氓de p氓 patruljefart酶jer, men s忙rligt p氓 ub氓dsv氓bnet under den danske fl氓de. Det har gjort, at vi ikke har de 酶jne og de 酶rer, vi f酶r i tiden havde for at kontrollere, hvad fremmede magter gjorde i vores n忙romr氓de. Derfor kan vi kun h氓be p氓, at de NATO-allierede europ忙iske lande omkring 脴sters酶en, Sverige, Finland, Danmark, de baltiske lande, Polen og Tyskland finder sammen i et langt st忙rkere s酶forsvar. Men samtidig er der noget, der nager, og det er, at vi fra EU's side, fra dansk side ikke har v忙ret i stand til at indf酶re sanktioner mod den russiske skyggefl氓de. Det er kommet frem, at danske v忙rfter har en forpligtigelse til at reparere p氓 netop skibe fra den russiske skyggefl氓de, p氓 trods af at de b氓de er med til at facilitere Ruslands krigsindsats i Ukraine med deres eksport af russisk gas og olie og er mist忙nkt i dele af disse angreb. Lad os nu tage os sammen og f氓 indf酶rt de sanktioner, s氓 europ忙iske og danske rederier ikke er forpligtet til at underst酶tte denne aktivitet ved at reparere skibene.

听听Reinis Poz艈aks, ECR grupas v膩rd膩. 鈥� Labdien, priek拧s膿d膿t膩ja kungs! Labdien, komis膩res kundze! Labdien, cien墨jamie kol膿模i! Kop拧 iepriek拧膿j膩m debat膿m par 膿nu floti ir pag膩ju拧i divi p膩rrauti kabe募i Baltijas j奴r膩 un viena ekolo模isk膩s katastrofas ilustr膩cija Melnaj膩 j奴r膩.

Ir sankcion膿ti da啪i desmiti ku模u, bet vair膩ki simti joproj膩m melno darbu turpina. Bet ku模i jau ir tikai transports. B奴t墨b膩 runa ir par sankcion膿tu naftu 鈥� uz kurieni to ved un kas to p膿rk. Un 拧eit ir da啪as interesantas sakrit墨bas. Kop拧 ieviestas sankcijas pret Krievijas naftu, t膩s imports Eiropas Savien墨b膩, protams, ir dramatiski sarucis, ta膷u vajadz墨bas jau nav mazin膩ju拧膩s. Un t膩 nu ir sagad墨jies, ka 拧o kritumu m膿s da募膿ji kompens膿jam ar naftas produktiem no Indijas un 拧is apjoms ir pieaudzis vair膩kk膩rt墨gi. P膿c da啪膩diem datiem, aptuveni 60 % no 膿nu flotes non膩k tie拧i Indij膩. Dro拧i vien vai varb奴t, ka t膩 ir sakrit墨ba, lai gan man tam negribas tic膿t.

M膿s gribam, lai m奴su gr膩matu izdev膿ji sp膿j pier膩d墨t katra koka izcelsmi, no kura ir sara啪ots pap墨rs vi艈u gr膩mat膩m. Bet varb奴t l墨dz墨gi mums vajadz膿tu iztur膿ties ar墨 pret naftas produktu importu Eirop膩, jo cit膩di var izr膩d墨ties, ka m膿s pa拧i vismaz da募膿ji finans膿jam ne tikai Krievijas agresiju Ukrain膩, bet ar墨 ekolo模isko katastrofu izrais墨拧anu un m奴su pa拧u kritisk膩s infrastrukt奴ras boj膩拧anu. T膩 k膩 reiz膿m t膩s liel膩k膩s c墨艈as ir pie spogu募a.

听听Urmas Paet, fraktsiooni Renew nimel. 鈥� Head kolleegid! Veel p盲ev enne seda, kui 24. veebruaril 2022 alustas Venemaa Ukraina vastu uut r眉nnakulainet, 眉tlesid paljud t盲htsad anal眉眉tikud, et nende andmetel Venemaa Ukrainat ei r眉nda. Ometi r眉ndas. Ja need anal眉眉tikud eksisid r盲ngalt.

N眉眉dseks on mitmed laevad viimaste kuude jooksul korduvalt l玫hkunud L盲盲nemeres veealuseid elektri- ja side眉hendusi. Viimati j玫ulu玫htul, mille tulemusel maksavad Balti riikide inimesed elektri eest m盲rksa rohkem, kui nad seda toimiva 眉henduse puhul teeksid.

Ja ikka on neid, kes ei usu, et 眉henduste l玫hkumine on Venemaa L盲盲ne-vastase h眉briids玫ja osa. Ometi see seda on ja sellele tuleb koos ja 眉htselt vastu seista. Venemaa testib, kui kaugele tal lastakse minna ja potentsiaalsed r眉nnakuobjektid ei asu vaid L盲盲nemeres, vaid ka P玫hjameres, Atlandil, Vahemeres ja mujalgi.

Meie 眉hendusi tuleb kaitsta ja nende l玫hkujaid karistada t盲ie rangusega. Et Venemaal muutuks muuseas keerulisemaks ka leida neid laevu ja meeskondi, kes on valmis Venemaa eest kuritegusid sooritama. Euroopa riikide tegevus saab aga olla t玫hus ainult siis, kui meie ohuhinnang on adekvaatne ja Venemaa suhtes k玫igist illusioonidest loobutakse.

听听Ville Niinist枚, Verts/ALE-ryhm盲n puolesta. 鈥� Arvoisa puhemies, on t盲ysin naurettavaa v盲itt盲盲, ett盲 It盲meren kaapelirikot olisivat vahinkoja. Yht盲kki盲 useat tankkerit It盲merell盲 olisivatkin alkaneet raahata sattumalta ilman sabotaasitarkoitusta ankkureitaan kymmeni盲 kilometrej盲 merenpohjassa ja samalla py枚ri盲 tunnettujen kaapelireittien ymp盲rill盲 鈥� no ei varmasti.

Ven盲j盲n varjolaivasto on pys盲ytett盲v盲 niin huonokuntoisten alusten mittavien ymp盲rist枚riskien kuin turvallisuusriskien takia. EU:n komission ja j盲senvaltioiden on varmistettava, ett盲 kaikki varjolaivastoon kuuluvat alukset liitet盲盲n pakotteiden alle. T盲ll枚in samalla 鈥� kumppaniemme avulla 鈥撎齥un teemme vaikutuksesta globaalia, varjolaivaston pys盲ytt盲minen vie onnistuessaan Ven盲j盲lt盲 miljardien eurojen vientitulot ja tehostaa energiapakotteita ja Ven盲j盲n erist盲mist盲.

Lis盲ksi It盲merell盲 on varmistettava kaikkien ep盲ilytt盲vien alusten vakuutusten valvonta systemaattisesti joka j盲senvaltiossa. Samalla on varmistettava merioikeuden kaikki tavat puuttua kulkuun It盲merell盲 ilman asiallisia vakuutuspapereita tai jos alus on pakotteiden alla. Merioikeus n盲kemykseni mukaan sallii puuttumisen my枚s Tanskan salmissa, jos on syyt盲 ep盲ill盲 vakavaa ymp盲rist枚- ja turvallisuusriski盲, ja sellaisen riskin varjolaivasto todellakin aiheuttaa. Meid盲n on ryhdytt盲v盲 ottamaan aloite omiin k盲siimme eik盲 vain reagoitava Ven盲j盲n sabotaaseihin.

听听Jonas Sj枚stedt, f枚r The Left gruppen. 鈥� Herr talman! Kollegor!听Den ryska skuggflottan 盲r ett akut hot mot s盲kerhet och milj枚 i 脰stersj枚n.

H盲romveckan drev en enorm tanker lastad med 100 000 ton rysk olja med motorhaveri i stormen utanf枚r den tyska kusten.

I slutet av december bordade finska myndigheter tankern Eagle S som nu utreds f枚r att ha f枚rst枚rt viktiga kablar f枚r el枚verf枚ring och internet mellan Finland och Estland. Tankern som var lastad med rysk olja hade stora brister i sj枚s盲kerheten.

Bordningen av Eagle S visar att l盲nderna runt 脰stersj枚n kan ingripa mot dessa oljetransporter som hotar 脰stersj枚ns milj枚, bryter sanktionerna och finansierar Rysslands olagliga krig mot Ukraina.

Vi m氓ste agera nu, innan det sker en st枚rre olycka. Fler b氓tar m氓ste svartlistas. Fartyg som passerar nationella vatten m氓ste inspekteras s氓 att de 盲r s盲kra och f枚rs盲krade. Den ryska skuggflottan m氓ste stoppas f枚r milj枚ns skull och f枚r Ukrainas skull.

听听Siegbert Frank Droese, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. 鈥� Herr Pr盲sident, verehrte Kollegen! Die Texte der Kommission zur Schattenflotte haben immer nur einen Inhalt: Hinter jedem Zwischenfall in der Ostsee steckt der Russe. Letzten Montag hat der NATO-Generalsekret盲r Rutte in einer EP-Anh枚rung noch vom Problem Schattenflotte und von Angriffen auf unsere Infrastruktur in der Ostsee phantasiert. Die NATO-Amateure und Ostseeanrainer haben letzten Dienstag dazu extra einen Gipfel in Helsinki abgehalten. Und Sonntag berichtet die Washington Post unter Bezug auf eine Reihe von Geheimdienstinformanten, dass es sich bei der Besch盲digung von Unterseekabeln in der Ostsee nicht um russische Sabotage handelt. Also noch einmal f眉r Sie alle: Ostseekabel, Unterwasserkabel听鈥� keine russische Sabotage laut Geheimdiensten.听Man kann es daher Pr盲sident Trump voll nachsehen, wenn er in Zukunft mit den europ盲ischen NATO-Versagern nichts mehr zu tun haben will.

Auf der anderen Seite h盲tte ich mir als Vertreter deutscher Interessen bei der Aufkl盲rung der Nord-Stream-2-Sprengung so viel Einsatzwillen gew眉nscht. Nat眉rlich stellt die Schattenflotte ein 枚kologisches Risiko in der Ostsee dar. Das Problem Schattenflotte k枚nnte aber ganz einfach gel枚st werden: Lassen Sie uns die Russlandsanktionen aufheben, und wir werden erleben, wie die Schattenflotte in den Nebeln der Meere verschwindet.

听听Mika Aaltola (PPE). 鈥� Arvoisa puhemies, arvoisa komissaari Virkkunen, Ven盲j盲 k盲ytt盲盲 varjolaivastoa kiert盲盲kseen pakotteita ja vahingoittaakseen kriittist盲 infrastruktuuria. N盲ill盲 toimilla se tahallaan ja tuottamuksellisesti testaa l盲nnen reaktiota, ja meid盲n tulee ymm盲rt盲盲, ett盲 passiivisuus t盲m盲n haasteen edess盲 viestii heikkoutta. Ven盲j盲 ja Kiina k盲ytt盲v盲t It盲merta testialustanaan.

Liiallisen itsevarmuuden tasosta kielii sekin, ett盲 Ven盲j盲 kokee voivansa painostaa Eurooppaa siell盲, miss盲 sen itsens盲 kaikkein kriittisimm盲t energiakuljetukset seilaavat. Keskeisin vastatoimi on lis盲t盲 valvontaa sek盲 kirist盲盲 vakuutuksien ja alusten kunnon tarkastuksia Suomenlahdelta Tanskan salmiin.

Ven盲j盲lle on l盲hetett盲v盲 selke盲 viesti: jokainen sabotaasitoimi tekee sen merenkulusta It盲merell盲 entist盲 rajoitetumpaa ja vaikeampaa, sill盲 selke盲sti kyseess盲 ei ole viaton kauttakulku. Varjolaivaston alukset on tunnistettava ja asetettava t盲ysim盲盲r盲isesti pakotteiden alaiseksi viipym盲tt盲.

听听Eero Hein盲luoma (S&D). 鈥� Arvoisa puhemies, It盲merell盲 on nyt todellakin aivan liikaa elint盲rkeiden kaapelien rikkoontumisia, ett盲 t盲t盲 kaikkea voisi pit盲盲 sattumana.

EU voi menesty盲 vain, jos se osaltaan pit盲盲 huolta h盲iri枚tt枚mist盲 kansalliset rajat ylitt盲vist盲 tietoliikenne- ja s盲hk枚nsiirtoyhteyksist盲. Siksi It盲meren kaapelien toistuvat rikkomiset ovat koko unionin asia.

It盲meren maat ovat jo ryhtyneet toimiin valvonnan parantamiseksi. Eurooppalaisten Nato-liittolaisten tiiviimpi l盲sn盲olo It盲merell盲 on ilahduttava asia.

Ven盲j盲n varjolaivaston ymp盲rist枚riskeist盲 piittaamattomaan toimintaan on puututtava. EU:n on l盲hestytt盲v盲 laivojen lippuvaltioita ja edellytett盲v盲 turvallisuuss盲盲nt枚jen ja normaalien merenkulun k盲yt盲nt枚jen noudattamista. Sanktioituja aluksia on nyt lis盲tt盲v盲. 脰ljyn hintakattoa on alennettava. On edistett盲v盲 vakuustarkistusten toteuttamista k盲yt盲nn枚ss盲. Komissiolta odotetaan vahvoja toimia.

听听Micha艂 Dworczyk (ECR). 鈥� Panie Przewodnicz膮cy, Kole偶anki i Koledzy! Po raz kolejny na agend臋 Parlamentu wraca temat przest臋pczej dzia艂alno艣ci Rosji realizowanej przy pomocy stworzonej przez ni膮 tzw. floty cieni. Niestety, dotychczasowy brak adekwatnych i skutecznych dzia艂a艅 ze strony Unii Europejskiej spowodowa艂, i偶 nie tylko nie ograniczy艂a ona swojej dzia艂alno艣ci, ale wr臋cz przeciwnie rozszerzy艂a j膮, przechodz膮c tym razem do dzia艂a艅 terrorystycznych, doprowadzaj膮c do zerwania kabli morskich na dnie Ba艂tyku. By艂y to niew膮tpliwie akty mi臋dzynarodowego terroryzmu i jako takie wymagaj膮 zdecydowanej odpowiedzi. Czas najwy偶szy podj膮膰 realne dzia艂ania. Przede wszystkim konieczna jest 艣cis艂a wsp贸艂praca z NATO na rzecz przywr贸cenia bezpiecze艅stwa Ba艂tyku oraz zdecydowane dzia艂ania wobec podmiot贸w zaanga偶owanych w akty terroru. Sankcje na艂o偶one na flot臋 cieni musz膮 by膰 bezwzgl臋dnie przestrzegane, a lista statk贸w skutecznie uzupe艂niana. Bowiem obecnie liczy ona 79 jednostek, a przecie偶 aktywna flota cieni liczy ponad 600 statk贸w. Wreszcie konieczne s膮 kolejne sankcje wobec Rosji, w tym takie, kt贸re uderz膮 w rosyjski sektor gazowy i chemiczny.

听听Petras Au拧trevi膷ius (Renew). 鈥� Gerbiamas pirmininke, gerbiama Komisijos nare, gerbiamas ministre, gerbiami kolegos, oficialiai neskelbtas, bet jau ne vienus metus besit臋siantis intensyv臈jantis Rusijos karas prie拧 Vakarus, m奴s懦 kritin臋 infrastrukt奴r膮, demokratin臋 sistem膮 ir ekonomik膮 yra 拧i懦 dien懦 tikrov臈. Pa啪eisti telekomunikacij懦 ir elektros tiekimo kabeliai Baltijos j奴roje n臈ra atsitiktiniai. Tai 鈥� hibridinis karas. Bendras Europos S膮jungos ir NATO tvirtas atsakas yra b奴tinas. Turime didinti regionin寞 bendradarbiavim膮 ir imtis konkre膷i懦 veiksm懦. Baltijos j奴ros policijos misija yra b奴tina siekiant u啪tikrinti m奴s懦 visuomenin寞 ir ekonomin寞 saugum膮. Be to, privalome i拧 anksto numatyti j奴ra einan膷i懦 kabeli懦 pl臈tros program膮. Vakar懦 kompanij懦 dalyvavimas investicijose, ma啪inant Kinijos investicijas ir 寞tak膮, Baltijos j奴ros regione sukaupta telekomunikacij懦 ir kabeli懦 apsaugos patirtis pravers kitose Europos S膮jung膮 supan膷iose j奴rose.

听听Hannah Neumann (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Mr听President, dear colleagues, for too long have we treated the Baltic Sea as a tourist destination, a quiet periphery of Europe. Well, it turns out it's not. Hundreds of vessels of Russia's shadow fleet pass through the Baltic, lacking proper insurance and sailing under ever鈥慶hanging flags. These worn鈥慸own, uninsured tankers are creating the conditions for an environmental disaster of unimaginable scale. The recent breakdown of two such ships just in front of the island of Ruegen offered us a glimpse of the potential magnitude. These ships are severing energy and communication lines, deliberately attacking the very arteries that connect the European Union.

Last week, Europe stepped up. NATO's Baltic Sentry initiative uses advanced drone fleets to patrol and protect critical undersea infrastructure. It is the first NATO mission led solely by European troops and capabilities and it proves that Europe can lead in securing its regions.

But we must go further than monitoring: sanction shadow fleet vessels and their owners; ban tanker sales to states undermining the oil price cap; and automatically stop sanctions and uninsured ships entering EU waters. We shouldn't wait for a blackout or an oil spill before we act decisively to protect our waters and our citizens.

听听Li Andersson (The Left). 鈥� Arvoisa puhemies, viimeksi lokakuussa per盲盲nkuulutin t盲ss盲 salissa vahvempia toimia Ven盲j盲n varjolaivastoon puuttumiseksi.听Sen j盲lkeen olemme todellakin n盲hneet varjolaivastoon liittyv盲t riskit: se mahdollistaa Ven盲j盲lle laittoman sodan rahoittamisen ja jatkamisen Ukrainassa, sill盲 voidaan sabotoida kriittist盲 infrastruktuuria ja se muodostaa jatkuvan vakavan ymp盲rist枚riskin It盲merelle. Siit盲 olemme jo saaneet muun muassa Mustallamerell盲 varoittavan esimerkin.

Suomen viranomaisia on oikeutetusti kiitelty ripe盲st盲 toiminnasta Eagle S -laivan osalta, mutta me tarvitsemme enemm盲n keinoja. EU:n on tuettava It盲meren alueen j盲senmaita l枚yt盲m盲盲n kansainv盲lisen merioikeuden puitteissa keinot laivojen pys盲ytyksiin ja tarkastuksiin. EU:n on lis盲tt盲v盲 laivoja pakotteiden piiriin. Toisin kuin mit盲 v盲lill盲 kuulee v盲itett盲v盲n, pakotepolitiikka vaikuttaa ja on vaikuttanut merkitt盲v盲ll盲 tavalla Ven盲j盲n talouteen, ja siksi ty枚t盲 varjolaivaston pys盲ytt盲miseksi on jatkettava 鈥� niin Ukrainan kuin ymp盲rist枚n puolesta.

听听慕ubo拧 Blaha (NI). 鈥� V谩啪en媒 p谩n predsedaj煤ci, v谩啪en铆, pros铆m, presta艌te tu 拧铆ri钮 kon拧pira膷n茅 te贸rie o nejak媒ch tie艌ov媒ch rusk媒ch flotil谩ch, ktor茅 strihaj煤 k谩ble v Baltskom mori. Ve膹 to s煤 煤pln茅 hl煤posti. Nem谩te d么kazy, nem谩te ni膷, len smie拧nu protirusk煤 propagandu. Potvrdzuj煤 to u啪 aj americk茅 m茅di谩. 膶o tak sa rad拧ej p媒ta钮, kto zni膷il Nord Stream? Samotn铆 Ameri膷ania vr谩tane Jeffreyho Sachsa 膷i Seymoura Hersha dokazuj煤, 啪e to boli americk茅 tajn茅 slu啪by, ktor茅 sp谩chali tento teroristick媒 akt. A 膷o tak sa p媒ta钮, kto za煤to膷il na Turkish Stream a kto zastavil plyn z v媒chodu do Eur贸py? Odpove膹 je: Zelensk媒, dikt谩tor Zelensk媒. Tento 拧ialenec vyhl谩sil energetick煤 vojnu Eur贸pe a my na Slovensku sa budeme br谩ni钮. V hre s煤 desiatky mili谩rd eur. Toto je v谩m jedno? P媒tam sa, v koho z谩ujme je, 啪e sa Eur贸pa tot谩lne odrezala od lacn茅ho rusk茅ho plynu? Je to v z谩ujme Ameriky, od ktorej si teraz budeme musie钮 kupova钮 拧tvorn谩sobne drah拧铆 plyn, 膷o Eur贸pu zruinuje. Namiesto toho, aby sme sa vr谩tili k lacn媒m rusk媒m energi谩m, vy si tu vym媒拧木ate hoaxy o rusk媒ch tie艌ov媒ch flotil谩ch a glorifikujete arogantn茅ho Zelensk茅ho, ktor媒 zradil Eur贸pu a sl煤啪i americk媒m firm谩m. Zobu膹te sa, preboha!

听听David McAllister (PPE). 鈥� Herr Pr盲sident, sehr verehrte Frau Vizepr盲sidentin, meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren! Mit dem Ostseegipfel der NATO Anfang letzter Woche in Helsinki ist das Thema der russischen Schattenflotte auf h枚chster politischer Ebene angekommen, und das war auch 眉berf盲llig. Denn mit einer wirklich schrecklichen Schwemme maroder 脰ltanker, deren Eigentumsverh盲ltnisse unklar und deren Risiken im 脺brigen auch unterversichert sind, umgeht Russland gezielt internationale Sanktionen. Jeden Monat werden damit laut einer aktuellen Mitteilung der Deutschen Presseagentur 12听Milliarden Euro in die russische Kriegskasse hineingepumpt. Die Schattenflotte ist zu einer der wichtigsten finanziellen Lebensadern f眉r Russland in seinem v枚lkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine geworden. Deshalb sollten die EU鈥慚inister schnell pr眉fen, welche Ma脽nahmen das internationale Seerecht erlaubt, um gegen die Schattenflotte vorzugehen und Russland f眉r seine Aggressionen in der Ukraine verantwortlich zu machen.

听听Tobias Cremer (S&D). 鈥� Mr President, dear colleagues, I wouldn't usually recommend watching Russian television, but in the last couple of days it has offered some revealing insights into Russia's view on the Baltic Sea. Because in talk show after talk show, we can watch Russian commentators discussing which undersea cables and pipelines connect European countries in the Baltic Sea, and also which would cause the greatest harm if destroyed.

Sadly, this isn't just television drama, but it's a grim reality. In recent months, we've seen the destruction of critical energy and data infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. One incident involved a Chinese vessel. Another one, a ship from Putin's so-called shadow fleet. So let's call this what it is: sabotage. Putin is testing us. Putin is testing our resolve.

So let's show him our resolve through decisive measures to strengthen our resilience, through greater naval presence in the region and through, finally, tougher sanctions on the owners of Putin's shadow fleet. Colleagues, it's time to push Putin's hybrid warfare back to where it belongs: into Russian TV fiction.

听听Roberts Z墨le (ECR). 鈥� Priek拧s膿d膿t膩ja kungs! Ministra kungs! Izpildvietnieces kundze! S膩k拧u ar labo 鈥� ar Helsinku valstu vad墨t膩ju san膩ksmi NATO ietvaros. Kop膿j膩 situ膩cija uzlaboj膩s p膿c 拧墨s san膩ksmes, vismaz taj膩, ka tiek kontrol膿ta 拧墨 Baltijas j奴ras teritorija, kas ir apdraud膿ta.

Bet pa拧reiz膿j膩 situ膩cij膩 Eiropas rok膩s nav svar墨g膩ka un stipr膩ka instrumenta, k膩 sankcion膿t 拧o 膿nu flotes darb墨bu, l墨dz墨gi, k膩 to veica ASV pavisam nesen. Krievija g奴st vair膩kus ieguvumus no 拧墨s 膿nu flotes: 募auj g奴t ien膩kumus, apejot eso拧膩s cenu sankcijas naftai, ir r墨ks infrastrukt奴ras boj膩拧anai, k膩 m膿s 拧odien 拧eit run膩jam, spiegot pret mums un rada vides apdraud膿jumus, ko rada vecie naftas ku模i, parasti vienkorpusa ku模u lieto拧ana, un tas 拧姆e募 Eiropas Savien墨bas 模eogr膩fisk膩s intereses. M膿s redzam ar墨 拧odien 拧eit dal墨bnieku sast膩vs ir izteikti 模eogr膩fisks, t膩p膿c 拧墨m stingraj膩m sankcij膩m ir j膩b奴t vakar, jo visi 拧ie hibr墨delementi ir v膿rsti, pirmk膩rt un galvenok膩rt, pret Eiropas valstu interes膿m.

Un, ja ES (Eiropas Savien墨ba) to nedar墨s, jaunajai ASV administr膩cijai var膿tu rasties jaut膩jums: k膩p膿c mums, ASV, aizsarg膩t Eiropu, ja Eiropa pati sevi neaizsarg膩?

听听Anna-Maja Henriksson (Renew). 鈥� Herr talman! Kommission盲r Virkkunen! S盲kerhetsl盲get p氓 脰stersj枚n har f枚rs盲mrats. Dagligen trafikerar underm氓liga lastfartyg tillh枚rande den ryska skuggflottan, med tiotals ton olja, p氓 detta viktiga innanhav. De h盲r utg枚r en s盲kerhetsrisk f枚r s氓v盲l den marina milj枚n som f枚r l盲nderna runt 脰stersj枚n och hela EU.

Lastfartyget Eagle S togs under julen p氓 bar g盲rning av finl盲ndska myndigheter i ett mycket lyckat tillslag. Fartygets ankare hade f枚re tillslaget sl盲pat l盲ngs havsbotten, och viktig undervattensinfrastruktur hade skadats. En tillf盲llighet? Knappast.

S氓v盲l Nato som medlemsl盲nderna har intensifierat sin bevakning p氓 脰stersj枚n. Det 盲r v盲lkommet och det 盲r n枚dv盲ndigt. Med m氓lmedvetet agerande och samarbete mellan EU, Nato och medlemsl盲nderna 盲r vi starka.

Vi beh枚ver 枚ka anslagen f枚r s盲kerhet, f枚rsvar och beredskap. 脰stersj枚n ska inte vara en tummelplats f枚r hybridoperationer och sabotage.

听听Virginijus Sinkevi膷ius (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Mr President, dear colleagues, today we confront a critical issue at the core of the EU's commitment to Ukraine, global security and economic stability. The shadow fleet is fuelling Russia's oil trade and, of course, the Russian oil chest.

While the recent oversight and monitoring efforts are commendable, they are sort of like painting over rust 鈥� a temporary fix that, at the end of the day, fails to address the root cause. The reality is clear: Russian oil finds its buyers, including here in Europe. This revenue funds the war in Ukraine and funds destabilisation in Europe too.

So to address this, I propose a five-step action plan. First of all, the G7 oil price cap needs to go down even further to USD听30 per barrel. Secondly, expanding sanctions to target shadow fleet vessels and their enablers. Thirdly, enhancing EU maritime surveillance. We need to close loopholes allowing Russian oil imports, such as in Bulgaria. And finally, establishing an EU task force to improve intelligence sharing and the enforcement of sanctions.

So I call for action now, not to wait for further sabotage in the Baltic Sea. We have a unique moment with the Polish Presidency of the EU, but also with the Commission, and I call to ensure unity in this matter and to take measures as soon as possible.

听听Per Clausen (The Left). 鈥� Hr. formand! I 脴sters酶en oplever vi nu et stigende antal slet skjulte sabotagehandlinger mod vores unders酶iske infrastruktur. Sabotagehandlinger, som alt tyder p氓 udf酶res af Ruslands skyggefl氓de. Det m氓 vi reagere p氓, og jeg kan ikke lade v忙re med at sp酶rge: Hvorn氓r begynder vi at tage det her alvorligt og smider fl酶jlshandskerne? Hvorn氓r g酶r vi det, som vi gentagne gange har opfordret til: L忙gger et grundigt pres p氓 de flagstater, Rusland benytter sig af, og bruger alle de muligheder, vi rent faktisk har for at begr忙nse skyggefl氓den. For for hver dag skyggefl氓den sejler, tilf酶rer den store summer penge til Putins krigsmaskine. Penge, der g氓r til d酶d, 酶del忙ggelse og undertrykkelse. Og hver dag uds忙tter den b氓de milj酶 og infrastruktur for fare. Hvorn氓r er det nok? Vi skal hverken b酶je nakken for Trump eller Putin. Lad os nu sige stop og lad os g酶re det effektivt.

听听Jan-Peter Warnke (NI). 鈥� Herr Pr盲sident, Frau Kommissarin, meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren! Die gezielte Zerst枚rung von Unterwasserinfrastruktur ist ein Verbrechen und muss aufs Sch盲rfste verurteilt werden. Wir unterst眉tzen听鈥� wie alle in diesem Haus听鈥撎齤ede Ma脽nahme, dies zu verhindern, und wenn geschehen, zu ahnden. Am 26.听September 2022 wurden drei von vier R枚hren der Nord-Stream-Pipeline in einem kriminellen Akt zerst枚rt. Dabei wurden 25听Prozent der j盲hrlichen Methanemissionen Deutschlands freigesetzt听鈥� eine riesige Umweltkatastrophe dazu.

Wo blieb die Verurteilung durch dieses Parlament? Gibt es denn gute und schlechte Infrastruktur unterm Meeresspiegel? Und wenn ja, wo ist der Unterschied? Die damals sofort ausgemachten T盲ter听鈥� die Russische F枚deration听鈥� waren aber, wie wir wissen, daf眉r gar nicht verantwortlich. Es waren mit gro脽er Wahrscheinlichkeit ukrainische Kr盲fte mit Billigung unseres NATO-Partners USA.

Ich w眉nschte mir weniger Scheinheiligkeit, weniger Doppelmoral und mehr ideologiefreie Bewertung von zeitgeschichtlichen Vorkommnissen durch dieses Parlament.

听听Sandra Kalniete (PPE). 鈥� God膩tie kol膿模i! P膿d膿j膩 gad膩 m膿s esam piedz墨voju拧i m膿r姆tiec墨gus uzbrukumus kritiskajai infrastrukt奴rai Baltijas j奴r膩. Tie grauj m奴su komunik膩cijas un energosist膿mu, k膩 ar墨 katru dienu apdraud 10听triljonu dol膩ru v膿rtus finan拧u dar墨jumus. Izmekl膿拧anas proces膩 iez墨m膿jas Krievijas un 亩墨nas ku模u iesaiste.

M奴su infrastrukt奴ras aizsardz墨ba ir b奴tiska, t膩p膿c NATO ir uzs膩kusi pastiprin膩tas uzraudz墨bas misiju 鈥淏altic Sentry鈥�. Ta膷u ar to nepietiek. Lielbrit膩nija ir sankcion膿jusi - 110,听ASV -听vair膩k nek膩 200 膿nu flotes ku模u. M膿s ar 79 ku模iem atpaliekam. Kol膿模i, 拧ie ku模i ne tikai ar naid墨g膩m darb墨b膩m apdraud m奴su zem奴dens infrastrukt奴ras un j奴ras vides dro拧墨bu, bet ar墨 pelna miljardus Krievijai un paildzina karu Ukrain膩. Eiropas Savien墨bai ir akt墨v膩k j膩v膿r拧as pret 膿nu floti. Mums ir j膩r墨kojas 膩tri un izl膿m墨gi.

听听Marina Kaljurand (S&D). 鈥� Lugupeetud president, volinik, eesistuja! Venemaa h眉briidr眉nnakud Euroopa Liidule on viimastel aastatel j盲rjepidevalt suurenenud. Me teame seda, me kordame seda. Ja ometigi ei suuda me r眉nnakuid ennetada, peatada ega karistada.

Euroopa Liit, maailma suurimaid majanduspiirkondi, ei suuda suruda p玫lvili mitmeid kordi v盲iksemat Venemaa s玫jamajandust. Piinlik. T盲na patrullivad L盲盲nemerel kaldariigid ja NATO liitlased. Samal ajal v玫tab Euroopa Liit vastu j盲rjest uusi sanktsioonidepakette, mis kubisevad eranditest, mida ei t盲ideta ja mille 眉le Venemaa lihtsalt irvitab.

Ka t盲na r盲盲kisid volinik ja eesistuja 玫iget juttu. Koordinatsioon, infovahetus, k眉bersolidaarsus, partnerlus, aga s玫nadest on v盲he. Aeg on hakata tegutsema, otsustavalt ja efektiivselt. Ainult nii saab peatada Venemaa s玫jamasina Ukrainas ja h眉briidr眉nnakud Euroopa Liidus.

听听Adam Bielan (ECR). 鈥� Mr President, Russia's war of aggression is creeping its way to our Union and neighbours, highlighting both the commendable work of national security forces, but also our collective shortcomings in our defences against hybrid threats. It is imperative that we bolster our resilience against these provocations, which are endangering our populations, our infrastructures and our ways of life.

We know that the information鈥憇haring and resources dedicated in national programmes to the detection and countering undersea infrastructures are not sufficient. However, solutions exist: better EU鈥慛ATO cooperation, investments in backup systems, enhanced collective security in the region, but also a stricter enforcement of the UNCLOS.

To conclude, let me underline that undersea infrastructures are the tip of the iceberg: exploding packages, arson attacks, death threats and election interference are happening, and it is our duty to provide our collective answers.

听听Elsi Katainen (Renew). 鈥� Arvoisa puhemies, hyv盲 komissaari, Ven盲j盲n varjolaivaston toiminta It盲merell盲 on oikea paraatiesimerkki hybridivaikuttamisesta. Merenalainen infrastruktuurimme on ollut helppo kohde sabotaasille my枚s Suomen n盲k枚kulmasta. Laajoja merialueita on hankala vartioida, ja syyllisi盲 on vaikea saada kiinni itse teossa.

Naton vahvistuva l盲sn盲olo ja valvonnan lis盲盲minen It盲merell盲 on hyv盲 askel hybridivaikuttamisen ennaltaehk盲isyyn. It盲meren vartija -operaatiolla aluetta valvotaan sek盲 laivoin ett盲 erilaisin teknologisin ratkaisuin. Toimista huolimatta emme pysty t盲ysin turvaamaan merenalaista infrastruktuuriamme. Nopea reagointi ja viranomaisyhteisty枚 on siksi v盲ltt盲m盲t枚nt盲.

Meid盲n pit盲盲 my枚s varautua ymp盲rist枚uhkiin, joita talvimerenkulkuun soveltumattomat varjolaivat aiheuttavat. On oltava valmiina torjumaan esimerkiksi 枚ljyonnettomuuksia, jotka on saatettu aiheuttaa ihan tahallaankin. On todella t盲rke盲盲, ett盲 komissio tukee kansallisia viranomaisia ty枚ss盲盲n ja ett盲 infrastruktuurin toimivuus my枚s varmistetaan.

听听Isabella L枚vin (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Herr talman! Fru kommission盲r! I mitten av december br枚ts ett fartyg tillh枚rande den ryska skuggflottan av p氓 mitten, och ett annat gick p氓 grund i Svarta havet. 3 000 ton olja l盲ckte ut i havet. Vi vet nu att den ryska skuggflottan har f枚rst枚rt undervattensinfrastruktur i 脰stersj枚n. Vi m氓ste ocks氓 vara medvetna om att n盲r som helst kan 盲ven en oljekatastrof liknande den i Svarta Havet h盲nda i 脰stersj枚n.

Situationen i v氓rt 盲lskade innanhav 盲r katastrofal redan som det 盲r nu. Vi har 枚verfiske, 枚verg枚dning, f枚rsurning, milj枚gifter, plastf枚roreningar. Det sista vi beh枚ver 盲r en oljekatastrof.

I detta nu trafikerar omkring 25 fartyg fr氓n den ryska skuggflottan 脰stersj枚n. Fartygen 盲r ofta gamla, skrotf盲rdiga, de saknar f枚rs盲kring. De 盲r med andra ord tickande milj枚bomber. Milj枚katastrofer kan n盲r som helst sl氓 till.

S盲tter vi stopp f枚r Putins fartyg p氓 脰stersj枚n stryper vi ocks氓 finansieringen av kriget i Ukraina. EU m氓ste s盲tta stopp f枚r skuggflottan omedelbart f枚r fredens skull, men ocks氓 f枚r v氓rt 盲lskade innanhavs skull.

听听Riho Terras (PPE). 鈥� Mr听President, Executive Vice鈥慞resident, dear colleagues, over the last year and a half there have been a number of incidents and underwater critical infrastructure was damaged by commercial vessels in the Baltic Sea. These are acts of covert war, dear colleagues, and not isolated mishaps, as some have recently speculated. Russia has identified our underwater critical infrastructure as one of the main weak points 鈥� our Achilles heel. Russian politicians have publicly bragged that this sea is the new face of a war, and we should live with it. We cannot accept this kind of behaviour.

In addition to NATO operations, the EU should step up as well. One of the possible protective measures could be voluntary acceptance of cameras on the captain's deck, for instance. We need to use technology and an out鈥憃f鈥憈he鈥慴ox approach to stand up against this nasty threat!

PREDSED脕: MARTIN HOJS脥K
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听听Johan Danielsson (S&D). 鈥� Herr talman! F枚r n氓gra m氓nader sedan diskuterade vi h盲r i Europaparlamentet hotet fr氓n den ryska skuggflottan. I dag st氓r vi h盲r igen och talar om skador p氓 viktig infrastruktur i 脰stersj枚n. Vi diskuterar skadade undervattenskablar, men det h盲r 盲r inte de enda attacker vi ser. Vi ser att GPS-st枚rningar ocks氓 har blivit allt vanligare. De str盲cker sig i dag 枚ver Gotland, Finland och Baltikum och p氓verkar flygtrafiken i hela regionen.

Det h盲r 盲r ingen slump. Det 盲r s氓 h盲r hybridkrigf枚ring ser ut i praktiken, och det 盲r tydligt att v氓ra sanktioner inte r盲cker. Det kommer att kr盲vas h氓rdare tag mot Putins skuggflotta. S盲kerheten m氓ste 枚verhuvudtaget prioriteras h枚gre inom transportpolitiken, inte bara kopplat till sanktioner. Om det g盲ller EU:s hamnstrategi, utbyggnaden av TEN-E- och TEN-T-projekten s氓 m氓ste s盲kerhetsaspekten v盲ga tyngre i utformningen av infrastrukturen.

Men till att b枚rja med: L氓t oss s盲tta stopp f枚r Putins skuggflotta.

听听Ruggero Razza (ECR). 鈥� Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, da quando si sono verificate delle ipotesi di danneggiamento nelle aree del Baltico e del Mediterraneo, la sensazione che 猫 emersa a pi霉 osservatori 猫 quella di una carenza di attenzione da parte dell'Unione europea nella tutela dei propri asset strategici.

Uno di questi 鈥� forse il pi霉 importante e il meno osservato 鈥� 猫 proprio il versante sottomarino. Alcuni Stati dell'Unione, come l'Italia, per iniziativa del governo del presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni, hanno dedicato alla dimensione del sottomarino e听alla dimensione della tutela della connessione digitale e dell'approvvigionamento energetico appositi provvedimenti amministrativi e normativi.

La sensazione che emerge dal Baltico al Mediterraneo 猫 che da parte dell'Unione non vi sia stata questa attenzione, che oggi diventa ancora pi霉 determinante, perch茅 siamo, in alcuni casi, di fronte a vere e proprie azioni di guerra.

听听Ivars Ijabs (Renew). 鈥� God膩tais prezidenta kungs! God膩t膩 Virkunenas kundze! Man liekas, ka daudziem kol膿模iem 拧aj膩 m膩j膩 Krievijas hibr墨duzbrukumi ir kaut kas jauns un neierasts. Pie mums Baltijas valst墨s tas t膩 glu啪i nav. M膿s esam jau 拧o to piedz墨voju拧i no 拧it膩 Putina repertu膩ra, proti, k膩 migrantu instrumentaliz膩cija, glob膩l膩s navig膩cijas sist膿mu krop募o拧ana, par ko jau Padomes p膩rst膩vis run膩ja, gan ar墨 strat膿模isk膩 infrastrukt奴ra, kabe募i, kuru post墨拧anu veic 拧ie 膿nu flotes ku模i.

Es dom膩ju, ka 拧obr墨d m奴su r墨c墨b膩 eso拧ie instrumenti ir j膩izmanto piln膩 spar膩. Pirmk膩rt, visi 膿nu flotes ku模i 鈥� to 墨pa拧nieki j膩iek募auj sankcij膩m, un ne tikai tie 70. Es dom膩ju, ka ar墨 par apdro拧in膩拧anu j奴ras ties墨b膩s ir instrumenti, lai aptur膿tu 拧膩du kust墨bu. Un, visbeidzot, Eiropas Savien墨bai un Komisijai ir j膩st膩v stingri ar墨 par iesp膿ju sl膿gt D膩nijas 拧aurumu, ja 拧ie ku模i apdraud ne tikai Baltijas j奴ras ekolo模iju, bet ar墨 visu m奴su vit膩l膩s dro拧墨bas intereses un kritisko infrastrukt奴ru. Citiem v膩rdiem sakot, solid膩ra un nopietna reakcija 拧obr墨d no Eiropas Savien墨bas kop膩 ar NATO ir vien墨gais, kas sp膿j aptur膿t agresoru.

听听M膩rti艈拧 Sta姆is (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Prezidenta kungs! God膩t膩 komis膩res kundze! Baltijas j奴ru apdraud Krievija, konkr膿ti, Krievijas 膿nu flote. M膿s varam tikai iedom膩ties, kas notiktu, ja Baltijas j奴r膩 t膩pat k膩 pavisam nesen Melnaj膩 j奴r膩 avar膿tu krievu tankku模is un pla拧a naftas nopl奴de notiktu ar墨 Baltijas j奴r膩.

艩膩da katastrofa manam re模ionam b奴tu neatgriezeniska. J奴ras ekosist膿ma b奴tu izn墨cin膩ta, un vair膩k膩m paaudz膿m m奴su skaist膩s pludmales princip膩 b奴tu sabeigtas uz gadu desmitiem. NATO jau ir rea模膿jusi, nos奴tot patru募ku模us. Eiropas Savien墨bai tagad ir j膩izdara savs m膩jasdarbs, un Baltijas j奴rai ir j膩b奴t aizsarg膩tai.

Un ko tas noz墨m膿? Apm膩c墨tu, apr墨kotu rea模膿拧anas vien墨bu izveide, kuras var nekav膿joties r墨koties naftas nopl奴des gad墨jumos; Baltijas j奴ras valstu sadarb墨bas sh膿ma koordin膿tai r墨c墨bai un naftas nopl奴des nov膿r拧anas apr墨kojuma uzglab膩拧ana strat膿模iski viet膩s tuvu augsta riska zon膩m. Kam膿r Krievija nav sakauta, bet ku模o Baltijas j奴r膩, mums ir j膩b奴t gataviem visslikt膩kajam scen膩rijam.

听听Rasa Juknevi膷ien臈 (PPE). 鈥� Gerbiamas Pirmininke, gerbiami kolegos, 拧e拧臈linis Rusijos laivynas, kuris padeda Kremliui u啪dirbti pinig懦 tam, kad toliau 啪udyt懦 ukrainie膷ius, yra didelio Rusijos ir jos pagalbinink懦 karo prie拧 demokratijas dalis. Koki懦 veiksm懦 turi imtis Europos S膮junga, kovodama su Rusijos 拧e拧臈liniu laivynu, Parlamentas pasak臈 i拧samioje rezoliucijoje pra臈jusi懦 met懦 lapkrit寞. Dabar matome, kad tie laivai naudojami ir kaip sabota啪o 寞rankis. Noriu pasveikinti Suomij膮, parod啪iusi膮 pavyzd寞, kaip galima veikti. Gerai, kad sureagavo ir NATO, nes taip, tai yra gr臈sm臈 m奴s懦 saugumui. Rusijos karas prie拧 Europos S膮jungos valstybes kol kas yra toks, kad neb奴t懦 per啪engtas NATO penktasis straipsnis. Tikslas 鈥� daryti 啪al膮, kelti chaos膮 ir nerim膮 visuomen臈se, pajungti jas Kremliaus valiai per rinkimus ir pana拧iai. Tod臈l turime imtis veiksm懦 dabar, 拧iandien. 漠ranki懦 tam privalome rasti. Tuo labiau, kad j懦 tikrai turime.

听听Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). 鈥� Gerbiamas pos臈d啪io pirmininke, gerbiama komisare, tikrai nemanau, kad 2024 met懦 pabaigoje 寞vyk臋s incidentas, kada buvo pa啪eista Baltijos j奴roje esanti povandenin臈 infrastrukt奴ra, yra atsitiktinumas. Juo labiau, kad Baltijos 拧alys kaip tik dabar testuoja galimyb臋 atsijungti nuo sovietin臈s elektros BRELL sistemos 啪iedo, kuris 拧iuo metu yra Rusijoje. Taip pa啪eidus 拧it膮 infrastrukt奴r膮 smarkiai sutrikdomas Baltijos 拧ali懦 noras atsijungti nuo sovietin臈s sistemos. Putinas bando provokuoti ir 啪i奴r臈ti, kiek rimtai Europos S膮junga ir NATO 寞 tai sureaguos. Tod臈l sausio 10 d. NATO padidintas patruliavimas yra laiku ir sveikintinas, bet sankcij懦 skai膷iai Europos S膮jungoje ai拧kiai per ma啪i. 79 Rusijos 拧e拧臈linio laivyno laivai sankcionuoti, taip pat menkai i拧naudojama Tarptautin臈 j奴ros organizacija d臈l to, kad ne寞plaukt懦 寞 Europos S膮jungos vandenis laivai be draudimo, be saugos ir be kit懦 reikalavim懦.

听听Maciej W膮sik (ECR). 鈥� Panie Przewodnicz膮cy! Szanowni Pa艅stwo, byli艣cie przez wiele lat 艣lepi na to, co robi艂a Rosja. Ma艂o tego, najwi臋ksze pa艅stwo Unii Europejskiej, Niemcy, budowa艂o infrastruktur臋, kt贸ra da艂a Putinowi mo偶liwo艣膰 zgromadzenia ogromnych 艣rodk贸w finansowych, pozwalaj膮cych mu dzisiaj prowadzi膰 agresywn膮 wojn臋 wobec Ukrainy i u偶ywa膰 szanta偶u paliwowego wobec pa艅stw Europy Wschodniej. Mowa tu oczywi艣cie o budowie na Ba艂tyku gazoci膮gu Nord Stream. Dzi艣 zamiast g艂osu w Niemczech o budowie Nord Stream chcia艂bym s艂ysze膰 g艂os o nowych sankcjach na Rosj臋 i tych, kt贸rzy Rosj臋 wspieraj膮.

Amerykanie wprowadzili kilka dni temu nowe sankcje na rosyjskie firmy wydobywcze, a tak偶e na ponad 100 tankowc贸w. Koszt transportu rosyjskiej ropy przez flot臋 cieni wzr贸s艂 natychmiast 3 krotnie. Tylko t膮 drog膮 nowych, twardych sankcji jeste艣my w stanie przeciwdzia艂a膰 agresji Rosji.

Namawiam wszystkich do opowiedzenia si臋 za nowymi, daleko id膮cymi sankcjami na imperium, kt贸re zagra偶a dzi艣 nie tylko Ukrainie, ale ca艂ej Europie i 艣wiatu. Mamy ponownie do czynienia z imperium z艂a. Rosja Putina musi zbankrutowa膰 i zadaniem ca艂ego cywilizowanego 艣wiata jest doprowadzenie do tego. Inaczej b臋dziemy za kilka lat zmuszeni uczy膰 si臋 j臋zyka rosyjskiego.

听听Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Renew). 鈥� Mr President, Commissioner, I demand a much higher priority by both the Commission and the Member States. We simply have no time to waste.

For three reasons: first of all, this shadow fleet is a floating environmental disaster 鈥� we've seen it in the Black Sea, and a new big oil spill was only recently just avoided in Germany; secondly, the shadow fleet is undermining the sanctions and financing Putin's war; and thirdly, they are a danger for our security 鈥� our energy and it cables are targets for Putin, and while we are very busy mapping our sea cables, Putin is at the same time destroying them.

So I have a few very concrete questions. Why are we not entering every ship, like Finland has done, that we suspect might be part of the shadow fleet? Why have we only managed to identify 79 tankers?

So I urgently call on the EU, the Member States, the coastal guards: make this your first and foremost priority.

听听Alice Teodorescu M氓we (PPE). 鈥� Herr talman! Under snart tre 氓r har EU inf枚rt 15 olika sanktionspaket mot Ryssland. Det 盲r bra, men det spelar ingen roll hur m氓nga sanktioner vi inf枚r n盲r det g氓r att kringg氓 dem.

Ryssland har under de senaste 氓ren kraftigt byggt ut sin skuggflotta och bed枚ms i dag kontrollera hundratals fartyg under utl盲ndsk flagg som fraktar rysk olja, f枚r att kringg氓 sanktioner och finansiera sitt brutala krig mot Ukraina.听Dessa fartyg 盲r ofta gamla och of枚rs盲krade, och risken f枚r stora oljeutsl盲pp 盲r allvarlig, inte minst i k盲nsliga vatten som 脰stersj枚n.

EU har hittills inf枚rt sanktioner mot endast 79 fartyg medan USA nyligen inf枚rde sanktioner mot 183. Jag f枚resl氓r att EU inf枚r sanktioner mot samtliga ryska fartyg som misst盲nks ing氓 i den ryska skuggflottan samtidigt som EU borde se 枚ver m枚jligheten att beslagta olja fr氓n dessa oljetankers om de anl盲gger vid ett medlemsland.

Till sist m氓ste EU och medlemsl盲nderna ut枚va s氓v盲l ekonomisk som diplomatisk press p氓 de medl枚pare till stater som m枚jligg枚r den ryska skuggflottans existens. Om Ukraina ska vinna kriget m氓ste vi sl氓 till med alla medel mot den ryska skuggflottan.

听听Sabrina Repp (S&D). 鈥� Herr Pr盲sident! Die Zukunft europ盲ischer Sicherheit entscheidet sich im Ostseeraum. Unterseekabel, Pipelines und H盲fen sind unverzichtbar f眉r Handel, Vernetzungen und Versorgungssicherheit. Doch diese kritischen Infrastrukturen stehen unter enormem Druck. Die russische Schattenflotte kartiert gezielt maritime Anlagen. J眉ngste Sch盲den an Unterseekabeln zwischen Finnland und Deutschland, Litauen und Schweden zeigen die Bedrohungen deutlich. Wir m眉ssen entschlossen handeln durch Diversifizierung der Infrastrukturen, verbesserte 脺berwachung und koordinierte Schutzma脽nahmen auf europ盲ischer Ebene.

Wo staatliche Bedrohungen bestehen, brauchen wir neben zivilen Strategien auch milit盲rische Absicherung. Ein starkes B眉ndnis der Staaten im demokratischen Ostseeraum ist erforderlich, um Werte zu verteidigen und Bedrohungen ausgehend von Autokraten entschlossen entgegenzutreten. Meiner Heimatstadt Rostock kommt in dieser Entwicklung eine besondere Rolle zu. Rostock ist nicht nur ein bedeutender Hafenstandort, sondern auch ein zentraler Koordinationspunkt f眉r maritime Sicherheitsfragen im Ostseeraum. Diese Rolle gilt es weiter zu st盲rken. Wir m眉ssen das Ruder selbst in die Hand nehmen, statt uns weiter diesen Bedrohungen auszusetzen.

听听Aurelijus Veryga (ECR). 鈥� Pirmininke, gerbiami kolegos, kol kas tik Suomijai u啪teko dr膮sos imtis reali懦 veiksm懦 ir bent jau sulaikyti 拧e拧臈linio laivyno laiv膮, pa啪eidus寞 Estlink 2 kabel寞. Ir b奴tina imtis reali懦 veiksm懦, o ne tik reik拧ti dar vien膮 nei Rusijai, nei kitiems galimiems 啪aid臈jams nieko nerei拧kiant寞 gil懦 susir奴pinim膮 kritin臈s infrastrukt奴ros gadinimo. Kuomet vis daugiau Europos S膮jungos valstybi懦 palaipsniui 寞gyvendina energetin臈s nepriklausomyb臈s priemones, galima tik臈tis vis daugiau ir daugiau bandym懦 pa啪eisti kritin臋 infrastrukt奴r膮. Skambiai paskelbta, kad Baltijos j奴ra tapo NATO e啪eru. Dabar labai svarbu 拧iuos 啪od啪ius patvirtinti realiais veiksmais, o pavyzd寞 gal臈tume imti i拧 tos pa膷ios mano pamin臈tos Suomijos. Tokie laivai kartu su kroviniu tur臈t懦 b奴ti ma啪懦 ma啪iausiai konfiskuoti ir panaudoti bent dalies 啪alos atlyginimui. Tai b奴t懦 bent jau 拧ioks toks atgrasymo 啪enklas.

听听Wouter Beke (PPE). 鈥� Voorzitter, commissaris, collega's, We weten al langer dan vandaag dat Rusland zijn oorlog tegen Oekra茂ne niet alleen aan het front uitvecht. In de afgelopen twee jaar zijn er verschillende incidenten geweest in heel Europa. Sabotage. Sabotage met als doel onze samenleving te ontwrichten, chaos te veroorzaken. Er is eigenlijk maar 茅茅n woord voor en dat is "terreur".

Een duidelijk voorbeeld daarvan was de inzet van civiele schepen. Met die zogenaamde schaduwvloot tracht Rusland niet alleen economische sancties te treffen of te omzeilen. Het gaat ook actief over tot sabotage van onze nutsvoorzieningen. Het is dan ook niet meer dan logisch dat wij hiertegen actie ondernemen. Preventief en reactief. De samenwerking met de NAVO in de Baltische Zee is daarom ook noodzakelijk.

Ook het vijftiende sanctiepakket is een goede stap. Maar er moet meer gebeuren. Laat ons niet terugdeinzen voor de druk van buitenaf. En dan kijk ik ook naar mijn Hongaarse collega's. Het is aan ons om Oekra茂ne en onszelf te beschermen tegen de Russische terreur, ter land, ter zee en in de lucht.

听听Elio Di Rupo (S&D). 鈥� Monsieur le Pr茅sident, Madame la Commissaire, j鈥檃i un peu regard茅 qui s鈥檕ccupait de ces navires et j鈥檃i constat茅 qu鈥櫭﹏orm茅ment d鈥檃gences intergouvernementales 茅taient mobilis茅es. Bien s没r, le Service europ茅en pour l鈥檃ction ext茅rieure se charge de la coordination, mais il s鈥檃git aussi de questions int茅rieures 脿 l鈥橴nion europ茅enne.

En effet, les cons茅quences concernent l鈥檌nternet, par exemple: on compte 1,3听million de kilom猫tres de c芒bles Internet sous-marins. Les questions li茅es au gaz et au p茅trole ont des cons茅quences imm茅diates sur le prix de ces ressources et sur la s茅curit茅 int茅rieure.

Je me demande dans quelle mesure, au niveau europ茅en, en parall猫le de l鈥橭TAN, nous pourrions tenter d鈥檡 voir clair. Par exemple 脿 l鈥檌nitiative de votre d茅partement, avec une structure dont on sentirait la coh茅rence et la capacit茅 d鈥檃ction.

听听Pekka Toveri (PPE). 鈥� Mr听President, Madam Commissioner, dear colleagues, as we have heard, Russia is waging hybrid war against us all, in this case, by using its shadow fleet and other maritime actors to destroy our undersea infrastructure and to threaten us with ecological catastrophe. We have now heard about many different defensive actions taken to prevent these attacks in the future.

However, let's keep the eye on the ball and at the root cause of these attacks, the Russian illegal attack on Ukraine. Russia uses the shadow fleet to avoid EU sanctions and to fund its war in Ukraine, plus to punish us for our support to Ukraine. We need to stop this for Ukraine and for ourselves.

But let's not fool ourselves: these attacks won't stop by surveillance and defensive operations. These actions stop when Russia is made to pay for its crimes. We need to lower the price restrictions on the Russian export oil to USD听50 per barrel or even lower, and we need to stop the whole shadow fleet, using many different methods mentioned here, and not only around one sixth, as we have done so far. Inaction and lack of punishment just empowers Russia. Making Russia pay stops it.

Slava Ukraini!

听听Tom Berendsen (PPE). 鈥� Voorzitter, collega's,听Wij kunnen niet accepteren dat een paar kilometer voor onze kust onze eigen belangrijke infrastructuur gesaboteerd wordt. Onze kabels voor data en elektriciteit op de bodem van de zee zijn onzichtbare snelwegen voor onze energie en communicatie. Veel Europeanen zien misschien niet het belang van deze infrastructuur in. Rusland en China doen dat overduidelijk wel. De Russische schaduwvloot vaart dagelijks over onze infrastructuur op zee. Dat doen ze niet voor niets. In China is een patent goedgekeurd op technologie om deze kabels sneller te kunnen doorknippen.

Wij moeten beter samenwerken om onze infrastructuur te beschermen. Dat betekent meer aanwezigheid van de Marine op zee, meer inzet van technologie, zoals drones, sensoren en data, en meer capaciteit om heel snel eventuele schade te kunnen herstellen. En nee, commissaris, dat hoeft niet allemaal in gedetailleerde Europese wetten. Geef steun aan de landen aan zee die nu een kopgroep vormen. Ze werken samen in het belang van ons allemaal.

听听H茅lder Sousa Silva (PPE). 鈥� Senhor Presidente, Senhor Ministro, Senhora Comiss谩ria, ao operar frotas de navios fantasmas, atrav茅s de empresas de fachada, a R煤ssia criou um novo modelo de 芦guerra por procura莽茫o禄 que amea莽a a Europa e o mundo. N茫o 茅 s贸 no B谩ltico, no Atl芒ntico e no Mediterr芒neo tamb茅m andam.

Enquanto aqui estamos, estes navios mapeiam detalhadamente a localiza莽茫o, o estado e eventuais vulnerabilidades das nossas infraestruturas submarinas, quer de telecomunica莽玫es, quer de energia, maioritariamente n茫o para sabotagem imediata, mas para possibilitar ataques ulteriores.

A nossa toler芒ncia a este comportamento hostil tem mesmo de terminar. Por isso, proponho que a Uni茫o Europeia, em estreita articula莽茫o com a NATO, crie uma task force que envide todos os esfor莽os com vista a sancionar e desmantelar estas frotas e, assim, garantir a seguran莽a das nossas infraestruturas cr铆ticas subaqu谩ticas.

听听J眉ri Ratas (PPE). 鈥� Austatud president, volinik! Head ametikaaslased! Venemaa kasutab varilaevastikku oma s玫jamasina rahastamiseks. Viimasel ajal on need laevad j盲rjest sagedamini kahjustanud L盲盲nemere p玫hjas paiknevate Euroopa Liidu riikide taristut.

Vene varilaevastik kujutab endast 眉ha selgemat ohtu Euroopa Liidu julgeolekule, majandusele ja keskkonnale. Need laevad tegutsevad varjus, kuid peavad vastutama tagaj盲rgede eest. Kaablite, gaasitorude ja teiste taristuobjektide tahtlik l玫hkumine on kuritegu ja selle kuriteo toimepanek peab olema v盲listatud. Sabotaa啪i ja r眉nnakute korraldamine L盲盲nemerel peab l玫ppema.

NATO on juba L盲盲nemere kriitilise t盲htsusega taristut sihip盲raselt kaitsmas, kasutades selleks senisest enam patrull-lennukeid, s玫jalaevu ja droone. Euroopa Liit peab samuti suurendama oma kontrollv玫imekust. N盲eme, et need laevad vahetavad tihti nimesid ja lippe. Olgem k玫ik valvel ka selle suhtes, mida nad merel teevad. Neil puudub kindlustus. Nende tegevusega seotud riskid on m盲rkimisv盲盲rsed. Suurendame v玫imekust reageerida selliste ohtude vastu.

听听Jessica Polfj盲rd (PPE). 鈥� Herr talman! Fru kommission盲r! Det 盲r snart tre 氓r sedan den ryska fullskaliga invasionen av Ukraina b枚rjade. Under tre 氓r har det ukrainska folket visat prov p氓 en ofattbar motst氓ndskraft och ett stort mod. Vi har som frihetsv盲nner en skyldighet att st枚dja Ukraina ekonomiskt, milit盲rt och humanit盲rt.

Ryssland kringg氓r sanktionerna genom falskt flaggade fartyg p氓 脰stersj枚n. Samtidigt kan vi se undervattensaktiviteter. Vi ser att 脰stersj枚n har blivit en m氓ltavla b氓de 枚ver och under vattnet.

EU har gjort mycket, men mer beh枚ver g枚ras. Framf枚r allt beh枚ver vi stoppa den krigsekonomi som finansierar Rysslands krig mot bland annat Ukraina. Jag 盲r s盲ker p氓 att vi kan g枚ra mer h盲rifr氓n EU, tillsammans med andra akt枚rer, f枚r att f氓 bukt med det som beh枚ver g枚ras f枚r att Ukraina ska vinna kriget.

听听Aura Salla (PPE). 鈥� Mr听President, let's face it. Russia is testing us in the Baltic Sea. Europe needs short-term and long-term actions to protect our critical infrastructure. We need more effective sanctions against intentional sabotage, actors that flag and host fleet vessels, and investigations to identify and sanction also shadow vessels' ultimate beneficial owners.

The EU and NATO should utilise AI-driven tools to detect suspicious activities near undersea infrastructure and have a strong enough presence in the Baltic Sea. Baltic Sea Member States should also have the right to inspect the cargo and documentation of vessels in their waters to discover the cargo's origin and destinations.

In the long run, we need a unified regulatory framework for cable protection, reduced reliance on Chinese companies, develop advanced technologies for cable protection, monitoring and repair, and strengthen cooperation among Member States, NATO and our global allies.

听听Ana Miguel Pedro (PPE). 鈥� Senhor Presidente, trata-se de uma guerra que n茫o se declara, mas que ataca onde somos mais vulner谩veis.

A sabotagem de cabos submarinos no mar B谩ltico n茫o 茅 apenas um incidente. Estes cabos transportam 99 % do tr谩fico internacional de dados, formam a coluna vertebral das comunica莽玫es globais e da economia moderna. Pensemos no que isso significa. As nossas economias, os nossos governos, as nossas sociedades, tudo depende de cabos que repousam no fundo do mar.

A sabotagem russa, o crescente envolvimento da China e os ataques que agora se alastram a Taiwan questionam se estamos prontos para enfrentar uma nova era de guerra h铆brida. A resposta 茅 evidente. Isto n茫o 茅 um mero descuido.

A Europa precisa de uma estrat茅gia s贸lida, de refor莽ar as nossas alian莽as, de investir em tecnologia avan莽ada, de criar regras robustas contra amea莽as cada vez mais sofisticadas.

Em Portugal, o aumento do tr谩fego de navios russos nas nossas 谩guas n茫o 茅 coincid锚ncia, 茅 um sinal. Somos um dos portos mais importantes para a conectividade entre continentes e isso faz de n贸s um alvo.

Proteger os cabos submarinos 茅, acima de tudo, assegurar que a nossa soberania n茫o fica ref茅m de uma batalha no fundo do mar e de uma guerra h铆brida que j谩 come莽ou.

Vyst煤penia na z谩klade prihl谩senia sa o slovo zdvihnut铆m ruky

听听Tobiasz Boche艅ski (ECR). 鈥� Panie Przewodnicz膮cy! Szanowni Pa艅stwo! Kwestia, o kt贸rej dyskutujemy tutaj dzisiaj, jest fundamentalna, dlatego 偶e Rosja jest immanentnym zagro偶eniem dla bezpiecze艅stwa i pokoju w Europie. W艂adimir Putin jasno i kategorycznie stwierdzi艂, i偶 chce restytuowa膰 pot臋g臋 Zwi膮zku Radzieckiego i Rosj臋 w jak najszerszych granicach. Oznacza to, i偶 zamierza podbija膰 nie tylko Ukrain臋, ale r贸wnie偶 inne pa艅stwa, pa艅stwa ba艂tyckie. Zagra偶a Finlandii. Zagra偶a Polsce.

Wiemy z doktryny militarnej Rosji, i偶 zamierzaj膮 traktowa膰 wszystkie narz臋dzia polityki jako narz臋dzia wojny, w tym r贸wnie偶 basen Morza Ba艂tyckiego b臋dzie wykorzystywany na wszelkie mo偶liwe sposoby po to, by realizowa膰 rosyjsk膮 my艣l geopolityczn膮. I powinni艣my jako Europa stawa膰 razem, solidarnie i twardo przeciwko polityce rosyjskiej. My, jako Polacy, w szczeg贸lno艣ci 艣p. prof. Lech Kaczy艅ski, m贸wili艣my o tym od bardzo dawna, ale byli艣my lekcewa偶eni w tej izbie i w innych instytucjach europejskich. Mamy nadziej臋, 偶e przyszed艂 czas refleksji i Europa b臋dzie sta艂a razem przeciwko rosyjskiemu imperializmowi.

听听Joachim Stanis艂aw Brudzi艅ski (ECR). 鈥� Panie Przewodnicz膮cy! Oczywi艣cie na pocz膮tku pe艂na zgoda z moim szanownym przedm贸wc膮. C贸偶 wi臋cej doda膰? Dlatego chcia艂bym zwr贸ci膰 uwag臋 na zupe艂nie inny element, ot贸偶 niebezpiecze艅stwa zwi膮zane z aktami sabota偶u wymierzonego w infrastruktur臋 krytyczn膮 na Ba艂tyku, jak r贸wnie偶 te niebezpiecze艅stwa zwi膮zane z obchodzeniem sankcji wymierzonych wobec Rosji przez tak zwan膮 flot臋 cieni.

Mam tutaj na my艣li te niebezpiecze艅stwa zwi膮zane g艂贸wnie z katastrof膮, potencjaln膮 katastrof膮 ekologiczn膮. Dotycz膮 one dw贸ch obszar贸w morskich: Ba艂tyku i Morza Czarnego. Oba te obszary charakteryzuj膮 si臋 tym, 偶e s膮 morzami zamkni臋tymi, wi臋c gdyby by艂a pe艂na wola do tego, aby t臋 flot臋 cieni wyeliminowa膰, to wystarczy kontrola w dw贸ch newralgicznych punktach. Je偶eli chodzi o Ba艂tyk to Cie艣niny Du艅skie. Je偶eli chodzi o Morze Czarne to Dardanele.

Szanowni Pa艅stwo, ja jestem marynarzem, nie dalej jak kilka dni temu rozmawia艂em z moim przyjacielem, kapitanem, kt贸ry prowadzi jeden z najwi臋kszych tankowc贸w na 艣wiecie. W艣r贸d oficer贸w i kapitan贸w floty, kt贸ra jest sprawdzana po kilkana艣cie razy dziennie, jest powszechna wiedza dotycz膮ca tak zwanej floty cieni, 偶e mo偶na by ich wyeliminowa膰 w ten spos贸b, gdyby by艂a wola. One s艂u偶膮 nie tylko Putinowi i re偶imowi Putina, ale r贸wnie偶 wielkim koncernom naftowym, kt贸re w ten spos贸b obchodz膮 sankcje. Wi臋c takie nasze gadanie tutaj ma sens o tyle, o ile prze艂o偶y si臋听.

(Koniec vyst煤pen铆 na z谩klade prihl谩senia sa o slovo zdvihnut铆m ruky)

听听Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Mr听President, first, thank you for this debate. And thank you for all the support for our very strong and coordinated actions we are making.

Keeping Europe safe is my priority during this mandate. Much has been done, but much more is needed, as we know. You can count on the Commission to ensure that this will happen.

We will together defeat Putin's war of aggression and hostile actors sabotaging our security. We will remain vigilant. We will build our own resilience and strengthen our ability to hold those behind attacks accountable for their actions. We stand ready to respond fast and decisively to all these threats.

听听Adam Sz艂apka, President-in-Office of the Council. 鈥� Mr President, honourable Members, Madam Commissioner, thank you very much for this debate, that mostly shows our unity on this very important issue. The incident involving undersea cables in the Baltic Sea is the latest in a series of suspected attacks on critical infrastructure. These malicious actions demand our united attention and a swift response. We will enhance cooperation for information鈥憇haring and protection of critical infrastructure, both within the EU and with our international partners.

Together with our partners, we will continue to curb the activities of the shadow fleet, disrupt Moscow's revenue streams and ensure that Russia's war machine is deprived of the income to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine. And we remain ready to use all available instruments, including further restrictive measures, to ensure the security of our continent.

听听Predsedaj煤ci . 鈥� T谩to rozprava sa skon膷ila.

P铆somn茅 vyhl谩senia (膷l谩nok 178)

听听Rihards Kols (ECR), in writing. 鈥� The recent attacks on undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea expose Europe's failure to protect its critical infrastructure. Russia is exploiting our weaknesses with hybrid warfare, and Europe's response remains inadequate. Despite repeated warnings鈥擝alticconnector and other sabotage attempts鈥攚e are still reacting instead of acting.

Where are the advanced surveillance systems, technological investments, and deterrence measures needed to protect our infrastructure? Europe's fragmented security approach leaves us vulnerable, and the Kremlin knows it. While NATO鈥檚 efforts are valuable, Europe must take responsibility.

We need coordinated investment in real-time monitoring, AI-driven threat detection, and rapid response mechanisms. The EU must move beyond empty statements and take concrete strategic actions. This is not just about repairing cables; it鈥檚 about defending our sovereignty and credibility.

Resilience means showing that any attack on our infrastructure is an attack on Europe鈥檚 collective strength鈥攐ne that will face decisive action. Anything less invites further aggression.

Let鈥檚 stop pretending that good intentions are enough and start treating this threat with the seriousness it demands.