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听听S膿des vad墨t膩js. 鈥� N膩kamais darba k膩rt墨bas punkts ir jaut膩jumu laiks (Komisija) (Reglamenta 137.听pants).

艩aj膩 jaut膩jumu laik膩 laipni l奴dzu piedal墨ties komis膩ri Jutta Urpilainen.

Jaut膩jumu laika temats: 鈥淓S un 膧frikas strat膿模ija鈥�.

艩is jaut膩jumu laiks ilgs aptuveni 60听min奴tes.

K膩 ierasts, jaut膩juma uzdo拧anai b奴s viena min奴te, savuk膩rt atbildes snieg拧anai 鈥� divas min奴tes.

Run膩t膩jiem pirmaj膩 k膩rt膩 b奴s iesp膿ja uzdot 30 sekun啪u garu papildjaut膩jumu ar div膩m min奴t膿m atbildes snieg拧anai.

Atg膩dinu, ka iesp膿jamo papildjaut膩jumu var uzdot tikai tad, ja tas ir cie拧i saist墨ts ar galveno jaut膩jumu un nav jauns jaut膩jums.

Ja v膿laties uzdot jaut膩jumu, aicinu j奴s to re模istr膿t jau tagad, izmantojot br墨v膩 mikrofona funkciju j奴su balso拧anas iek膩rt膩 p膿c tam, kad b奴siet taj膩 ievietoju拧i savu balso拧anas karti.

Jaut膩jumu laik膩 uzst膩拧an膩s notiks no vietas, un aicinu visus run膩t膩jus iev膿rot pie拧姆irto uzst膩拧an膩s laiku.

Kol膿模iem, iesp膿jams, vajadz膿s da啪us br墨啪us, lai re模istr膿tu savu piepras墨jumu uzdot jaut膩jumu, izmantojot balso拧anas iek膩rtu. T膩p膿c v膿lreiz aicinu j奴s savu piepras墨jumu iesniegt tagad, un m膿s s膩ksim ar pirmo jaut膩jumu.

听听Gy枚rgy H枚lv茅nyi (PPE). 鈥� Eln枚k 脷r! T枚bb mint h谩rom 茅v telt el az贸ta, hogy a Bizotts谩g nyilv谩noss谩gra hozta az Uni贸 Afrika-strat茅gi谩j谩t. Ebben partners茅get 铆g茅rt az afrikai z枚ld 谩t谩ll谩shoz, a digitaliz谩ci贸hoz, a munkahelyteremt茅shez, a b茅k茅hez, valamint a migr谩ci贸 kezel茅s茅hez. Jogosan mer眉l fel a k茅rd茅s: teljes铆tett眉k-e az 铆g茅reteinket? Biztons谩gosabb hely lett 谩ltalunk Afrika? Siker眉lt e hat茅konyan tenn眉nk a migr谩ci贸 kiv谩lt贸 okainak felsz谩mol谩s谩茅rt?

A vil谩g h煤sz leginstabilabb orsz谩ga k枚z眉l sajnos ma 15 Afrik谩ban tal谩lhat贸. 2020 贸ta olyan strat茅giai partnereink sodr贸dtak polg谩rh谩bor煤ba, vagy annak sz茅l茅re, mint Eti贸pia, Szud谩n vagy Nig茅ria. Tisztelt Biztos Asszony, mit tehet眉nk az茅rt, hogy j枚v艖re az elm煤lt 枚t 茅v munk谩j谩t val贸ban k茅zzelfoghat贸 eredm茅nyekkel z谩rhassuk? Mit tehet眉nk az茅rt, hogy az afrikai fiatalok elv谩ndorl谩sa helyett, helyben j谩rulhassanak hozz谩 k枚z枚ss茅gei fejl艖d茅s茅hez?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much, honourable MEP, for your question. Indeed, in March 2020 we were able to adopt a new strategy for Africa 鈥� so a little bit over two or three years ago 鈥� and you ask whether we have already seen tangible results on the ground. Indeed, we are able to see tangible results on the ground. I鈥檒l just give you a couple of examples.

The first one is our MAV+ plus initiative, through which we are able to work with four different African countries 鈥� Ghana, Senegal, South Africa and Rwanda 鈥� in order to start vaccine and medicine manufacturing production in those countries. Because what we learned in the middle of the COVID was that Africa still imports 99% of the vaccines and 94% of its medicines. So we need to strengthen the resilience and strategic autonomy of Africa. It means that we have to help them to produce, for instance, more vaccines and medicines in their continent, in Africa for Africa.

Another very concrete example is, for instance, the energy sector. Just recently, a couple of weeks ago in Paris, we were able to approve a new JETP with Senegal, which means that we are able, together with our international partners and international banks, to accelerate the deployment of renewable energies in Senegal. We also have several energy projects in Nigeria, as well as the Ruzizi III hydropower plant in DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. So they are very tangible projects which are ongoing, but of course we still have a lot of work to do, taking into account the fact that our financial tool NDICI 鈥� Global Europe is also existing until the year 2027.

听听Gy枚rgy H枚lv茅nyi (PPE). 鈥� K枚sz枚n枚m a v谩lasz谩t, Biztos Asszony, 茅s abszol煤t egyet茅rtek vele, 茅s ezekben a t枚rekv茅seiben azt hiszem, a Bizotts谩got a frakci贸m r茅sz茅r艖l mindig is t谩mogattuk. Hangs煤lyozni szeretn茅m, hogy Afrika rendelkezik minden olyan lehet艖s茅ggel - 茅s itt nek眉nk ezt al谩 kell h煤zni -, ami a kontinenst a 21. Sz谩zad vezet艖 r茅gi贸j谩v谩, Eur贸pa els艖 sz谩m煤 strat茅giai sz枚vets茅ges茅v茅 teheti.

De egyet musz谩j kihangs煤lyozni, a rendk铆v眉l fiatal 茅s gyors, n枚vekv艖 lakoss谩g lehet艖s茅g, amivel 茅lni kell. Ennek felt茅tele pedig, hogy az afrikai fiatalok megfelel艖 oktat谩st, szakk茅pz茅st kapjanak. A most az iskolapadokban 眉l艖 gener谩ci贸 feladata lesz ugyanis, hogy meghozza azokat a strat茅giai d枚nt茅seket, amelyek Afrik谩t a 21. sz谩zad val贸ban gy艖ztes茅v茅 tehetik.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� I fully agree with you. Actually, we have made a strategic choice in terms of education. So what I did as a Commissioner, I decided to increase our funding to education from 7% to 13%. We precisely 鈥� because most of the population in Africa are young people, over 60% of them are below 25 years old 鈥� decided to focus on education. Why? Because education is the most transformative tool one can use in developing and transforming societies. That is why we are prioritising education.

We have three main areas we are mainly focusing on. The first one is access to primary education for girls, because we know that girls are still lagging behind. The second priority area is vocational education and training. We know that many young people are entering the labour market in Africa but unfortunately, they are lacking in the skills which are required in the labour market. The third priority areas is teacher training, because it is not enough to access education. We also have to have quality education and that鈥檚 why we need to improve the quality of education through teacher training. For instance, in January in South Africa, I was able to launch a regional teacher training initiative for sub-Saharan Africa worth EUR听100 million, precisely to train more teachers in Africa but also to improve the quality of teacher training in sub-Saharan African countries.

So I fully agree with you. We have to prioritise education and we have to pay more attention to the young people and young citizens of Africa.

听听Maria Arena (S&D). 鈥� Monsieur le Pr茅sident, Madame la Commissaire, vous le savez et vous en 锚tes porteuse, nous avons, au niveau de l鈥橴nion europ茅enne, une grande tradition de partenariat entre l鈥橴nion europ茅enne et les pays africains, et je dirais m锚me les pays d鈥橝frique, des Cara茂bes et du Pacifique dans le cadre des accords de Lom茅 et de Cotonou 鈥撎齟t j鈥檈sp猫re post-Cotonou le plus rapidement possible, parce que le Conseil nous fait des caprices sur cette question. Mais j鈥檃urais plusieurs questions.

La premi猫re concerne la strat茅gie, et on a quelques priorit茅s en la mati猫re, notamment la paix et la s茅curit茅. Je prends un exemple: dans le Sahel aujourd鈥檋ui, on a deux situations diff茅rentes entre le Tchad et le Burkina听Faso. Pour le Burkina听Faso, l鈥檃ide budg茅taire n鈥檈st plus possible aujourd鈥檋ui. Est-ce qu鈥檌l est possible de revenir 脿 une coh茅rence et donc 脿 une aide budg茅taire au Burkina听Faso pour aider effectivement la transition d茅mocratique?

La deuxi猫me question concerne la migration, qui est une autre priorit茅. On a vu dans les discussions sur le SPG que le Conseil et la Commission pr茅sentaient syst茅matiquement une condition 脿 la migration. Est-ce que vous pensez, vous qui 锚tes la commissaire du partenariat, que cette conditionnalit茅 脿 la r茅admission est une bonne chose?

Une derni猫re question concerne le d茅veloppement durable. Nous allons travailler sur les mati猫res premi猫res critiques. 脌 ce sujet, est-il dans vos intentions de conditionner l鈥檃cc猫s 脿 ces mati猫res au consentement des populations?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much for your questions. I try to cover them all, but let鈥檚 see if I have time for that.

I start with Sahel. Indeed, this is a very strategic region for Europe, and we have also invested a lot in that region. But if I look at the results, I have to admit that the results are quite poor, taking into account how many military coups we have seen in that region recently and during the past years, we have to remember that development and stability and peace are two sides of the one coin. And that鈥檚 why we have to, of course, support the security forces in that region. And this is precisely what we are doing, for instance, with Burkina Faso.

We support the security forces of Burkina Faso, but at the same time we have to pay more and more attention to the development side. So we have to invest in education, we have to invest in basic services, because we know that, for instance, in Burkina Faso, where I have visited as Commissioner twice, the state is lacking in a big part of the country. And that鈥檚 why people don鈥檛 really feel that they benefit from the services of the state. And that鈥檚 why we have to invest in the security side, but we also have to invest in development services.

When it comes to critical raw materials, indeed, we are now creating new partnerships with several partner countries in Africa, but also in Latin America and in Caribbean regions in order to have critical minerals and raw materials for us to be used for our green transition. But we want to use that in a sustainable and mutually beneficial way. It means that we are looking at the 360鈥攄egree approach so we don鈥檛 only extract and export minerals to Europe, but we also want to support our partner countries鈥� societies to develop their business environment as well as support them to train their labour force and workforce, as well as support them to industrialise their countries. So the idea is really to support them also to develop their value chain. I鈥檓 happy to continue in my next answer.

听听Maria Arena (S&D). 鈥� Monsieur le Pr茅sident, revenons 脿 la question du Sahel. La situation aujourd鈥檋ui au Burkina Faso est compliqu茅e parce que ce pays n鈥檃 pas beaucoup de revenus budg茅taires et qu鈥檌l d茅pend pour plus de 20听% de l鈥檃ide ext茅rieure. Et donc la situation telle qu鈥檕n la conna卯t aujourd鈥檋ui, si听鈥� et comme vous le disiez听鈥� nous n鈥檌ntervenons pas, risque de s鈥檈mpirer encore.

Alors, que peut-on faire pour 脿 la fois favoriser le processus d茅mocratique et soutenir par exemple les deux millions de personnes d茅plac茅es, sachant que le gouvernement a perdu le contr么le de 40听% de son territoire? Il y a donc sans doute l脿 quelque chose 脿 ajuster.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Indeed in the Sahel, I would describe that we have a very tailor-made approach. As you said in the beginning, with some of the Sahelian countries, we use, for instance, a budget support modality.

But a very good example of it is Niger. I just recently, a couple of weeks ago, adopted EUR听66听million of additional budget support funding to Niger, precisely because we want to support Niger to educate their population and their young people and their children.

In terms of Mali, the approach is completely different because of the recent development in Mali, but also because of their choices that they have made recently.

In the case of Burkina Faso, unfortunately, we have not been able to use our budget support modality because of the coup, but also because of the transition. We haven鈥檛 seen enough concrete results and our conditions are not met 鈥� because we always have conditions in our budget support modality. So those conditions are not met and that is why we have not been able to use that modality.

But it doesn鈥檛 mean that we have not supported financially Burkina Faso. On the contrary, we have provided a lot of assistance, humanitarian assistance, but also development assistance through our special measures in terms of health, in terms of education, in terms of food security.

And the new element, as I said in the beginning, is also now our support to the security forces, because we know that the country is really, I would say, struggling against jihadists and terrorist groups. So we want to support also the security forces.

But, I would say that in the case of Burkina Faso, we have to have this kind of gradual approach, you know, go step-by-step forward and see whether in the future there is also a stage where we can resume the budget support with Burkina Faso.

听听Karen Melchior (Renew). 鈥� Thank you, Commissioner and Vice-President. Looking at the EU Africa Strategy, I wish to focus on a specific country, Tunisia, which I find is symptomatic for our approach to Africa as a whole. We need strategic and equal partnerships with the countries in Africa. And so that is not just focused on migration, but, as your portfolio says, to promote democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance. Looking at Tunisia, we need a strategic partnership between the EU and a democratic Tunisia. It was important that we invested in our partnership with Tunisia leading up to our current strategic priorities adopted in 2018, when Tunisia was implementing the democratic reforms following the Arab revolution that had brought Ben Ali down. But why is the EU intensifying a comprehensive partnership with Tunisia and completing a memorandum of understanding with an unelected president which has been undermining parliamentary democracy and rule of law? Furthermore, why has the EU stopped engaging with Tunisia鈥檚 civil society in a time when the human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists of Tunisia need our support? How do we stand strong with democratic forces and human-rights defenders when we seem to prefer to form partnership with strongman rulers in the Sahel, in Rwanda, in Uganda, and now in Tunisia?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much for your question. I have to say that I agree with you. The EU is indeed a long鈥攕tanding partner of Tunisia, particularly as regards its socio鈥攅conomic development and its democratic transition. And I can only quote President von der Leyen, who was in Tunisia in June: 鈥榳ith Tunisia we share much more than geographical proximity: we share a history鈥�.

Since 2011, the European Union has been supporting Tunisia鈥檚 journey of democracy. It is a long, sometimes difficult road, but these difficulties can be overcome against the backdrop of global uncertainties. It is in our common interest to strengthen our relationship and to invest in stability and prosperity. So in this context, the EU and Tunisia are working together on a memorandum of understanding on a strategic and comprehensive partnership covering the strengthening economic development, but also investment and trade, a sustainable and competitive renewable energy partnership, migration and people鈥攖o鈥攑eople connections and contacts, as presented by President von der Leyen in June during a joint mission to Tunisia, together with the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, as well as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

听听Karen Melchior (Renew). 鈥� Thank you Commissioner for your focus on human rights and democracy in Tunisia. Will the Commission and the EEAS then take up the tripartite meetings that used to be held between the Tunisian Government, Tunisian Civil Society and the EEAS? At the moment, human rights defenders and civil society have been arrested following meetings with EU Member State embassies and holding meetings with civil society in an organised way and supporting them is an important signal and support for civil society in Tunisia.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much for this very precise question. As I said, part of this MOU, which is, as you know, under negotiations at the moment, so negotiations are ongoing between the EU and Tunisia, and there is the aim to conclude these negotiations shortly. And part of these negotiations are these people鈥攖o鈥攑eople connections. But when it comes to your very precise question, I be looking into this together with my dear colleague, Commissioner V谩rhelyi, who is responsible for Tunisia. And I am sure that he will then come back to this question.

听听Malte Gall茅e (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Madam Commissioner, I have quite some questions, but let me see how many I will manage to ask. First of all, I stumbled over a problem I have no solution to, and it is about waste and the products that we ship to Africa. I was wondering whether you might find a solution to this.

If we ship products to African countries, often there are no extended producer responsibility organisations. So all the products we ship there, they are packed and they create a lot of waste. And it is doesn鈥檛 fall under the Waste Shipment Regulation since it is not waste yet, but it becomes waste pretty fast. How can we tackle this so that we do not contribute to the pollution in these countries where there are no such systems?

The second question, let me try to ask it, is basically: if we look at the Critical Raw Materials Act, you say 40% of production should come to Europe again. I think we should rather really foster industrialisation in the source countries in line with their local demands.

And the third thing, if you allow me one last second, is how do we support the whole idea of the Great Green Wall in the Sahel zone and how can we strengthen this as well?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Of course we support our partner countries to develop also waste management. I have myself, for instance, visited several projects where I have seen very concretely that we have made a huge difference in terms of waste management.

When it comes to critical raw materials, thank you for asking this because now I have an opportunity to explain, in a bit more detail, what we try to achieve. For instance, in Namibia 鈥� where I was in January with my dear colleague, Commissioner Breton 鈥� we are just now finalising the roadmap for our green hydrogen partnership, but also our partnership on critical raw materials. What we want to do in Namibia, what we need, as you said, are some critical minerals and raw materials for our green transition. That鈥檚 the fact, especially if we want to de-risk our relationship with China.

Through this partnership, we also want to develop and support Namibia to industrialise its society and develop value chains in their society. It means that we are supporting them in terms of strengthening their institutions, in terms of improving the regulatory environment, in terms of training young people in order to be able to employ themselves or get a job.

And then, of course, we also bring our companies to invest in Namibia in terms of infrastructure, but also in terms of mining. So we are creating new jobs, but at the same time, we want to support Namibia to really benefit from this partnership. And this is precisely the 360-degree approach, which is, I would say, something which is mutually beneficial for both of us, for Namibia, but also for the European Union.

听听Malte Gall茅e (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Thank you very much. Let me just quickly get back to the question of the waste, since, I mean it鈥檚 nice that we have some projects and it鈥檚 working well at some points, but how can we make sure that if European companies ship to African countries that what they ship there does not become waste? How can we, like basically, apply the same rules as we do with the waste shipment regulation for products that are no waste yet?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Let me first take the question regarding the Great Green Wall, because I didn鈥檛 have time to answer that, and that was your third question. So, exactly in line with the outcome of the EU summit last year 鈥� you know that we were able to organise that finally 鈥� the Great Green Wall Initiative is our long鈥攖erm, very cross鈥攕ectoral and multi鈥攁ctor undertaking initiative.

Very broad and continued mobilisation of actors for the Great Green Wall is key and, of course, this whole initiative will secure a steady stream of action and financial support towards the Great Green Wall, solidifying its sustainability in the medium to long term. What we aim to do is really to develop local and regional global sustainable value chains originating from the Great Green Wall, and that should be supported along with active involvement and commitment from the private sector.

Tree鈥攂ased and agro鈥攅cology based value chains are probably the strongest incentive for farmers engagement in sustainable land management. So this is something we are working on with our Member States but also with our partners in that region.

When it comes to waste management and waste legislation, I do not have a silver bullet as to how to solve that problem. But, of course, when it comes to the legislation, we also 鈥� through for instance, political dialogue 鈥� want to work together with our partner countries in order to improve their legislation. But what I鈥檓 against is this kind of imposing attitude that we come there and say that, okay, this is the legislation you have to adopt. This is not the mutually鈥攂eneficial equal partnership we are presenting and promoting.

That is why, of course, through this dialogue we can always explain what the existing legislation in the European Union is, what our experience of it is, and then we can offer to be at their disposal to help and keep, for instance, technical assistance and provide some expertise if it is needed. But through dialogue, I think that鈥檚 the best way to try to support our partners to develop also, and to improve their legislation.

听听Anna Fotyga (ECR). 鈥� Mr President, Commissioner, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU is already aware of near imperial policies, violence, cruelty, war crimes, and genocide perpetrated by Russia. What is less known, though, is the neo-colonial conquest perpetrated in many of territories directly or via proxies like Wagner groups. Is the EU aware of this fact? Is it ready and capable to raise awareness among our African partners? That is particularly relevant for them, and this process is extremely deteriorating to them and to the interest of the EU in Africa.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you for your question and I would say that, in many African countries, we face a battle of narratives. So we know that, for instance, Russia is very active in their propaganda, with their disinformation. But more and more we also face a battle of offers, what we partners are able to offer to our African counterparts. We know that Russia鈥檚 approach is very much on security and it鈥檚 based on Wagner Group services. China has been focusing on hard infrastructure projects through their Belt and Road initiative, and our approach is Global Gateway. So we want to offer Global Gateway to our partners, which is a very positive offer through which we want to accelerate green and digital transitions in our partner countries, focusing on energy, transport, digital, as well as soft connectivity like health, education and research.

And when it comes to Africa, we have the objective to mobilise up to EUR 150 billion in investments by 2027. That money does not come only from the EU budget. We have our part, but also our Member States are contributing to these investments as well as their financial institutions. And the idea is really to attract and encourage our European companies to invest in Africa because we need a private sector鈥檚 contribution in order to achieve and reach SDGs in the future, let鈥檚 say, even in the medium-term future. So indeed, we are facing this battle of narratives. We are facing the disinformation. But from my perspective, we also have a very good offer and answer how to tackle and compete with that disinformation in our partner countries.

听听Anna Fotyga (ECR). 鈥� As European 合法博彩网站 rapporteur for the opinion on the African strategy, I tried to convince my colleagues about the detrimental role of Russia 鈥� and China, by the way 鈥� knowing how difficult it was at that time.

My second question is: to what extent are EU delegations in Africa tasked to inform about the neo鈥攃olonial posture of Russia ?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� In the beginning of this mandate, actually, we created this Team Europe concept, and I have to say that as Commissioner for International Partnerships I am very proud of it.

The whole concept is based on this idea that European institutions, including the European 合法博彩网站, together with our Member States and their DFIs 鈥揹evelopment finance institutions 鈥� are working as a team. So we are pooling resources, we are setting common objectives at the country level, and then we are also, of course, trying to increase our European visibility in our partner countries.

So when it comes to the role of the delegation, when it comes to the role of communication, now we really have, I would say, improved cooperation between the Member States in terms of communication. We do that at the capital level, so we have regular meetings, but we also do that at the country level. So the idea is that the EU delegation can coordinate different activities at the country level with our Member States鈥� embassies.

I personally think that this is the right step forward. Of course we still have room for improvement because we know that, for instance, Russia is very active and they use new technology, social media, in a way that we have never imagined it to be able to use. But I would say that progress has been already made and now we have a clear concept, and I personally think that we can also benefit from it.

听听Anna Bonfrisco (ID). 鈥� Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ringrazio la signora vicepresidente e Commissaria per avere citato il recente viaggio della nostra premier Meloni insieme al premier Rutte, accompagnati dalla Presidente von der Leyen, a dimostrazione che l'Italia 猫 in prima fila nelle politiche di aiuto a questa vasta area strategica euro-mediterranea-africana.

E cosa dire della Sicilia, cruciale per affrontare queste sfide e che il ministro Salvini ha deciso di collegare meglio all'Europa attraverso il ponte sullo Stretto?

C'猫 per貌 la sfida della migrazione, un argomento che divide gli Stati membri e che continua a far cadere governi.

Se finalmente 猫 stato riconosciuto che la migrazione richiede una risposta europea, chiedo se lei ritiene che l'assunto di base, che la migrazione si possa gestire, possa essere validato alla luce della sfida all'ordine internazionale basato sulle regole?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Indeed, we know that migration is a high priority for the European Union Member States, and that鈥檚 why when we together adopted in the NDICI Global Europe financial tool, we also set a clear spending target for migration. So now the target is 10% of our external funding committed to migration and different aspects and dimensions of migration. If I remember correctly, I think the latest figure from the year 2021 is 14%. So around 14% of our external funding went to migration from the NDICI Global Europe. So from the financial perspective, we are prioritising migration.

Then, of course, we have to see the different angles and different dimensions of migration through development cooperation, which I am responsible for. Of course we are mainly focusing on the root causes of migration, so we want to address the root causes. We want to provide opportunities for young people through education, through investment, through job creation, so that they don鈥檛 need to leave their own country and try to get some prospects in Europe. So they really have opportunities. They have opportunities for a decent life in their own country.

When it comes to the peace and security angle, of course we want to also support our partners in Africa to, for instance, end the conflicts which also cause migration and are is one of the root causes behind the migration. Then there is, of course, this aspect of governance and border management and also readmission and returns. I want to mention one particular aspect when it comes to readmission and returns, and that is the post鈥擟otonou Agreement. I鈥檓 happy to continue to that in my next answer.

听听Anna Bonfrisco (ID). 鈥� Come riconosciuto da Europol, le tratte di esseri umani sono dinamiche che sfruttano ogni crisi come un'opportunit脿.

I trafficanti sono pi霉 digitalizzati che mai, abusano di piattaforme di social media, applicazioni mobili e strumenti di comunicazione crittografati.

Sono previsti, Le chiedo quindi, nella strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa strumenti per affrontare il traffico digitale legato all'immigrazione?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� So if I first conclude my answer regarding the post鈥擟otonou and then I鈥檓 happy to reply to your second question.

So when it comes to post鈥擟otonou Agreement, that is, like we heard earlier, it is a political agreement with 79 countries from Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific states. And what is now, I would say, remarkable from the migration perspective is this annex where we have now a legal basis for readmission and returns. And that鈥檚 why, that鈥檚 one reason why we should really make some progress in the Council side so that we would be able to sign this new agreement, which was already negotiated over two years ago. But unfortunately, one Member State is blocking the approval of this agreement in the Council, and that鈥檚 why we really hope that we are able to make some progress in the coming weeks.

When it comes to migration and what we are doing on digital, I would say that we have now really tried to strengthen also the cooperation with several Commission services. I give you one example: last week I had a meeting with my dear colleague, Commissioner Johansson, who is responsible for migration. So we really try to have this comprehensive approach. So of course I am responsible for the external dimension of the migration and she is very much focusing on the internal aspect of migration. And then we are looking into opportunities, for instance, of how we can together work with our partners, for instance with Niger, how we can reintegrate also those refugees who are voluntarily or forcibly returned to that country. So we have different kinds of tools and also, I would say, a very comprehensive approach through which we want to solve this, especially this irregular migration problem, which is unfortunately increasing at the moment in Europe.

听听Marc Botenga (The Left). 鈥� Monsieur le Pr茅sident, Madame la commissaire, je voudrais revenir sur la question des mati猫res premi猫res critiques, parce que je pense qu鈥檈lle est essentielle et je pense qu鈥檈n Afrique, cette question est tr猫s sensible.

Vous savez que le pillage colonial et n茅ocolonial de l鈥橝frique consistait essentiellement 脿 voler les mati猫res premi猫res. Vous savez aussi que, m锚me apr猫s les ind茅pendances, ces pratiques se sont poursuivies, souvent sous le couvert de recommandations, par exemple du Fonds mon茅taire international, de la Banque mondiale, soutenues par l鈥橢urope, demandant de r茅duire l鈥檌ntervention de l鈥櫭塼at, notamment au Mali. En cons茅quence, 脿 un certain moment, le gouvernement malien n鈥櫭﹖ait plus en mesure de conna卯tre les quantit茅s d鈥檕r qui quittaient son territoire, par exemple.

Je crains que les alternatives, les nouvelles politiques que vous avez pr茅sent茅es, ne rompent pas avec les anciennes pratiques. Vous utilisez le m锚me langage quand vous parlez de 芦faciliter le climat des affaires禄, de 芦renforcer les investissements europ茅ens禄...

Je voudrais que vous me fassiez une liste de ce qui a chang茅 entre les anciennes pratiques et ce que vous proposez. Quelle est la grosse diff茅rence entre la politique europ茅enne telle qu鈥檈lle 茅tait pratiqu茅e avant vous et celle que vous proposez aujourd鈥檋ui?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Well indeed I think you鈥檙e correct in terms of fiscal space. Fiscal space in many of our partner countries is very limited. And one reason for that is because of the very high debt levels: why are there high debt levels in our partner countries? One reason for that is the loans which are issued by China in order to give an opportunity to our partners to invest in hard infrastructure.

What I see and what we try to do through our partnership is really to support our partner countries to mobilise domestic resources. How to do that? We have to collect more taxes, but we also have to spend our expenditure better. And that鈥檚 why we need to support our partner countries in their institution鈥攕trengthening. So we have to support them to strengthen their institutions. We have to support them to fight corruption, which is still, unfortunately, a problem in many countries. And then we, of course, have to support them to get more investments because through the investments they also get revenues. That鈥檚 the fact. So this is how I how I see the situation.

And then, of course, if we only look at the ODA money, unfortunately the whole official development assistance last year, 2022, I think this is the preliminary figure from the OECD, was USD听204 billion. So a little bit over USD听200 billion last year. And if I look at the Sustainable Development Goals financing gap for low鈥� and middle鈥攊ncome countries, I mean, the gap is USD听3.9 trillion per year. So we can understand that through the public resources, through the ODA money, we cannot support our partners to reach sustainable development goals. And that鈥檚 why, in addition to our official development aid 鈥� which is needed and of course I support to increase that in all of our Member States 鈥� we also need private鈥攕ector involvement and contribution. This is precisely what we try to do through the Global Gateway Initiative.

听听Marc Botenga (The Left). 鈥� Madame la Commissaire, historiquement, la dette africaine ne trouve pas son origine en Chine. Elle trouve son origine dans la colonisation et dans le r么le des pays europ茅ens apr猫s la d茅colonisation. Il faut donc reconna卯tre notre responsabilit茅 l脿-dedans. Et du coup, est-ce que vous 锚tes pr锚te 脿 au moins dire qu鈥檕n va abolir la dette que ces pays africains ont vis-脿-vis des pays europ茅ens? 脟a, c鈥檈st une premi猫re question.

Deuxi猫me question, tr猫s rapidement. Vous n鈥檃vez pas vraiment dit ce que vous alliez changer par rapport au pass茅. Avant, l鈥橢urope, les pays membres, vous aviez des politiques de pillage. Qu鈥檈st-ce qui change fondamentalement? Est-ce que vous avez dress茅 un tableau de la situation: avant, on faisait 莽a, maintenant nous allons faire le contraire? Parce que sinon, j鈥檃i un peu l鈥檌mpression qu鈥檕n reste dans de bonnes intentions, sans les concr茅tiser.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� To be very precise, I said that one reason for this distress, I mean this very high debt level, is China. Of course, that is not the only reason, but that is one reason.

What is the new paradigm? What are we now proposing and promoting to our partners? I would say that the first new element is mutually beneficial partnerships. We really want to get out of this donor/recipient kind of relationship, which we had in the previous years. So we dealt with our partners and said okay, we鈥檒l give you this money to start development cooperation projects, but we didn鈥檛 really listen to them and have a really equal partnership with them. So this idea of mutually beneficial, equal partnership is the new element of our cooperation.

The second new element is Team Europe, so that we want to work together with our Member States. Instead of there being a fragmented approach, we want to build a team where our 27 Member States have a role as well as their development finance institutions, as well as European institutions. So this is definitely a new approach, a new element.

The third new element is engaging with the private sector. So we want European companies to invest in African countries so that also our African partners can benefit from those investments. I have to say that when it comes to critical raw materials, I see huge interests and 鈥� I would say 鈥� appetite and buy鈥攊n from our partner countries in Africa. There are already several countries who really want to start negotiating with us on critical raw materials partnerships. I mentioned Namibia earlier, but we are also starting to negotiate with Rwanda and with the DRC, for instance. And there are several other countries who are really seeking and want to start to negotiate with us.

I think this is also a kind of approval and an example of this new mutually beneficial partnership that our partners really want to invest in this 鈥� that it is not only us, but is also them.

听听Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI). 鈥� Madam Commissioner, thank you for being here today with us. As rightfully stated in the final declaration of the EU鈥擜frican Union summit of February 2022, we do share with our African counterparts a series of common challenges that need to be addressed in a cooperative way. Further than that, in the EP recommendation for the Strategic Partnership with the Horn of Africa, for which I served as the rapporteur, we have stressed the need to reinforce this cooperation, leaving apart the obsolete donor recipient mentality and unleashing all its potential, basing our relation on timely, effective talks aimed at finding common ground.

One area in which it seems to be difficult to keep the same speed and agree on certain commitments is the one of energy transition. Therefore I would like to ask you to elaborate on key messages and expectations conveyed by our African counterparts in terms of their perspectives on transition paths. For example, what is the pace of it, and the means of financing it? Where do they expect us to contribute the most? Thank you very much, and I will be eager to listen to your reply.

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much for your question. Indeed, energy partnership and energy cooperation is an important part of our Global Gateway strategy. Under the Global Gateway strategy, we created this Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative, which is worth EUR听3.4听billion. So the idea is really that through that initiative we can support our partner countries in their energy transition, and especially the green energy transition.

I already mentioned a couple of very concrete initiatives in terms of energy, for instance, the Ruzizi III hydropower plant in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. That鈥檚 one example. Then we also have several energy projects in Nigeria, which are ongoing or just about to start. Then the recent initiative we just adopted with Senegal, a couple of weeks ago in Paris, was this JETP. The idea is really to support Senegal in their deployment of renewable energies. And there is this commitment of EUR听2.5听billion, not only from the EU, but also from our international partners as well as international banks.

So there are very concrete, tangible projects, which are, some of them, already ongoing or just about to start. And, of course, we are definitely supporting our partners in the energy transition because we know, for instance, that in Africa still 600听million citizens are lacking access to electricity.

听听Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI). 鈥� Dear Commissioner, thank you for the all the details. I would like to ask you something related to the domain in this case of peace and security. When we presented the European Peace Facility, we stated that this would have increased our readiness to support efforts from our partners, as well as the predictability of our actions.

Now that the EPF funds have been completely devoted to the much-needed support to Ukraine, how can we support our African counterparts? And is there any plan to devote specific funding to this end?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Indeed, peace and security has long been a key pillar of the EU and AU partnership, and the European Union is fully committed to supporting the African Union鈥檚 peace and security efforts, and it鈥檚 putting its strength behind African solutions to African problems. So this is also important that there is an African solution to an African problem.

So at the last EU-AU summit last year here in Brussels we laid the ground for more strategic engagement on peace and security. So actually, if I look at the figures, in order to ensure the sustainability and predictability of funding for the missions, we have committed a financial package of EUR听730听million for the period 2021-2024 within the framework of the European Peace Facility.

We are also very committed for substantial resources to support the EU-AU Peace and Security Partnership. For instance, the multiannual indicative programme with sub-Saharan Africa dedicates EUR听650 million to African conflict prevention and resolution initiatives to address transnational security threats and support the resilience and stability of communities living in areas near conflict鈥攁ffected borders.

So there are also financial resources in the European Peace Facility although, as you correctly said, through the European Peace Facility we have also supported very much and very sizeable amounts of money to Ukraine.

听听Francisco Jos茅 Mill谩n Mon (PPE). 鈥� Se帽or presidente, me preocupa, como ya se ha dicho, la actitud que varios pa铆ses africanos est谩n adoptando ante la agresi贸n rusa a Ucrania. Solo la mitad, pr谩cticamente, han votado a favor de las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas que condenan la agresi贸n. Muchos se mantienen al margen, como si la guerra no fuese con ellos y se tratase solo de un asunto entre europeos. Solo ha habido una iniciativa reciente de algunos l铆deres africanos que han viajado a Rusia y Ucrania.

La guerra no les debe resultar indiferente. Rusia viola principios b谩sicos: la integridad territorial y el no uso de la fuerza. Es grav铆simo que Rusia vuelva al imperialismo y al colonialismo del siglo XIX.

Desde la Cumbre Uni贸n Europea鈥斆乫rica de febrero de 2022, a m铆 me parece que no hemos impulsado decididamente nuestra relaci贸n con el continente. Rusia 鈥擫avrov en particular鈥� s铆 lo ha hecho. A finales de este mes se celebra en San Petersburgo la Cumbre Rusia鈥斆乫rica.

S茅 que el se帽or Borrell estuvo en N铆ger la semana pasada. Adem谩s de eso, 驴qu茅 estamos haciendo desde la Uni贸n Europea para hablar con los africanos en materia de la guerra de Rusia? 驴Les hemos hablado de los riesgos que implica el Grupo Wagner?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you for your question. We do a lot of outreach. I have been in Africa several times this year. Also, several of my colleagues have travelled to the continent as well as several European ministers. So of course it鈥檚 important to reach out to our partners and explain to them also that, in the case of Ukraine and Russia鈥檚 attack against Ukraine, it is not only about sovereignty 鈥� of course it is also a question of sovereignty 鈥� but it鈥檚 also a question of the UN Charter.

Why did some of the African countries decide to abstain? There are several reasons for that. Firstly, we have to remember that even though the war is taking place on European soil, the crisis is very much global. So of course many African countries really face the consequences and the ramifications of the war, for instance in terms of food insecurity, because many of those countries traditionally have imported a lot of fertilisers or wheat grain from Ukraine and from Russia.

So they see the risks, they see the consequences, also in terms of high inflation or high energy prices. But at the same time, there are also historical relationships with Russia. For instance, Russia has been supporting some of our partner countries鈥� independence fight. Back in history they have been educating African political leaders in the former Soviet Union. So there are also historical relations which might also explain their behaviour.

And then, of course, we know, as was mentioned several times already in this plenary, that China is very important economic actor in many of our partner countries. So I would say that there are different reasons in different partner countries why they are hesitant to take sides in this conflict, which is very, I would say, important and clear for us, for the Europeans, but that is why it is so important to reach out to them and also explain why we have to condemn Russia鈥檚 attack and why it鈥檚 so important that they support us, for instance in the United Nations.

听听Carlos Zorrinho (S&D). 鈥� Senhora Comiss谩ria, recentemente, pude acompanh谩-la numa miss茫o na Z芒mbia, em que ficou bem claro o que pode significar a coopera莽茫o UE-脕frica.

A coopera莽茫o e o desenvolvimento sustent谩vel s茫o um motor de paz, compromisso entre os povos. Isso foi reafirmado tamb茅m na 43.陋 Assembleia Parlamentar ACP-UE, com a sua participa莽茫o.

E se olharmos para a agenda da Uni茫o Europeia - defesa da Ucr芒nia, pol铆tica de migra莽玫es, gest茫o de crises humanit谩rias, lideran莽a tecnol贸gica na descarboniza莽茫o e no digital -, percebemos que a import芒ncia da parceria entre iguais 脕frica-UE e a aplica莽茫o do Global Europe e do Global Gateway s茫o absolutamente fundamentais.

E por isso, Senhora Comiss谩ria, estando aqui na casa da democracia, no Parlamento, n茫o posso deixar de lhe fazer esta pergunta: at茅 quando vamos continuar a pagar o pre莽o da chantagem no adiamento da entrada em vigor do acordo de p贸s-Cotonu?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you for joining me on this joint mission to Zambia. I think it might have been the first ever joint mission, at least between the DEVE Committee and the Commissioner. And for me, it really showcases this approach of Team Europe 鈥� this concept that we want to work as a team also between the European institutions. So I think it was a very strong example of that commitment.

When it comes to post-Cotonou Agreement, I really share your frustration, I can tell you. We were able to finalise the negotiations with 79 countries in spring 2021 鈥� so over two years ago. And since that, unfortunately, the agreement has been blocked by the Council, mainly because of one country. First it was Hungary; now it鈥檚 Poland.

Of course, I really hope that Poland could change its position so that we can adopt that new agreement and we could sign that new agreement as soon as possible, especially because their request has nothing to do with the content of the agreement. So what Poland is asking for has nothing to do with the agreement. So that鈥檚 why I think it is important that we could really make some progress prior to the summit, which is taking place next week with Latin America and the Caribbean region.

听听Samira Rafaela (Renew). 鈥� Madam Commissioner, we have the Economic Partnership Agreement with Kenya, the first-ever Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement with Angola, we have the cooperation under the Global Gateway Initiative, and I could go on. So things are moving in the right direction and that is very positive news for the EU鈥擜frica relations, especially from a trade perspective.

However, not everything is as positive: individual Member States that hold the Council hostage on post-Cotonou, or the Council blocking in GSP negotiations by introducing an unethical migration clause. Progress is slowed down by conservative Member States and that is very unfortunate.

But in spite of that, we need to achieve our partnership of equals and with that, we need to assist our African partners where that is welcome and vice-versa. So I鈥檓 asking the following: how is the Commission concretely contributing to the economic integration of the African continent? Does the Commission also implement a sectoral approach, for example for relations with the ECOWAS region? And what is the Commission doing to help African companies comply with the increasing environmental standards?

听听Jutta Urpilainen, Member of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you for your question and thank you also for paying attention to this recent development we have done in terms of economic partnership agreements, 鈥楨PAs鈥�, for instance with Kenya. My dear colleague Commissioner Dombrovskis was able to sign the new agreement just recently in Nairobi.

Indeed, we want to have a reinforced dialogue with Africa at the continental level. To this end, at the last EU-African Union Commission-to-Commission meeting 鈥� which took place last autumn in Brussels 鈥� both the African Commission and the European Commission agreed to step up a high-level dialogue on economic integration with a view to strengthening trade relations and sustainable investment between the two continents.

The African Continental Free Trade Area is potentially a game-changer that may increase intra-continental trade diversification and development of intra-African value chains and also contribute to Africa鈥檚 industrialisation processes. So the African Continental Free Trade Area and the economic partnership agreements are mutually reinforcing one another. They have both contributed to creating predictable trade and investment conditions, but also to attracting capital and becoming a hub for foreign direct investment in several African countries and regions. So the African Continental Free Trade Area process can take this practical experience into account.

I can just add very quickly that these sustainability aspects have been included in all EPA talks, and that will be, of course, part of this dialogue regarding the African Continental Free Trade Area as well.

听听President. 鈥� That concludes Question Time.

Thank you very much, Commissioner Urpilainen. I would also like once more to apologise to all those who were not able to speak during Question Time.

听听 L墨dz ar to 拧膩 darba k膩rt墨bas punkta izskat墨拧ana ir pabeigta.