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听听Der Pr盲sident. 鈥� Als n盲chster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Fragestunde mit Anfragen an die Kommission (Artikel听137 GO).

Ich begr眉脽e Frau Jourov谩, Vizepr盲sidentin der Kommission, zu dieser Fragestunde.

Das Thema der Fragestunde lautet: 鈥濨ereitschaft der Regierungen in der EU, Einflussnahme aus dem Ausland, auch aus Russland, zu bek盲mpfen鈥�.

Die Fragestunde wird etwa 60听Minuten dauern.

Wie 眉blich betr盲gt die Redezeit eine Minute f眉r eine Frage und zwei Minuten f眉r die Antwort.

Bei der ersten Rednerrunde besteht die M枚glichkeit, eine Zusatzfrage zu stellen; f眉r diese Frage stehen Ihnen 30听Sekunden zur Verf眉gung, die Redezeit f眉r die Antwort betr盲gt zwei Minuten.

Ich weise Sie darauf hin, dass eine m枚gliche Zusatzfrage nur dann zul盲ssig ist, wenn sie in einem engen Zusammenhang zu der Hauptfrage steht und es sich nicht um eine neue Frage handelt.

Wenn Sie eine Frage stellen m枚chten, ersuche ich Sie, Ihren Antrag jetzt zu registrieren, indem Sie die Funktion Ihres Abstimmungsger盲ts f眉r spontane Wortmeldungen nutzen, nachdem Sie Ihre Stimmkarte eingeschoben haben.

W盲hrend der Fragestunde erfolgen Wortmeldungen von Ihrem Sitzplatz aus, und ich ersuche alle Rednerinnen und Redner, die ihnen zugewiesene Redezeit einzuhalten.

Die Kolleginnen und Kollegen ben枚tigen m枚glicherweise einige Augenblicke, um ihren Antrag, eine Frage zu stellen, 眉ber ihr Abstimmungsger盲t zu registrieren. Daher ersuche ich Sie erneut, Ihren Antrag jetzt zu stellen, damit wir mit der ersten Frage beginnen k枚nnen.

听听袝胁邪 袦邪泄写械谢 (PPE). 鈥� 袚-薪 锌褉械写褋械写邪褌械谢, 褍胁邪卸邪械屑邪 谐-卸芯 胁懈褑械锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌 薪邪 袝胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻邪褌邪 泻芯屑懈褋懈褟, 械写薪芯 芯褌 锌芯褋谢械写薪懈褌械 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪懈褟 薪邪 袝胁褉芯斜邪褉芯屑械褌褗褉 锌芯泻邪蟹胁邪, 褔械 懈屑邪 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 褔谢械薪泻懈, 胁 泻芯懈褌芯 褍写芯胁谢械褌胁芯褉械薪芯褋褌褌邪 芯褌 褔械褋褌薪芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈蟹斜芯褉懈褌械 械 写芯褋褌邪 薪懈褋泻邪. 袨褋胁械薪 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 泻邪褌芯 袘褗谢谐邪褉懈褟 懈 袪褍屑褗薪懈褟, 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪械褌芯 锌芯泻邪蟹胁邪, 褔械 芯褌 2019 谐. 褌邪蟹懈 褍写芯胁谢械褌胁芯褉械薪芯褋褌 芯褌 褔械褋褌薪懈 懈蟹斜芯褉懈 胁 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 泻邪褌芯 袚械褉屑邪薪懈褟 懈 袧懈写械褉谢邪薪写懈褟 褋褗褖芯 褋锌邪写邪 写褉邪褋褌懈褔薪芯.

袟邪褌芯胁邪 斜懈褏 懈褋泻邪谢邪 写邪 袙懈 锌芯锌懈褌邪屑: 小屑褟褌邪褌械 谢懈, 褔械 褌邪蟹懈 蟹邪谐褍斜邪 薪邪 写芯胁械褉懈械 胁 褔械褋褌薪芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈蟹斜芯褉懈褌械 胁 袝胁褉芯锌邪 械 芯锌邪褋薪邪 懈 褔械 褌褟 屑芯卸械 写邪 芯褌胁芯褉懈 胁褉邪褌邪褌邪 蟹邪 写芯锌褗谢薪懈褌械谢薪懈 屑邪薪懈锌褍谢邪褑懈懈 懈 薪邪屑械褋邪 芯褌 褋褌褉邪薪邪 薪邪 袪褍褋懈褟 胁 锌褉械写褋褌芯褟褖邪褌邪 泻邪屑锌邪薪懈褟 蟹邪 懈蟹斜芯褉懈 薪邪 袝胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻懈褟 锌邪褉谢邪屑械薪褌? 袙 褌邪蟹懈 锌芯褋芯泻邪 斜懈褏 懈褋泻邪谢邪 写邪 袙懈 锌芯锌懈褌邪屑 泻邪泻褗胁 械 锌谢邪薪褗褌 蟹邪 写械泄褋褌胁懈械 薪邪 袝胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻邪褌邪 泻芯屑懈褋懈褟, 蟹邪 写邪 屑芯卸械 褌芯泄 写邪 斜褗写械 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪 褋 锌芯胁懈褕邪胁邪薪械褌芯 薪邪 写芯胁械褉懈械褌芯 胁 懈蟹斜芯褉薪懈褟 锌褉芯褑械褋 薪邪 袝小, 芯褋芯斜械薪芯 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褋械 泻邪褋邪械 蟹邪 泻邪屑锌邪薪懈褟褌邪 蟹邪 懈蟹斜芯褉懈褌械 蟹邪 袝胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻懈 锌邪褉谢邪屑械薪褌?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you for organising this debate, because this is very topical, and I want to thank also for very strong support from INGE and ING2 Committees.

Now to the question. Well, indeed, also the data which we collect from different sources show that more and more citizens in the EU Member听States are announcing the feeling that democracy does not work for them and that they do not trust the democratic process.

You asked about the solution. I would name three things. First of all, we organised at the European level the national network for elections, where we discuss, among other things, how to organise free and fair elections. So the process, the technical means. Also, how to guarantee that the citizens will get sufficient, clear and early information about where they can cast their vote, and how they get the additional information in case they need it 鈥� for instance, the people with different handicaps, who were a little bit abandoned in the last elections. We now focus on that.

The third thing is the communication we have with the European political parties. Through them, with national political parties, we want the elections to be free and fair, in the sense of free from manipulation. That鈥檚 why I asked the political parties to resist the temptation to use methods like deepfakes, and at the same time to use their communication to encourage the voters鈥� activity and action.

As for the deepfakes, we just had a discussion here about AI. We also required some action from the digital platforms and from the technologies, and they also committed 鈥� the biggest ones, except Twitter or X 鈥� they committed to act against the deepfakes and hidden manipulation before the elections. The campaign has to be very transparent and free of manipulation.

听听Maria Grapini (S&D). 鈥� Domnule pre葯edinte, doamn膬 comisar, sigur c膬 dezbatem un subiect foarte important, mai ales c膬 anul acesta avem at芒tea alegeri. Considera葲i c膬 este important s膬 ne preocup膬m de toate alegerile, nu numai de alegerile la nivelul Parlamentului European? Pentru c膬, p芒n膬 la urm膬, alegerile la nivel local, la nivel na葲ional, parlamentele na葲ionale, acelea vor influen葲a dup膬 aceea rezultatul alegerilor de acolo, vor influen葲a 葯i alegerile pentru Parlamentul European.

A葯adar, dac膬 exist膬 o ingerin葲膬 str膬in膬 la nivelul alegerilor locale 葯i na葲ionale 葯i deformeaz膬 rezultatul alegerilor, evident c膬 vor fi influen葲ate 葯i celelalte. Pute葲i s膬 aprecia葲i cam 卯n ce procent considera葲i dumneavoastr膬 c膬 exist膬 acum, c芒nd vorbim, ingerin葲e str膬ine la nivelul celor 27 de state? A葲i spus c芒teva lucruri, dar cred c膬 a le cere doar s膬 nu foloseasc膬 inteligen葲a artificial膬 cu filmule葲e false nu este suficient. Nu crede葲i c膬 ar trebui s膬 avem la nivelul Uniunii Europene reglement膬ri care s膬 restric葲ioneze? Asta nu 卯nseamn膬 c膬 nu avem libertatea de exprimare, dar s膬 restric葲ioneze 葯i s膬 sanc葲ioneze dur toate aceste informa葲ii false 葯i manipul膬ri.

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I will not surprise you. I have to say that all elections matter. Of course, now with the upcoming European elections, we are focusing on them. But also, we have many national, regional and local elections. And in all of these elections, the citizens expect politicians to be transparent, to give them a realistic plan in the campaign and that they will not use dirty methods 鈥� if I may say it in such a, maybe too strong, way.

We see in fact, three main risks: cyberattacks, foreign interference, which you mentioned, and digital manipulation or hidden manipulation, including disinformation. We addressed some of the risks already vis-脿-vis Russia in the first sanctions package. So you may remember that it was a novelty in the EU, but we put on the sanctions list, so-called 鈥楻ussian media鈥� 鈥� I say 鈥榮o-called鈥� because they were nothing else than the Russian military arsenal. And there were some other so-called 鈥榤edia鈥� in the later packages.

At the same time, you ask about the legislation. We have now the Digital Services Act in combination with the Code of Practice on Disinformation. It has the power, if fully implemented and enforced, to decrease the impact of disinformation, including disinformation produced abroad.

You ask about the percentage of the impact. I cannot tell you. It differs state by state. And the average figure for Europe will not say anything. I have to say that our foreign adversaries, they have a special strategy for each Member State. Here, of course, Russia has to be mentioned at the first place. But also, we have Chinese and Iran and other activities which are influencing or trying to meddle into our electoral processes 鈥� nothing to be neglected or underestimated, because we can see that if the failure appears in one Member State, then it has impact on the whole EU.

Last comment: the organisation of elections falls under the competence of the Member States. But we try to be very supportive.

听听Nathalie Loiseau (Renew). 鈥� Monsieur le Pr茅sident, s鈥檌l y a bien un domaine dans lequel l鈥橢urope est une passoire, c鈥檈st face aux ing茅rences de ses adversaires 鈥撎齦a Russie la premi猫re. Bizarrement, cette passoire-l脿, ni le RN ni l鈥橝fD ne la d茅noncent jamais. Il est vrai que, dans ce domaine, ils sont en t锚te des r茅seaux de passeurs. L鈥橢urope doit mieux se d茅fendre, et pour cela, elle doit s鈥檈n donner les moyens. Aux 脡tats-Unis, au Royaume鈥擴ni et en Australie, on exige la transparence pour tous les repr茅sentants d鈥檌nt茅r锚ts 茅trangers.

Je salue le projet de directive pr茅sent茅 par la Commission, mais je d茅plore l鈥檃ngle qui a 茅t茅 choisi, celui du march茅 int茅rieur. Cela n鈥檃 pas de sens. Ni notre Parlement ni le Conseil ne doivent traiter l鈥檈mpoisonnement de nos d茅mocraties comme un simple probl猫me d鈥檋armonisation du lobbying. La transparence doit s鈥檌mposer pour tous les relais d鈥檌nfluence, et nous devons apprendre 脿 prot茅ger nos citoyens autant que nous prot茅geons nos consommateurs. O霉 en sont les discussions au Conseil, et peut-on 茅largir le champ de la directive pour 茅viter de taper 脿 c么t茅 de la cible?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you, Ms Loiseau, well, I agree with you that Europe needs to defend itself better. But I want to also mention what we hear from, for instance, United States, they will also have to do more to protect their electoral processes. I don鈥檛 want to intrude into that, but I know that they are watching what the European Union is doing.

I mentioned some of the pieces of legislation which are based on the single market, and I will mention another one which also has the legal basis in the article on the single market 鈥� Article 114 鈥� and it鈥檚 the interest representation, and this is under the defence of democracy package, because we are convinced that if there are some contracts between third country governments and European entities or entities operating on the European market we should know about that. So our proposed directive seeks to achieve as big as possible transparency on these contracts and on the purpose of these contracts. This is mainly lobbying or organising events and influencing the political decision-making in our Member States. Transparency is key, and I think that we have to make progress here.

You ask a concrete question about where we are in the Council. We had, I think, two debates. The last one was in the General Affairs Council, where this file belongs to. There were three kinds of reactions: most of the Member States said, 鈥榊es, this is useful, let鈥檚 work on it鈥�; part of the Member States said, 鈥榃e already have the register, which shows the contracts and the purpose of such contracts, so Europe, don鈥檛 touch it, we have our own system and we don鈥檛 want this to be decreased鈥�; and then the third group of Member States, where there was only one Member State, we heard that this is something we should not do. So that鈥檚 the dynamics in the Council. We have to continue because the Belgian Presidency has a very clear and ambitious plan to have the Council decision in June.

听听Hannah Neumann (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Herr Pr盲sident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Wer wissen will, wie ausl盲ndische Informationsmanipulation und Desinformation aussehen, der schaue in die Datenbank EUvsDisinfo. Dort wurden mittlerweile 16听000听Narrative, vor allem von Putins Trollen gestreut, gesammelt, die nur ein Ziel haben: unsere Gesellschaft zu spalten und zu schw盲chen.

Was man beim Scrollen durch diese Datenbank sehr leicht sieht, ist, einiges davon h枚rt sich doch ziemlich genau so an wie die Parolen derer, die hier ganz rechts sitzen: Ukrainische Agrarimporte w眉rden die polnische Landwirtschaft ruinieren. Manchmal werden sogar konservative Politiker zu trojanischen Pferden russischer Desinformation, so Friedrich Merz, wenn er vom Sozialtourismus ukrainischer Fl眉chtlinge schwadroniert.

Meine Frage an Sie daher, Kommissarin: Welche Erkenntnisse haben Sie zur Rolle rechtsextremer und rechter Politiker bei der Verbreitung russischer Desinformation, und wie planen Sie, diese Form der Desinformation zu bek盲mpfen?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� You mentioned that disinformation and the attacks from Russia in information space 鈥� indeed, I agree 鈥� tries to weaken our society, but also to abuse, in fact, democracy and freedom of speech, which we protect and which we want to continue to defend in the EU. We are in the information war, in fact.

What we see is a very concrete effort of Russia to interfere into the elections and to influence the public opinion of European people to convince or push their politicians to stop support for Ukraine. There is a very concrete plan. It鈥檚 simple, and Putin is a master in creating different strategies and different narratives for different Member States.

Your question was about whether there are some cooperating parties or individuals. Well, in fact, Mr Putin needs a mouthpiece that will speak domestic language. He is using the willing collaborators in each Member State. They are either individuals or some parties or movements which are out of the parliaments. In some Member States, we already see parliamentary parties, and unfortunately, we also see some parties which are in our Member States鈥� governments, which now do not hesitate to spread in their country, in their society, the pro-Kremlin narratives. And so this is happening through the intermediaries, and so it means that we cannot just blame Russia, but we also have to have a very strong discussion with those who obviously stand on the side of the aggressor.

听听Hannah Neumann (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Thank you for your answer, Commissioner. Would you mind to clearly name some of these domestic perpetrators, so that our citizens are very aware, when they hear them speak, what their message is, and who stands behind those messages?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I am hesitant whether to name and shame 鈥� yes, this is a shame, in my view. I think that it鈥檚 also a moral duty now to choose the right side of the conflict, and to be very clear in our position that we stand by the side of those who defend, which means Ukrainians. I hesitate whether to name the political parties which spread the narratives, because I don鈥檛 want to spread their fame and create their visibility. But I think that in our Member States, we have political parties in the different parliaments, which started to spread the narrative of Russia that, it鈥檚 vice versa, that it鈥檚 not Russia, but it鈥檚 Ukraine who started the war and that the Ukrainians do not deserve to have any state, and they do not deserve to have sovereignty, they do not deserve to be part of the EU.

So, you know very well in each Member State what are what are the parties which are spreading these narratives and I would like to call on the other parties, movements and individuals to have courage and counter this speech because without using especially the digital space for telling the people the facts 鈥� I avoided the word truth, truth has always some colour or according to many truth is very individual thing but we have some objective facts which have to be defended. And this is for all those who are standing on the right side of history to distribute the facts so that the people can make their free choice and well-informed choice.

听听Joachim Stanis艂aw Brudzi艅ski (ECR). 鈥� Panie Przewodnicz膮cy! Szanowna pani komisarz! Komisja Specjalna ds. Obcych Ingerencji we Wszystkie Procesy Demokratyczne w Unii Europejskiej, w tym Dezinformacji, szczeg贸艂owo ujawni艂a kierowane przez Rosj臋 dzia艂ania i operacje maj膮ce na celu infiltracj臋 europejskich demokracji i instytucji unijnych. Aby osi膮gn膮膰 swoje cele, Rosja stosuje szerok膮 gam臋 metod wojny hybrydowej: takie dzia艂ania jak manipulowanie informacjami zar贸wno za pomoc膮 medi贸w tradycyjnych, jak i platform spo艂eczno艣ciowych, przeci膮ganie elit na swoj膮 stron臋, ataki hakerskie dla niewygodnych dla Rosji kandydat贸w, i w ko艅cu co艣 niezwykle kompromituj膮cego dla Izby, w kt贸rej tutaj dyskutujemy, a mianowicie korumpowanie europos艂贸w i kupowanie u nich rezolucji, wymierzonych chocia偶by w rz膮dy obna偶aj膮ce imperialn膮 polityk臋 Putina. Tak jak mia艂o to miejsce, kiedy za rosyjskie pieni膮dze powstawa艂y rezolucje w tej Izbie, g艂贸wnie po lewej stronie sali, wymierzone w rz膮d Prawa i Sprawiedliwo艣ci 鈥� rz膮d, kt贸ry pierwszy pospieszy艂 z pomoc膮 dotkni臋tej wojn膮 Ukrainie.

Jako skandal odbieram s艂owa wypowiedziane tu przez moj膮 przedm贸wczyni臋 atakuj膮c膮 opini臋 publiczn膮 w Polsce i polskich rolnik贸w, 偶e sprzeciwiaj膮 si臋 nap艂ywowi ukrai艅skiego zbo偶a do Polski i ma to by膰 dow贸d dzia艂a艅 rosyjskich. Szanowna pani, tak samo protestuj膮 rolnicy belgijscy, niemieccy, holenderscy czy hiszpa艅scy. A pytanie do pani komisarz: jak dzisiaj instytucje unijne s膮 przygotowane na te dzia艂ania dezintegracyjne ze strony Rosji?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I am not sure if I got rightly the question.

It is true that Poland was the strongest voice, especially at the beginning, after the invasion of Russia to Ukraine, in helping the rest of Europe to take very strong position on the invasion of Russia to Ukraine.

At the same time, we see that now during the war, there is an issue for the farmers of the EU and especially in the countries like Poland and Romania, Slovakia. It is a heavy situation for the farmers because they have to face problems on the market and the problem with the prices. Here we speak about the disinformation and about the manipulation of the facts. I would really like everybody 鈥� or everybody who has influence on the public opinion 鈥� to be able to say the facts about this, so that, again, the people understand the situation.

The protests against the Ukrainian crops and the transport of the Ukrainian wheat and eggs and so on, this is not the protest against the support of Ukraine; it鈥檚 in its fight against Russia. But the fact about this is that Ukraine lost markets because of the war. So we wanted to create a safe way for the crops, for the grain, to get to Africa and to some other places, which failed because there were some speculators who kept the crops on the territory of our Member States. This has to be solved. And it cannot be solved by saying something which will just manipulate the facts. The facts are this.

And the fact is also that the farmers need help. The Polish farmers, the Slovak farmers, the Romanian farmers, the farmers in the Member States who are affected by that, need help. That鈥檚 why we agreed on the compensation. We agreed on some limit for the tariffs. We agreed on many, many different things to ease the situation. I would like us to understand the situation on the basis of the facts. It鈥檚 true that the protests of farmers were surrounded by many, many pieces of disinformation which should be debunked.

听听Joachim Stanis艂aw Brudzi艅ski (ECR). 鈥� Pani komisarz, bardzo dzi臋kuj臋 za te s艂owa, szczeg贸lnie w odniesieniu do Polski, mojego kraju. Mam nadziej臋, 偶e ta dezinformacja rosyjska, kt贸ra by膰 mo偶e le偶a艂a u podstaw tego ataku, zupe艂nie irracjonalnego, kt贸ry zosta艂 skierowany tutaj przez przedstawicielk臋 lewicy, zosta艂a chocia偶 cz臋艣ciowo obna偶ona.

Ale chcia艂bym dopyta膰, pani komisarz: na ile dzisiaj, w przededniu wybor贸w do Parlamentu Europejskiego, instytucje unijne s膮 przygotowane na kolejne dzia艂ania hybrydowe ze strony Rosji, kolejne fake newsy i kolejne ataki, szczeg贸lnie wymierzone w te rz膮dy, kt贸re nie ciesz膮 si臋 poparciem lewicowego establishmentu, chocia偶by w tej Izbie?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Maybe I will surprise you, but for me, left or right, conservative or liberals, it鈥檚 not the most important thing. For me, what is important is evidence-based truth, the facts, which have to be delivered to the citizens so that they understand our reality, because we see more and more attacks against the reality or understanding of reality.

We see politically motivated and produced campaigns full of disinformation. We already see artificial intelligence being used for that. We see many different attempts to deliver to citizens the false picture of what鈥檚 happening. So this is my job here, not to protect the left or right, but my job here is to, first of all, protect the freedom of speech, and second, to protect all the channels and all the actions which will result in delivery of the facts to the citizens.

And I want to repeat one thing, maybe I already indicated that we work with the principle that opinions are subjective. They belong to each individual and they should be protected. Facts are objective. We should be able to verify them. And then the citizens, when they have the reach to the objective facts, they can make their choice, also in the elections. That is why, again in connection with the elections, we are supporting the fact checking online. Again, no ideology, no left or right, but looking at the facts. And we are also trying to support more the independent media and public service media because they are the ones who should be able to professionally work with the subjects and who should be able to deliver the facts to the people.

I know I repeat again and again the word 鈥榝acts鈥�, but I think that if we stop recognising the importance of facts, we will have a destiny to live in lies. And this is what we should not want.

听听Sandra Kalniete (PPE). 鈥� God膩tais s膿des vad墨t膩j! Pirms devi艈iem m膿ne拧iem, komis膩res kundze, Eiropas Parlaments p膩rliecino拧i nobalsoja par manu zi艈ojumu par 膩rvalstu iejauk拧anos Eiropas Savien墨bas demokr膩tiskajos procesos, aicinot paredz膿t ilgtermi艈a finans膿jumu Eiropas Savien墨bas bud啪et膩, lai c墨n墨tos pret mas墨vaj膩m Krievijas dezinform膩cijas kampa艈膩m, ar kur膩m Krievija 墨steno Eiropas Savien墨b膩 inform膩cijas hibr墨dkaru, gan c墨noties par eiropie拧u pr膩tiem, gan 拧姆e募ot sabiedr墨bas salied膿t墨bu. 艩is kar拧 norisin膩s jau gadiem, un taj膩 Kremlis ir ieguld墨jis vair膩kus miljardus eiro. 艩o hibr墨duzbrukumu atvair墨拧ana un invest墨cijas sabiedr墨bas notur墨b膩 ir nacion膩l膩s un m奴su kontinenta dro拧墨bas jaut膩jums.

K膩ds ir bijis re膩lais Eiropas Savien墨bas finans膿juma apjoms, lai 墨stenotu 拧o strat膿模isko m膿r姆i, un, vai s膩kot pl膩not n膩kamo Eiropas Savien墨bas daudzgadu bud啪etu, tam tiks paredz膿ts nepiecie拧amais finans膿jums?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Ms听Kalniete, you got me to the situation when I have to admit I don鈥檛 have the figures here. But I can tell you that between 2015 and today we are increasing the budget of the External Action Service, which is dealing with the collection of data and analysis of the data of foreign interference, especially focusing on Russia through the East StratCom Task Force, which has collected, exposed and counted around 17听000 cases of pro-Kremlin information manipulation.

In 2023 alone, this EUvsDisinfo system reached over 20听million people via its website and social media channels. And East StratCom Task Force alone, for example, directly engaged with well over 10听000听people last year via a number of trainings conducted by us, including to journalists, visitors, groups hosted, speeches given, and so on.

I don鈥檛 want to fill in the time after admitting that I don鈥檛 have the money and the figure here. But I want to illustrate that over time, between 2015, when we already were under big Russian manipulation depicting Ukrainians as the fascists and narkomans and so on 鈥� the campaign started, and you know it very well, already after the invasion of Crimea 鈥� we increased the number of staff in our External Service. We increased the money through different programmes, like Horizon, or these training programmes. We increased also, in our Member States, the capacities. I would say the more we go to the east of Europe, the more capacities are used or deployed to counter the Russian propaganda.

More than money and our own sources is maybe the fact that we managed by legislation to push the big digital players to take action against these well-coordinated and well-designed disinformation campaigns against our citizens or happening in our information space. The action which the digital platforms now have to take is invaluable, because it鈥檚 about hundreds of millions of euro, which they have to invest in taking care of the content in the sense of especially fact-checking.

So, if you count all that 鈥� what we are doing, what we pushed the platforms to do, what the Member States are doing, what the civil society is doing, through the EDMO structures 鈥� I think that we speak about very big resources, which are increasing over time, because it has to correlate with the increased pressure from Russia, which we see every year.

听听Juozas Olekas (S&D). 鈥� Gerbiamas pirmininke, gerbiama Komisijos nare. Europa nema啪ai padar臈, kad u啪kardint懦 Rusijos ki拧im膮si 寞 Europos 拧ali懦 rinkimus ir 寞 politin寞 gyvenim膮. Ta膷iau jau treti metai Rusijos nauja agresijos banga Ukrainoje rodo, kad ji naudojasi galimyb臈mis Europoje. A拧 noriu paliesti vien膮 klausim膮, kuris n臈ra 膷ia diskutuotas labai garsiai. Tai 鈥� besit臋sianti prekyba ir i拧likusios investicijos, europin臈s investicijos Rusijoje. Jos leid啪ia Rusijai gauti pajamas, jos leid啪ia u啪dirbti kai kuriems 啪mon臈ms 膷ia, Europoje, ir finansuoti arba 寞takoti t懦 啪moni懦 pozicijas. Mes galime pamatyti, kad 寞vairios 寞mon臈s, kurios turi legal懦 ry拧寞 su Rusija dabar, jos ai拧kiai 啪i奴ri palankiau 寞 situacij膮 Rusijoje. Tai ar nemanote, kad 拧i膮 legali膮 prekyb膮 ir investicijas 寞 Rusij膮 reik臈t懦 dar stipriau u啪kardinti arba pareikalauti mok臈ti karo mokes膷ius u啪 tai, kad jie prekiauja su agresore?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I am afraid it is a very relevant question, but maybe not under the topic of foreign interference and disinformation.

I want to say that with every new sanction package, we are addressing more and more sectors, which is compelling, which is pushing European businesses to stop the business they make in Russia. And the problem is not only that, maybe there might be more companies or more sectors affected, but the avoidance or evasion or trying to avoid the sanctions by different means, also through the export through third countries, not directly through Russia.

And this is exactly what we wanted to address by the legislation, which seeks to introduce sanctions for avoiding the sanctions. If I am not mistaken, the legislation is still in the legislative process. So this is in the making. But the story or the saga of sanctions has not finished. And we will have to react to new findings and new situations.

You mentioned that this is legal business. Well, the legal business is still so until the moment when the democratic institutions declare it illegal. And so this is happening over time.

Also, our Member States are acting in this field, but we cannot just over overnight say that the legal business has to be stopped. My personal view is that every business which is helping Russia in the war or which is making money on the horrible war and misery and catastrophe which Russians are doing in Ukraine, every such business should be should be stopped.

听听Jordi Ca帽as (Renew). 鈥� Se帽or presidente, se帽ora comisaria Jourov谩, 驴sabe c贸mo se est谩 preparando el Gobierno de Espa帽a, presidido por Pedro S谩nchez, para combatir la injerencia rusa en Europa? Aprobando una amnist铆a a medida de los separatistas catalanes que pidieron ayuda a Putin para la independencia de Catalu帽a. Una amnist铆a que busca no solo borrar sus delitos, sino que, sobre todo, lo que busca es impedir investigaciones judiciales en curso que tienen s贸lidas pruebas y evidencias de esas relaciones entre el separatismo catal谩n y Rusia.

Y, entonces, si queremos saber la verdad, 驴la Comisi贸n Europea va a permitir que haya un Estado miembro que amnist铆e a presuntos delincuentes para evitar investigaciones judiciales que aporten la verdad sobre la injerencia rusa en un Estado miembro? Yo sinceramente espero y quiero escucharle decir qu茅 va a hacer la Comisi贸n para evitar que se impida investigar a unos jueces que quieren saber la verdad y descubrir las conexiones entre pol铆ticos y partidos europeos con Putin.

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I will reply now more in the capacity of the Commissioner responsible for the matters related to the rule of law.

I said it several times already publicly 鈥� also after having discussions with the political representation of Spain, from, let鈥檚 say, both sides of the spectrum 鈥� that we are following the legislative process, which is now still ongoing in Spain. After the legislative process on amnesty law is finished, we will do the proper assessment. Then we will either react, if we see that the law is in breach of EU law, or we will not react, if this is not the case.

You know very well the method. We cannot comment on laws or we cannot take action against laws which fully fall under the sovereign Member State鈥檚 competence or which are not in breach of EU law. So I cannot predict any result. But we are waiting for the final version.

Puhetta johti HEIDI HAUTALA
varapuhemies

听听Vlad Gheorghe (Renew). 鈥� Doamn膬 pre葯edint膬, Putin investe葯te miliarde 葯i miliarde de euro, de ruble, 卯n politicieni de aici, din Uniunea European膬; de foarte multe ori, 卯n politicieni de aici, din aceast膬 sal膬 din Parlamentul European. Am cerut, 葯i foarte mul葲i din colegii mei au fost de acord, s膬 modific膬m regulamentul acestui parlament astfel 卯nc芒t trompetele lui Putin s膬 nu mai poat膬 s膬 se mai desf膬葯oare aici, astfel 卯nc芒t s膬 le putem t膬ia microfoanele 葯i, foarte, foarte important, s膬 le t膬iem accesul la putere, la decizie.

葮ti葲i ce s-a 卯nt芒mplat? Una dintre trompetele lui Putin de la mine din 葲ar膬, din Rom芒nia, a 卯nceput instant s膬 m膬 jigneasc膬, m-a f膬cut vierme, m-a f膬cut tr膬d膬tor 葯i a 卯nceput s膬 m膬 amenin葲e. Nu c膬 a葯 avea o problem膬 cu asta, dar mi se pare cel mai bun exemplu c膬 ceea ce facem aici c芒nd facem ceva cu adev膬rat 卯i deranjeaz膬.

葮ti葲i de ce se 卯nt芒mpl膬 toate astea? Pentru c膬 noi nu reu葯im s膬 le lu膬m banii oligarhilor 葯i oamenilor care fac bani cu Putin 葯i care 卯i trimit 卯napoi pentru ca acei bani s膬 vin膬, uite a葯a, frumos, 卯napoi la aceste trompete. Pentru c膬 mesajul meu este, c膬tre Uniunea European膬 acum, 鈥濽E, ia-le banii!鈥�, pentru c膬 numai a葯a putem s膬 le t膬iem microfoanele de tot. 脦ntrebarea mea este: ce face Comisia, doamn膬 comisar, 卯n leg膬tur膬 cu acest lucru?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� I will have three comments. First of all, with every new sanctions list, we have new names there. And new names mean the people who might have their properties and their money in the EU, which has to be frozen, and the proceeds of such frozen properties and money could be partly used for the reconstruction of Russia.

So first of all I want to say that we have to be very precise in addressing this problem by legal means, which is sanctioning the people, the oligarchs 鈥� if you want to use this word 鈥� and to be precise in blocking their properties and their proceeds.

As for the representatives of this House, if I understood well, I think that it is absolutely key that we achieve, as much as possible, transparency in how we work. And here comes the transparency register, which registers those who want to lobby us. You know there is huge lobbying around many, many pieces of legislation and many, many political actions which we are taking.

So as for transparency, I believe that in the next mandate the Commission, 合法博彩网站 and the Council should look at what other transparency register is still fit for purpose, and maybe also take a lesson from some cases from the past, when we saw Russian entities actively lobbying us who are involved in the legislative process.

And also I have to mention the ethics body which we are now trying to establish, because also here there will be a very strong call on transparency, and on the registration of gifts and travels and so on. I think that this is very important.

Last comment: I know I am beyond time, but I really think that achieving the adoption of the defence of democracy package and register of contracts with third countries will help, because we need to know who does what for whose money.

听听Barry Andrews (Renew). 鈥� Commissioner, I have a very specific question about media blackouts in the immediate 24 hours before elections.

I think you will say that this is a matter for Member States, that it鈥檚 a national competence 鈥� and that鈥檚 probably correct. Nevertheless, I would like to hear what the Commission has to say about the vacuum that is created by the 24-hour media blackouts, the vulnerability that it creates for our democracies, where there is a ban on public discussion in the media about the election that is going to take place within 24 hours.

And of course, as we heard in the last debate, artificial intelligence has the capacity to really supercharge this kind of disinformation in the 24 hours before an election. It鈥檚 much harder to detect. It鈥檚 in the hands of many, many people. And we have seen examples of it: both in 2017, with the famous 鈥楳acron leaks鈥� period, and also in 2020 in the US election.

So my question is: do you have any plan to communicate with Member States ahead of the European 合法博彩网站 elections about what I consider to be a ridiculous 24-hour media blackout period?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Yes, it鈥檚 a specific question. It doesn鈥檛 cover the whole EU. You predicted yourself my answer that it falls under the competence of the EU Member States. But, indeed, we discuss with the electoral network very intensively how the campaign should look, in the sense of phasing of rules, of stay periods maybe.

And all the discussions we had with the electoral network, but also with the experts on political marketing, tried to convince me that, in fact, political advertising and political marketing with access to digital platforms and social media is ongoing all the time, till the last minute before the elections. So we are discussing whether it makes sense to create some special rules for the last days before the elections, but it鈥檚 a decision for the Member States.

I am more involved now in discussing with the digital platforms the need to protect, let鈥檚 say, the last 10听days before the elections against deepfakes and AI production. Because there might be some last-minute 鈥� I will say a military word 鈥� shrapnel or some well-targeted weapon thrown into the information space, onto social media, which might be amplified by artificial intelligence and which will really flood our information space with some, as I said, well-targeted kind of disinformation.

For me, it鈥檚 important that the big platforms, except X, committed to either label such production or remove especially deep fakes, which might have the power to radically mislead the citizens and change their voting preferences.

So we are discussing best practices, the methods they use in some Member States. But believe me, the Member States are very much reluctant to receive some very concrete advice from Brussels because, again, it鈥檚 their national competence.

听听Juan Fernando L贸pez Aguilar (S&D). 鈥� Se帽ora presidenta, se帽ora vicepresidenta Jourov谩, estamos en el turno de preguntas del Parlamento Europeo sobre las injerencias rusas en procesos democr谩ticos.

Este Parlamento Europeo ha dedicado muchos debates a seguir paso a paso a la Comisi贸n y al Consejo los 煤ltimos nueve a帽os, desde la Br煤jula Estrat茅gica hasta los grupos especializados de trabajo StratCom, el Centro de puesta en com煤n y an谩lisis de la informaci贸n, el Observatorio Europeo de los Medios de Comunicaci贸n Digitales 鈥攓ue los obliga a la rendici贸n de cuentas, transparencia y responsabilidad por sus actos鈥� y el C贸digo de Buenas Pr谩cticas en materia de Desinformaci贸n.

Bien, tenemos todos los elementos para un an谩lisis y un diagn贸stico, pero se trata de dar una respuesta. Se帽ora vicepresidenta Jourov谩, en el caso de que se produzca una injerencia rusa en el pr贸ximo proceso electoral conducente a las elecciones europeas de junio de 2024, 驴cu谩l ser谩 la garant铆a de una respuesta eficaz en defensa de la integridad y credibilidad de las elecciones europeas? 驴Cu谩l ser谩 la sanci贸n a quienes se injieran en el proceso democr谩tico? 驴Cu谩l ser谩, en definitiva, el marco de respuesta europea 鈥攄isuasorio y represivo鈥� a las injerencias extranjeras en los procesos democr谩ticos?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Yes, Mr L贸pez Aguilar, this is again very relevant question. We don鈥檛 have many certain things in current life. One of them is climate change. And then the second thing I would mention, the almost absolute certainty, is that there will be foreign interference into our electoral campaigns, stronger or weaker per member state. Russia especially is the master in analysing where to attack which narratives through which allies, domestic proxies 鈥� I would even say useful idiots because they have very good mapping of the situation, and they know very well where it is effective or efficient to attack through which means.

As for the sanctions, we have to build it on our current legal framework. So the sanctions vis-脿-vis or covering the foreign actors, yes, we can add them on the sanctions list in case we have sufficient evidence that they were the originators, the producers of the concrete campaigns.

As for the sanctioning of the domestic proxies, the citizens or the entities who belong to European society, who am I to tell you? You are a lawyer, so you know very well how we can or cannot sanction the distributors of disinformation. Disinformation is mainly covered by the freedom of speech. Here I have to differentiate between hate speech, terrorism, extremism, which is a manifestly clear kind of illegal content. But disinformation requires more analysis.

So disinformation, which has the potential to do harm in the society, to do harm to security, or integrity of elections, maybe, in some Member States, can be sanctioned. But again, it鈥檚 for the Member States鈥� authorities to apply the laws which they have in their legal framework. But the sanctionability of the amplification of the disinformation in the EU exists, and in my view should be applied.

听听Viola von Cramon-Taubadel (Verts/ALE). 鈥� Frau Pr盲sidentin! Sie haben es eben schon erw盲hnt, Frau Kommissarin: Russische Desinformationen sind 眉berall听鈥� im Fernsehen, in Zeitungen, aber vor allem in den sozialen Medien. Russland hat eben auch eine Armee aus Bots, die viel gr枚脽er ist eigentlich als das Milit盲r. Sie posten sehr gezielt in Afrika, S眉damerika, im Nahen Osten, aber eben auch aus Russland heraus. Und es gibt 眉berall Kollaborateure听鈥� von Elon Musk angefangen bis zu anderen听鈥� wie Sie es gerade genannt haben听鈥� n眉tzlichen Idioten, die diese Desinformation des Kremls sehr gezielt weiterverbreiten.

Russland verf眉gt aber auch 眉ber eine Armee von Spionen und von Agenten听鈥� und, das merken wir immer wieder, das wird, glaube ich, hier untersch盲tzt听鈥�, die nicht nur in den Botschaften, sondern auch in unseren staatlichen Institutionen, auch hier in der EU, und auf allen Ebenen sehr aktiv sind. Russland hat auch Killer und Handlanger, die umherziehen und politische Ziele t枚ten听鈥� in Berlin, in Wien, in Alicante; und vieles von dem geschieht noch unerkannt.

Meine Frage ist: Was tun Sie? Was tut die EU ganz gezielt auf diesem Gebiet? Warum k枚nnen diese Agenten und diese Schl盲fer hier ungestraft weiter ihre Aktivit盲ten verrichten?

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Yes, I agree with you that this is a serious combination of different, very dangerous things which are happening on our territory.

On the army of bots, I think that we make very clear also in the AI Act 鈥� and in many different things we are doing 鈥� that the artificial intelligence bots, the robots, they do not have the freedom of speech. It鈥檚 here for the human beings. And that鈥檚 why I always speak to the digital platforms and to those who are running the information space that they should approach it like that. Because if the human beings will be attacked by the army of bots and robots, we will not have any chance. And especially when these AI products will be tasked to spread disinformation. This is what I call disinformation on steroids. That鈥檚 why we have to protect the information space, especially before the elections, against this phenomenon. And that鈥檚 why I am really glad that digital operators are taking it seriously.

On the spies, we are, of course, following the situation in our Member States. However, here I have to say that this is for the Member States to react on it because it falls under the national security rank. In some Member States, they are equipped in the criminal laws to address the spying as the criminal offence. In some of the other Member States, they are more tolerant, but I regret to say that this is for the Member States to take it seriously and to address it in their national legislation and in the proper action.

Coming back to what you said at the beginning, I also have to say that Russia is winning the information war in Africa, in South America and in the Middle East, and that we have to accelerate our counteraction to also distribute our way of thinking, our narrative, and our vision of the world, because this is serious.

听听Fabio Massimo Castaldo (Renew). 鈥� Signora Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, quello del contrasto alle ingerenze esterne 猫 un dibattito sempre pi霉 urgente e cruciale se vogliamo salvaguardare l'integrit脿 delle elezioni europee del prossimo giugno.

Tuttavia mi sorge un dubbio: quanto possono essere efficaci le misure di prevenzione che metteremo in campo se in un paese come il mio, l'Italia, c'猫 un vice primo ministro, Matteo Salvini, che si rifiuta categoricamente di fare luce sullo stato dell'accordo sottoscritto dal suo partito, la Lega, con Russia Unita di Vladimir Putin, ormai sette anni fa?

Possiamo veramente pensare di poterci proteggere dalle ingerenze della Russia quando sono le pi霉 alte cariche di uno Stato membro a intrattenere, coscientemente e colpevolmente, strette relazioni con un criminale di guerra, scegliendo addirittura di rinnovare l'accordo due settimane dopo l'inizio della criminale invasione dell'Ucraina? Non 猫 forse la peggiore forma di propaganda?

Il mio partito Azione ha gi脿 presentato nel parlamento italiano una mozione di sfiducia verso Salvini; vedremo se il resto della maggioranza continuer脿 a trincerarsi dietro un silenzio complice.

Le chiedo per貌, cara Commissaria, non sarebbe opportuno istituire un registro di trasparenza per tutte le forze politiche che si presenteranno alle prossime elezioni europee, rendendo obbligatorio chiarire gli accordi sottoscritti con i partiti di Stati terzi autoritari? E qualora verificati, interrompere qualsiasi forma di finanziamento ai loro partiti europei?

I nostri concittadini hanno il diritto di sapere per chi e per cosa votano!

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Thank you very much, Mr Castaldo. Well, I have nothing else to say, or I agree with you that we live in the times when some political forces simply abuse the uncertainty and fear of the society, and they sometimes do not hesitate to fly on the Russian propaganda. This is the reality in many, many Member States.

I would like to say that we will not help it, or change or improve the situation by lamenting that they are abusing the information space for Russian propaganda. We should ourselves be able to explain to citizens what鈥檚 going on, and to also explain why we need to support Ukraine. That鈥檚 why what you mentioned, the unity of the Member States, is absolutely key, because for the prime ministers and for the ministers, for the national leaders, it might be more and more difficult to support Ukraine because the society is under permanent pressure from the Russian propaganda, which wants them to stop the support.

On the transparency register, well, this is a very important piece of work. We have it for the European institutions. I have to say that for me it was never a problem to register those who I speak to, the visitors, those who try to convince me to do this or that, and I even found it as a kind of my protection, because when you look at sometimes very demanding pieces of work and our decisions which influence big money and big things in reality, I think that we also need to say yes, we have been lobbied by these entities, but at the end we decided like that.

So I always was a big promoter to see the transparency registers also at the level of the Member States, because it鈥檚 not only fair that we disclose who we speak to and what we do and on which basis, but it鈥檚 also a good source of our own protection.

听听Guy Lavocat (Renew). 鈥� Madame la Pr茅sidente, Madame la Commissaire, je souhaite revenir sur les propos de Nathalie Loiseau, qui s'est exprim茅e tout 脿 l'heure, ma coll猫gue, et sur la directive que vous proposez concernant les risques d'ing茅rence 茅trang猫re et sur l'id茅e de ne pas se tromper de cible concernant ces m锚mes influences indirectes.

Pour ma part, il ne s'agit pas d'une question d'ing茅rence commerciale, d'ing茅rence financi猫re ou de lobby, mais d'une question, qui me para卯t centrale, de d茅fense globale de l'Union europ茅enne, de nos int茅r锚ts d茅mocratiques, de nos int茅r锚ts vitaux. Je vous prie d'oser sortir d'une seule logique de march茅 et de trouver les moyens de nous prot茅ger d'adversaires port茅s par des id茅ologies et non pas par des relations commerciales visant 脿 d茅truire ce que nous sommes.

Quelles peuvent 锚tre les pistes, madame la Commissaire, pour ouvrir le spectre de cette directive et permettre de nous prot茅ger des diff茅rentes formes d'influence? L'Europe est en train de se r茅veiller dans le domaine de sa d茅fense. Elle doit aussi se r茅veiller concernant cette question des repr茅sentations d'int茅r锚ts et d'influences et des menaces qu'elles repr茅sentent pour nos d茅mocraties.

听听V臎ra Jourov谩, Vice-President of the Commission. 鈥� Well I think that we are quite awake already. And when you look at the pieces of legislation, indeed, you are right that we use the legal basis of the single market, be it Digital Services Act, be it AI act or the Defence of Democracy package. But at the same time we are doing a lot of other things which seek to make us stronger in the external action field. We have very intense communication with our partners within G7, but also with the African countries, with our partners in Indo-Pacific area.

We are strong defenders of our system. We have had to defend strongly our system and democracy as the well-functioning method of governance. In COVID time you remember the big attack from China spreading the information in the EU that democracy cannot solve a problem like COVID. And you saw that we managed together, in unity.

So we have the external action, we have a lot of funding, which supports our civil society, also humanitarian aid abroad. I could speak about all the things which we do to be more resilient in the economic sphere 鈥� definition of the critical infrastructure, critical raw materials, being more assertive in our trade; there are many different things which altogether should make us stronger. But at the same time, the legislation we speak about, which you say we should not base it only on the single market, it seeks to make us stronger inside of Europe. And I insist on the conviction that this legislation, when it comes into force, will make us stronger.

And, as to the last question, I would like to ask the audience, because we didn鈥檛 speak about our citizens and how difficult for them it is to sort out what to believe and what not. I think that we should all be aware that not everything we read online or in the social media is worth believing, and that in the future we will have to do more to increase the critical thinking and media literacy and understanding of what鈥檚 going on. So this is the invitation, rather than mentoring: we will all have to do something to be more resilient, especially against the foreign interference and disinformation.

听听President. 鈥� Thank you. I think perhaps in the future we can have a Question Time where the Commissioners can ask the MEPs 鈥� to have a real interaction.

That concludes Question Time.