Dokumenty - Think Tank - Evropský parlament

Briefing - EU economic developments and projections - 02-05-2025

Thu, 01 May 2025 22:00:00 GMT

This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in EU Member States and gives an overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major EU and international institutions. Annex 1 includes the latest GDP data and forecasts for all EU Member States. Annex 2 provides the latest inflation data and developments.

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Briefing - Robert Schuman - 02-05-2025

Thu, 01 May 2025 22:00:00 GMT

In 1958, Robert Schuman was elected president of the European �Ϸ��վary Assembly, predecessor to the European �Ϸ��վ. This French politician, who was particularly sensitive to the tensions between France and Germany, is regarded as one of the 'founding fathers' of what is now the European Union. After the Second World War, he supported the establishment of the Council of Europe and helped to bring many other European projects to fruition. With his declaration of 9 May 1950, considered the founding act of the European integration process, Robert Schuman assumed political responsibility for a common coal and steel market that would later become the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The declaration underlines the role of France in building a strong, prosperous and peaceful Europe, starting with France and Germany. Going far beyond mere objectives, the declaration also sets out the precise basis upon which the negotiations should begin. Robert Schuman was president of the European �Ϸ��վary Assembly from 1958 to 1960. This institution was the political institution par excellence of the Communities: at once a democratic organ representing the peoples of Europe, a body invested with the power of executive scrutiny, and a unifying element between the three Communities. Highly influenced by Christian values, Robert Schuman campaigned to build a strong and united Europe step by step, and to establish institutionalised solidarity between European countries. Robert Schuman's legacy continues to influence and shape the European Union to this day.

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Briefing - Critical medicines act - 02-05-2025

Thu, 01 May 2025 22:00:00 GMT

In light of the current geopolitical situation, and in response to the growing issue of medicine shortages in the EU, on 11 March 2025 the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on a critical medicines act. The proposed regulation seeks to strengthen the availability of critical medicines in the EU and the security of supply of these medicines by reducing the dependency on single suppliers and third countries and boosting pharmaceutical manufacturing in the EU. It also aims to improve access to certain medicines of common interest that encounter market failures. The proposal, which complements the ongoing revision of the pharmaceutical legislation and the enhanced role of the European Medicines Agency in managing shortages, contributes to the European health union's goal of ensuring that all EU patients have access to the medicines they need, wherever they are and whenever they need them. Going beyond public health, the proposal is about security and resilience. By securing stable and reliable medicine supply chains, the EU is expected to be able to improve its preparedness and strengthen its overall security. The proposal is also one of the actions set out in the competitiveness compass published by the Commission in January 2025.

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Briefing - Monetary Dialogue in March 2025: Summary of parliamentary scrutiny activities - 29-04-2025

Mon, 28 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

This paper provides a summary of all scrutiny activities of the European �Ϸ��վ related to euro area monetary policy in occasion of the March 2025 Monetary Dialogue with the European Central Bank (ECB). It covers the topics chosen by the competent Committee and related expertise papers provided in advance of the Dialogue, the actual topics addressed during the Dialogue, a brief overview of results from the Monetary Policy Expert Panel Survey, the latest written questions made by Members to the ECB President and European �Ϸ��վ resolution on the ECB Annual Report 2024. The document is published regularly ahead and after each Monetary Dialogue with the ECB.

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Briefing - Transforming animal farming through artificial intelligence - 29-04-2025

Mon, 28 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

By 2033, global meat protein consumption is projected to increase by 3 %, which is expected to result in higher greenhouse gas emissions. Artificial intelligence (AI) and the internet of things have the potential to revolutionise the livestock sector by enabling farmers to increase productivity while reducing environmental impact. AI-powered systems support real-time monitoring of animal health, behaviour and welfare, allowing for the early detection of disease and stress and enabling personalised care. Precision livestock farming uses sensors, cameras and machine learning algorithms to collect and analyse data, thereby facilitating data-driven decision-making and optimised production methods. This approach can increase productivity while reducing emissions and improving animal welfare. The integration of AI in farm management has resulted in innovative solutions that contribute to a more sustainable and efficient farming and food system. In terms of animal health, AI can predict disease outbreaks, identify potential host reservoirs and detect emerging disease threats, enabling prompt intervention and treatment. Animal welfare can also benefit from AI on farms, thanks to the early recognition of discomfort, stress or pain. However, it is essential to acknowledge the potential risks associated with AI, such as cyberattacks, accidental failures and unintentional environmental consequences. Additionally, AI decisions may prioritise efficiency, productivity and cost savings over ethical considerations, potentially leading to negative repercussions for animal welfare.

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Briefing - European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only - 28-04-2025

Mon, 28 Apr 2025 14:05:53 GMT

The European Peace Facility (EPF) was created in March 2021 as a funding instrument aimed at enhancing the EU's ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security and stability. The EPF rests on two pillars. The first is to fund EU military operations and missions under the common foreign and security policy. The second is to provide assistance to countries in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the Middle East and Africa to strengthen security in their respective regions. Following Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU started using the EPF to rapidly deliver military aid to Ukraine. This support was provided alongside continued assistance to the EU's eastern neighbourhood, as well as to partners in the Middle East and Africa. The EPF has a total financial ceiling of more than €17 billion for the 2021-2027 period. As the facility is an off-budget instrument, EU Member States contribute directly to it, based on the gross national income key. Currently, the EPF lacks fresh resources to continue supporting Ukraine in facing the war. Furthermore, since March 2023, Hungary has refused to mobilise EPF funds in military aid to Ukraine. In line with the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, Russian assets held in EU banks were frozen. In May 2024, the Council of the EU allocated 90 % of the 'windfall' (extraordinary) profits from these frozen assets to the EPF. A first transfer of €1.5 billion from these profits to Ukraine took place in mid-2024. A second payment, possibly amounting to €2 billion, is expected in spring 2025. Given Hungary's veto, the EU is looking for more reliable ways to continue assistance to Ukraine than by means of the windfall profits from the Russian assets channelled through the EPF. On 24 October 2024, the EU created the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) and issued an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of €18.1 billion, the EU's part of an EU-G7 syndicated loan to Ukraine totalling €45 billion. Starting after March 2025, 95 % of the windfall profits from the Russian assets held in EU banks will be allocated to the EU budget and channelled through the ULCM to Ukraine. The remaining 5 % will be allocated to the EPF. Beyond Ukraine, for which the EPF-funded approved military support amounts to approximately €10.6 billion, the EPF has an available budget of €6.4 billion to fund, until 2027, both the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad – including its military assistance mission in support of Ukraine – and assistance measures for the armed forces of partner countries.

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Briefing - Family reunification rights: Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection - 28-04-2025

Mon, 28 Apr 2025 13:48:43 GMT

Separating family members can have devastating consequences on their wellbeing and ability to rebuild their lives. This is true for everybody, but especially so for people who have fled persecution or serious harm and have lost family during forced displacement and their flight from danger. For beneficiaries of international protection, family separation can affect their ability to engage in many aspects of the integration process, from education and employment to putting down roots, and harm their physical and emotional health. Family reunification is therefore a fundamental aspect of bringing normality to the lives of such people. While European Union law ensures refugees and holders of subsidiary protection – the two types of beneficiaries of international protection – equal treatment in most areas, differences persist regarding family reunification under the Family Reunification Directive, among other things. After 2015, most EU Member States witnessed a significant increase in the number of asylum-seekers arriving in their territory, with a parallel increase in the number of beneficiaries of international protection seeking reunification with their families. To establish some form of control over this unprecedented flow of people, Member States shifted away from awarding refugee status towards granting subsidiary protection, thus restricting the possibility for beneficiaries to reunite with their families. In March 2025, certain EU countries announced restrictions on the right to family reunification for migrants. According to many legal experts, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection face stricter requirements regarding family reunification than refugees, which disregards the particular circumstances related to their forced displacement and the corresponding difficulties they are likely to face in meeting these stricter requirements.

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Briefing - Key challenges faced by LGBTI asylum applicants in the EU - 28-04-2025

Sun, 27 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans-gender and intersex (LGBTI) asylum applicants are recognised as a vulnerable social group under European Union (EU) legislation, and are therefore entitled to international protection. However, it is up to applicants to prove that they are indeed LGBTI, which can be challenging. As they often come from countries where being a member of the LGBTI community exposes individuals to persecution and violence, there is normally little documentary evidence they can produce to support their claims. EU legislation has imposed limits on how Member States can examine and assess LGBTI asylum applications. Whatever methods EU countries use, they are required to respect the human dignity of applicants. LGBTI applicants also have specific needs – for example, in terms of healthcare and safety at reception centres. Vulnerability based on sexual orientation can also play a role in Member States' decisions on whether an applicant can be sent to their country of origin or to another non-EU country. Although a country might be considered safe as a whole, it might still prove hostile to members of the LGBTI community, which would prevent Member States from being able to send them there. However, more could still be done to better meet the needs of LGBTI asylum applicants. EU legislation requires Member States to set up national independent mechanisms to ensure compliance with LGBTI asylum applicants' fundamental rights. Organisations such as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights have also come up with guidance, such as additional training for staff.

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Briefing - Observers in the European �Ϸ��վ - 28-04-2025

Sun, 27 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Accession to the European Union is a long process, requiring not only legislative, administrative and economic adaptation to EU standards, but also a degree of adaptation to the working methods of the EU institutions. One of these new working methods candidate countries must navigate is how the European �Ϸ��վ organises its activities, how members interact, and how to build alliances and dialogue among the various political families represented in �Ϸ��վ. �Ϸ��վ's rules of procedure allow parliamentary representatives of candidate countries to experience all these aspects in person, in advance of accession. Once the accession procedure is nearing conclusion, i.e. once an accession treaty is signed, the parliament of the acceding country may be invited to appoint, from among its members, persons who will be granted observer status to the European �Ϸ��վ. As they are not yet elected in European elections, these observers remain members of the acceding country's parliament, but have the opportunity to participate, with some limitations, in parliamentary activities. For example, they cannot vote or fill any elected position within �Ϸ��վ's organisation. However, they can participate in the activities of the parliamentary group to which they are affiliated, and attend plenary sittings and committee meetings. Observers were appointed in the last three EU enlargements, and remained in office either until ad hoc European Elections were organised for the acceding country, i.e. outside the official electoral cycle (Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria), or until the end of the parliamentary term (2004 enlargement). The possibility for Ukraine to have observer members in the European �Ϸ��վ, under the current rules, depends upon the progress on accession negotiations, which officially only opened in December 2023. Nevertheless, cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, and the European �Ϸ��վ already takes place in other forms.

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Briefing - Malta's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play - 25-04-2025

Thu, 24 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Malta's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) had an initial value of €344.9 million, while its amended plan is worth €336.3 million. Under the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), at the core of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument, Malta's RRF grant allocation decreased from €316.4 million to €258.3 million. In April 2023, Malta submitted a request to amend its NRRP, to which it added a new REPowerEU chapter with an additional grant allocation of €30 million. It also requested to transfer a portion of its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its plan (€40 million). With these funds, and cutting some measures, the overall EU financial contribution to the amended plan amounts to €328.2 million in grants, with the rest to be covered by national means. Malta has not requested loans. While in nominal terms, Malta has the second smallest allocation, it ranks higher in terms of RRF grants per capita. The value of Malta's grants under the RRF equals about 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), less than the average for the EU overall (the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). So far, Malta has received its pre-financing, the REPowerEU pre-financing, and two result-based payments, which has brought the total disbursements to date to €166.3 million, or 50.7 % of its RRF allocation (above the EU average of 47.4 %). A third payment request is currently under assessment. The plan takes into account the Council's 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policy programmes for the 2021-2027 period. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery, embracing major common EU challenges. The amended plan has a stronger focus on the green transition, devoting 68.8 % of the funds to it (up from 53.8 % in the original plan), making Malta's NRRP one of the greenest; 26.2 % of the amended plan (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), or 20.6 % (including the chapter), will contribute to the digital target. �Ϸ��վ participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

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Briefing - Romania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play - 25-04-2025

Thu, 24 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Romania's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) represents an ambitious agenda of reforms and investment aimed at mitigating the socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19, energy and cost-of-living crises. The amended plan – approved by the Council on 8 December 2023 – amounts to €28.5 billion, or 12.8 % of the country's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). This includes the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) grants of €12.1 billion (cut by 14.9 % following the June 2022 revision of the allocation); REPowerEU grants worth €1.4 billion; the transfer of Romania's share (€43.2 million) from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its NRRP; and the RRF loan allocation already fully committed under the initial version of the plan (€14.9 billion). The recovery plan is to be implemented by 2026. The REPowerEU chapter comes with seven investment and two reform measures, which –together with the remaining NRRP measures – devote €12.6 billion (44.1 % of the plan) to the green transition. Digital projects have been endowed with 21.9 % of the NRRP resources (excluding the REPowerEU chapter). Romania has so far received €9.4 billion (33.1 %) of RRF resources, including two payments and the pre-financing; this is below the EU average of 47.4 %. On 16 October 2024, the European Commission issued a partial positive assessment of the third payment request for grants and loans of €2 billion (net of pre-financing); the assessment, proposing a partial payment suspension, is being examined by the Council's Economic and Financial Committee. According to the Commission's evaluation in the 2024 European Semester, execution of the NRRP is facing significant delays. �Ϸ��վ continues to guarantee transparency and provide accountability for EU citizens by engaging in interinstitutional dialogues on the implementation of the RRF and scrutinising the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The author would like to thank Amalia Fumagalli, trainee in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance.

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Briefing - EU-UK trade flows: Continuities, changes and trends - 24-04-2025

Wed, 23 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU's relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal's implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026. On 20 November 2024, the European �Ϸ��վ's Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission's 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA. This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European �Ϸ��վary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA's implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject. Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia's war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID 19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration's (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations.

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Briefing - Canada ahead of the 2025 election: Navigating a complex geopolitical landscape - 23-04-2025

Tue, 22 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Following increasing pressure from members of his own party and a period of low opinion poll ratings, Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau announced his resignation from the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada on 6 January 2025. Mark Carney, his successor as prime minister of Canada, and new leader of the Liberal Party, has called a snap parliamentary election for 28 April. This year's election will mark a decade of Liberal Party rule in Canada, a period with significant political, economic and diplomatic developments. In some cases, the administration continued already existing policies; in some others, it diverged significantly. While Canada's relationship with China and India has grown increasingly tense in recent years, the country has traditionally relied on close partnerships with its Western allies, particularly its southern neighbour, the United States (US). This dynamic has shifted under the second Trump administration, which has started its term in a far more bellicose tone than before. Canada's next administration will need to navigate a volatile geopolitical environment characterised by the US's trade war and weakening commitment to its role as a global leader and guarantor of the Pax Americana; China's increasingly assertive posture as a second superpower; Russia's renewed ambitions for a greater global role; and the emergence of middle powers and countries from the Global South. This briefing builds on a 2022 EPRS briefing on Canada's �Ϸ��վ and other political institutions. While the earlier briefing examines Canada's federal structure, parliament and levels of governance, the present one focuses more on the political, economic and external relations developments over the past decade, in light of the upcoming election.

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Briefing - Critical approach to EU law-making: French Senate’s report on EU legislation - 23-04-2025

Tue, 22 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

The Policy Hub on Better Law-Making hold on 18 February, 2025 focused on challenges to EU law making. The French Senate’s report was presented and perceived as a wake-up call, urging a shift towards effective, accessible law-making in the EU. Academics highlighted issues of excessive legislation, the need for clearer and citizen-centered laws. They emphasized the need for simplifying legal texts, improving democratic scrutiny by the European �Ϸ��վ, and fostering collaboration with academia. These proceeding are prepared by the European �Ϸ��վ’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs for the JURI Committee.

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Briefing - Legal bases in Article 122 TFEU: Tackling emergencies through executive acts - 11-04-2025

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 11:22:00 GMT

Article 122 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for two legal bases, enabling the Council to adopt measures based on a European Commission proposal, without involving the European �Ϸ��վ in any way. Article 122(1) addresses economic difficulties faced by Member States, and Article 122(2) specifically addresses financial assistance to Member States. It is understood that the Council may resort to Article 122 TFEU in exceptional circumstances. A recent example of the use of Article 122 TFEU is the Commission's 19 March 2025 proposal to establish the security action for Europe (SAFE), aimed at mobilising the Union budget to support and accelerate national investment in defence. Considered jointly, the two legal bases enshrined in Article 122 TFEU are seen as the basis of an EU 'emergency law'. They have been praised for enabling the Union to react swiftly to unfolding crises, but at the same time, bypassing the European �Ϸ��վ is seen as limiting democratic legitimacy. In its 2020 resolution on the COVID 19 pandemic, �Ϸ��վ called for limiting the use of Article 122 TFEU, and called upon the Commission and Council to revise the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making to increase �Ϸ��վ's role in crisis management decision-making and to enhance the use of the ordinary legislative procedure for adopting emergency response instruments. In this vein, in December 2020, �Ϸ��վ, Council and the Commission adopted a joint declaration on budgetary scrutiny of new proposals based on Article 122 TFEU with potential appreciable implications for the Union budget. It supplements the Treaty framework by providing for the possibility of budgetary scrutiny of such proposals, with �Ϸ��վ playing an active role. Moreover, the recent reform of �Ϸ��վ's rules of procedure has inserted a new Rule 138, under which the Commission will be invited to make a statement to �Ϸ��վ explaining the reasons for the choice of Article 122 TFEU as legal basis. This briefing draws on various published sources and should not be taken to represent an official position of the European �Ϸ��վ.

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Briefing - Defence and artificial intelligence - 11-04-2025

Thu, 10 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming modern warfare. Russia's war on Ukraine has demonstrated AI's critical role in intelligence gathering, autonomous systems, and cyber operations. A global AI arms race is therefore gathering speed, with China and the United States vying for leadership and Russia investing heavily in AI capabilities. The EU Strategic Compass for security and defence underscores the growing importance of defence innovation, recognising its strategic value and emphasising the need to strengthen the EU's emerging military technologies, including AI. The EU and its Member States have increasingly acknowledged AI's significance for security and defence, leading to expanded investment in AI-driven military technologies over the past decade. AI-powered defence innovation is progressing, with multiple European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects dedicated to integrating AI into future military capabilities. Efforts are also underway to create synergies between the civilian, defence, and AI industries. In addition, the EU is cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). AI in warfare raises key ethical concerns, including accountability, compliance with international humanitarian law, and the risk of conflict escalation due to reduced human oversight. Global debate over military AI regulation has intensified amid the absence of a unified international framework, with contrasting approaches emerging – such as the US promoting flexible, innovation-friendly standards, and the EU adopting a human-centric, risk-based model through its AI Act, which excludes military use but may – according to some experts – shape future debate on military AI regulation. While organisations like the United Nations are pushing for responsible use and oversight, geopolitical tensions and differing strategic interests continue to hinder consensus on global rules. �Ϸ��վ recognises the strategic importance of AI in defence, but calls for regulation and a prohibition on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS). The �Ϸ��վ's Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) stresses the need for ethical guidelines in defence AI, and has warned of the EU's potential lag in AI and called for international regulation of LAWS, robust cybersecurity measures, and global cooperation in military AI regulation.

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Briefing - EU legislation and policies to address racial and ethnic discrimination - 11-04-2025

Thu, 10 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

People from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. However, the exact scale of the problem is hard to gauge, owing to a lack of data and general under reporting of racist incidents. Although the European Union (EU) has been introducing legislation to combat racial and xenophobic discrimination since 2000, the problem persists. The global Black Lives Matter protests highlighted the need for new measures, while the COVID 19 pandemic saw a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, and the crisis it triggered had a disproportionately large negative effect on racial and ethnic minority groups, in the form of higher death and infection rates. Studies point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concerned, but also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racial and ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. EU citizens also acknowledge this problem: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to be widespread in their country. To address racial discrimination and the inequalities it engenders, the European Commission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. �Ϸ��վ, meanwhile, has long demanded an end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, �Ϸ��վ has called for an end to structural racism, discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality; for protection of the right to protest peacefully; for an enhanced role for culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism; and for authorities to take an intersectional approach. On 18 and 19 March 2025, Members of the European �Ϸ��վ from the Anti Racism and Diversity Intergroup (ARDI) co hosted the fourth EU Anti Racism and Diversity Week. This updates a briefing from June 2024.

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Briefing - Understanding crime statistics - 11-04-2025

Thu, 10 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Crime statistics are used to show crime levels and trends and to inform national policies to protect citizens and society. It is thus important that they are as accurate as possible, which is a challenge to both those who record the occurrences of crime and those who subsequently compile and use the resulting statistics. However, it is accepted among experts that complete accuracy or the measurement of the full extent of crime may never be achieved. To have a clear picture of the levels of crime, both over time and between countries, crime needs to be recorded in accordance with an accepted system of categorisation and in a uniform manner. The production of statistics nationally and trans-nationally is constantly changing and adapting its methods to achieve this goal. The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes is an important step in this direction. The accurate reporting and recording of crime is the foundation on which statistics are built. However, countries differ in when and how they do this, which can especially impact the comparability of statistics between countries. Under-reporting of crime can also affect accuracy and minimise the severity of certain crimes. A decision not to report a crime can have personal or social reasons, and the most vulnerable victims often avoid interacting with law enforcement authorities. However, these limitations do not negate the value of crime statistics. Statistics are an important element of evidence-based policymaking, but their users need to be aware of their shortcomings in order to draw informed conclusions.

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Briefing - Demographic changes and labour migration within the EU - 11-04-2025

Thu, 10 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

With EU citizens now living longer and healthier lives, the focus of EU policy has shifted from ageing to longevity. This demographic change has significant social and economic repercussions, such as increased demand for housing, healthcare and social services. Public spending is also expected to increase. Demographic changes are exacerbating labour shortages across various sectors and skill levels, posing a threat to the EU's green and digital transitions, competitiveness and public services. This issue is particularly concerning in areas already struggling with a labour shortage, such as healthcare. Attracting trained foreign workers is one solution to these issues, but EU countries must balance the need for recruiting such individuals with the challenge of controlling irregular migration flows. In response to the above shifts, the EU has started including demographic concerns into the creation of relevant EU policies. Specific EU initiatives to support Member States in dealing with demographic change include the talent mobility package, which complements the skills and talent package and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Despite migration being seen as a viable solution to demographic challenges, EU Member States continue to struggle between enforcing stricter migration policies and using legal migration to fill labour shortages. While Member States will find it difficult to sustain their welfare, pension systems and productivity without attracting skilled workers from non-EU countries, it is recognised that migration by itself will not reverse the ongoing trend of population ageing across the EU.

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Briefing - Clean trade and investment partnerships: A new instrument in the EU's trade policy toolbox - 10-04-2025

Wed, 09 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

The European Commission has announced a range of new trade partnerships – the clean trade and investment partnerships (CTIPs) – to bolster the EU's competitiveness, diversify supply chains and boost economies. CTIPs are the latest instrument in the EU's set of trade tools the Commission calls 'alternative forms of engagement', and to which experts also refer as 'trade-related agreements' or 'mini trade deals'. They are meant to complement the EU's vast network of trade agreements through a faster, more flexible and more targeted approach, tailored to the EU's and its partners' concrete business interests. The first CTIP was launched with South Africa in March 2025. The agreement will focus on investment, the clean energy transition, skills and technology, and on developing strategic industries along the entire supply chain. The EU-South Africa CTIP will be accompanied by a Global Gateway investment package worth €4.7 billion. However, the new trade policy instrument has raised questions, in particular regarding parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. Since the intended form of the CTIP with South Africa is that of a non-binding instrument, the question also arises as to whether such agreements can deliver tangible results.

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Briefing - Powering national financial instruments with Next Generation EU - 09-04-2025

Wed, 09 Apr 2025 16:21:31 GMT

In the EU context, financial instruments represent measures for financial support provided from the EU budget – in addition to traditional grants – to address one or more specific EU policy objectives. While these instruments can take various forms, they are largely grouped into equity investments, loans or guarantees, and can be used in combination with grants. In policymaking, financial instruments are of great value, as they produce a leverage effect that unlocks public and – most importantly – private resources beyond the initially invested capital. Financial instruments can be set up at different levels of governance. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument, worth up to €712 billion, was set up to help Member States emerge more resilient from the pandemic while fostering the green and digital transitions. It does so through its main spending tool – the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) –in the form of grants and loans. Moreover, NGEU combines loans and grants, which maximises the value added of this EU policy response focused on recovery and resilience. Through the individual national recovery plans that Member States needed to develop to tap into the RRF, NGEU can finance, among other projects, investment and reform measures creating national financial instruments. These measures address – to a varying extent – the country-specific recommendations that are relevant to financial instruments. The six selected reform measures range from strengthening capital markets in Slovenia to adopting laws allowing the use of guaranteed loans to improve energy efficiency in Greece. The 13 chosen investment measures, amounting to roughly €13.9 billion, include equity growth instruments for businesses in Bulgaria, financial instruments for digital innovation in Latvia, and guarantees for student loans in France. Eight Member States have not introduced financial instrument measures in their recovery plans, since this is not a requirement. Experts emphasise that the RRF has led to the uptake of some financial instruments, particularly regarding energy efficiency, which was deemed a positive trend.

Zdroj : © Evropská unie, 2025 - EP

Briefing - State of play: EU support to Ukraine - Payments, reform and investment, use of immobilised Russian assets - 09-04-2025

Tue, 08 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Since the start of Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level. To date, the support to Ukraine from 'Team Europe' – comprising the EU and its Member States – amounts to €143 billion. This support includes macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and through the European Peace Facility, as well as support to EU Member States hosting Ukrainian refugees. The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan, an ambitious plan for reform and investment drafted by Ukraine's government and endorsed by the EU. The European Commission and the Ukrainian government publish data on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments. Those data form the basis for a Ukraine Facility Dialogue, which ensures the democratic scrutiny of the EU's support to Ukraine. In addition to the Ukraine Facility, Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a €18.1 billion EU macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine as part of a €45 billion G7 loan. Furthermore, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism was established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and the associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for in the framework agreement under the Ukraine Facility, referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792, will apply to the macro-financial assistance loan in order to ensure seamless political and financial management of both. �Ϸ��վ has repeatedly called for the confiscation of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets as such – instead of just using the extraordinary revenues – to finance further support for Ukraine and the country's reconstruction.

Zdroj : © Evropská unie, 2025 - EP

Briefing - Understanding trilogue: �Ϸ��վ's rules and practices for reaching provisional agreement on legislation - 09-04-2025

Tue, 08 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Thanks to successive Treaty revisions, the European �Ϸ��վ legislates on an equal footing with the Council. Today, a vast number of policies are decided under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 294, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union − TFEU), previously known as co-decision. To adopt legislation, �Ϸ��վ, representing European Union citizens, and the Council, representing the governments of the EU Member States, have to agree on an identical text. This requires time and negotiation. The complexity of the EU legislative process has sometimes been criticised as lengthy and subject to gridlock. To overcome this issue, the co-legislators have developed methods of informal contact to speed up the legislative process, while ensuring representativeness and oversight. One of the tools commonly used today are trilogue meetings, defined as 'informal tripartite meetings on legislative proposals between representatives of the �Ϸ��վ, the Council and the Commission'. Due to the absence of any explicit reference in the Treaties, trilogue began in the early 1990s, on a very informal basis, and evolved over time. In the beginning, the institutions filled the legal void with an informal practice that became progressively formalised over time and resulted, inter alia, in successive modifications of �Ϸ��վ's Rules of Procedure. These modifications were driven by the need to ensure that trilogue negotiations support the legislative process in �Ϸ��վ efficiently, while remaining fully transparent and representative. Today, �Ϸ��վ's Rules of Procedure define the key elements of trilogue: how to conduct negotiations, and how to ensure that both the committee(s) responsible and plenary are fully informed and can exercise their oversight role. Other elements, such as the number and frequency of meetings, and the practical conduct of the negotiations depend on the nature of the legislative file to be negotiated, and thus remain uncodified. This briefing updates a 2021 EPRS publication.

Zdroj : © Evropská unie, 2025 - EP

Briefing - Private financing of the EU economy through pensions - 08-04-2025

Tue, 08 Apr 2025 09:23:39 GMT

On 19 March 2025, the European Commission unveiled its strategy for a savings and investments union with the goal of directing EU households' savings towards productive investments. This policy includes a review of existing EU pension legislation to increase participation in supplementary pensions and recommendations for auto-enrolment pension frameworks. The pan-European pension product (PEPP), introduced in 2019 through a regulation that became applicable in 2022, has only been registered in four Member States. Institutional investors have shown limited interest in this product, and improvements are likely to be the focus of the planned review. Some observers argue that the PEPP is too restrictive for investment product providers in terms of cost and value guarantees. The product may also compete with existing pension savings products. Some Member States suggest establishing an inter-governmental framework as a preliminary test for a cross-border product, with the possibility of developing a model at EU level in a later phase.

Zdroj : © Evropská unie, 2025 - EP

Briefing - Understanding the triple nexus: The challenges of creating synergies between humanitarian, development and security policies - 07-04-2025

Mon, 07 Apr 2025 07:37:47 GMT

Hosting a substantial portion of the world's poor and displaced populations, fragile countries and territories ('fragile contexts') are characterised by weak governance and vulnerability to crises, and often prone to conflict. This creates challenges for identifying complex power structures, accessing the persons most in need and implementing long-standing development solutions. In these contexts, the UN and OECD pushed for a shift towards integrated, context-sensitive responses that consider humanitarian, development, and peace dimensions simultaneously: the 'HDP Nexus' or 'Triple Nexus'. The EU, with its extensive competences across the three pillars of the Nexus, has adopted a comprehensive Triple Nexus approach, including coordinated strategies, shared financing, and partnerships with local and international stakeholders. However, implementing the Triple Nexus is complex, with organisational, financial, and mandate-related hurdles. Balancing immediate humanitarian needs with long-term development and peace goals often results in tensions. Additionally, the approach necessitates conflict-sensitive actions and ethical considerations, particularly in regions with questionable government legitimacy. Furthermore, the EU's migration, trade, and climate policies, which affect human movements, trade dynamics, and environmental strategies, add layers of complexity to the Nexus efforts. �Ϸ��վ supports the Triple Nexus, calling for enhanced collaboration and a clear policy framework. It stresses a holistic approach to addressing the root causes of crises in fragile contexts, recognising the interconnectedness of issues like conflict, climate change, migration, and poverty.

Zdroj : © Evropská unie, 2025 - EP

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