Dokumenter - Think Tank - Europa-Parlamentet

Oversigt - 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye - 30-04-2025

Wed, 30 Apr 2025 10:43:25 GMT

Türkiye has long been a strategic partner of the EU on migration, security, and trade. However, following the attempted coup in 2016, Türkiye's democratic backsliding led the Council to freeze its accession negotiations in 2018. Although relations have since thawed, the EU is exploring a more realistic framework for bilateral relations. �Ϸ��վ's Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) adopted its report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye on 9 April 2025. A debate and vote on the report are due to be held in plenary in May 2025.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Briefing - European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only - 28-04-2025

Mon, 28 Apr 2025 14:05:53 GMT

The European Peace Facility (EPF) was created in March 2021 as a funding instrument aimed at enhancing the EU's ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security and stability. The EPF rests on two pillars. The first is to fund EU military operations and missions under the common foreign and security policy. The second is to provide assistance to countries in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the Middle East and Africa to strengthen security in their respective regions. Following Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU started using the EPF to rapidly deliver military aid to Ukraine. This support was provided alongside continued assistance to the EU's eastern neighbourhood, as well as to partners in the Middle East and Africa. The EPF has a total financial ceiling of more than €17 billion for the 2021-2027 period. As the facility is an off-budget instrument, EU Member States contribute directly to it, based on the gross national income key. Currently, the EPF lacks fresh resources to continue supporting Ukraine in facing the war. Furthermore, since March 2023, Hungary has refused to mobilise EPF funds in military aid to Ukraine. In line with the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, Russian assets held in EU banks were frozen. In May 2024, the Council of the EU allocated 90 % of the 'windfall' (extraordinary) profits from these frozen assets to the EPF. A first transfer of €1.5 billion from these profits to Ukraine took place in mid-2024. A second payment, possibly amounting to €2 billion, is expected in spring 2025. Given Hungary's veto, the EU is looking for more reliable ways to continue assistance to Ukraine than by means of the windfall profits from the Russian assets channelled through the EPF. On 24 October 2024, the EU created the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) and issued an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of €18.1 billion, the EU's part of an EU-G7 syndicated loan to Ukraine totalling €45 billion. Starting after March 2025, 95 % of the windfall profits from the Russian assets held in EU banks will be allocated to the EU budget and channelled through the ULCM to Ukraine. The remaining 5 % will be allocated to the EPF. Beyond Ukraine, for which the EPF-funded approved military support amounts to approximately €10.6 billion, the EPF has an available budget of €6.4 billion to fund, until 2027, both the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad – including its military assistance mission in support of Ukraine – and assistance measures for the armed forces of partner countries.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Briefing - Measures against countries allowing non-sustainable fishing - 03-04-2025

Wed, 02 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Cooperation between countries to manage shared fish stocks is an international obligation. This is a particular challenge for the EU, which shares many of the fish stocks it exploits with third countries. If a third country does not cooperate in the management of a shared stock and decides unilaterally on its fishing opportunities, there is a risk of overfishing. The EU has adopted Regulation 1026/2012 to take measures against third countries that do not cooperate in the management of shared fish stocks. On 13 September 2024, the Commission presented a proposal to amend this regulation. The aim is to clarify the conditions under which a country is deemed to be non-cooperating, as well as the process before and after EU action. The updated regulation would give the EU a stronger tool to tackle unsustainable fishing practices.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Briefing - �Ϸ��վ in EU external action - 01-04-2025

Mon, 31 Mar 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Based on its Treaties, the European Union (EU) has developed a multifaceted external action policy, and is seen as an important actor far beyond its borders. Through its institutions and Member States, the EU is active in international trade, humanitarian assistance, economic, financial, and technical and development cooperation, as well as through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP). Increasingly, the external dimension of internal EU policies has also grown, notably in the economic, climate, energy, migration and digital fields. The role of the European �Ϸ��վ in the EU's external action has increased significantly since the 1990s, and especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Although �Ϸ��վ's powers remain relatively limited compared to other EU institutions involved in external action, especially with regard to CFSP and CSDP decision-making (which remain mostly intergovernmental), it nevertheless has considerable legislative, budgetary, agenda-setting and soft powers. Several of �Ϸ��վ's powers cut across all policy areas. Notably, it proactively supports multilateralism and conducts extensive parliamentary diplomacy. �Ϸ��վ contributes to policy framing through its debates, resolutions, recommendations, own-initiative reports and statements. It holds hearings, workshops, debates and organises missions. Members of the �Ϸ��վ exercise scrutiny of the executive, by holding hearings of and posing questions to the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's High Representative and the Council. �Ϸ��վ co-legislates on financing the EU's external action and controls EU institutions' expenditure, including the EEAS, through the discharge procedure. The �Ϸ��վ acts on an equal footing with the Council when adopting numerous acts in the fields of trade, development and humanitarian aid, and often external dimensions of internal policies. Since 2009, �Ϸ��վ's consent to legally binding international agreements is mandated by the Treaties.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Oversigt - A just transition and reconstruction in Syria - 06-03-2025

Thu, 06 Mar 2025 11:19:00 GMT

After the fall of the Assad regime, the European Union (EU) is ready to support the Syrian people through the process of transition and reconstruction, including by suspending certain restrictive measures. The Council and the Commission are due to give statements on the issue during �Ϸ��վ's March plenary session.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Oversigt - Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia: Economic indicators and trade with EU - 28-02-2025

Thu, 27 Feb 2025 23:00:00 GMT

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. The growth rate for Morocco and Egypt, although decreasing from 2023, remains at 2.8 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. The GDP growth rate of Tunisia and the EU is up compared to 2023, but still below 2 percent, standing at 1.6 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively. In the past two years, Egypt has experienced a rapid increase in inflation and fluctuations in its exchange rate. The inflation rate for 2024 was 33.3%. Trade in goods and services shows a steady and sustained increase from 2007 to the present. Among the three states compared, Morocco is the primary partner in trade for goods, while Egypt leads in services.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Briefing - Time to lift the international sanctions on Syria? - 11-02-2025

Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:44:54 GMT

Since the unexpected overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in early December 2024, Syria has embarked on an uncertain trajectory. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the armed jihadi group leading the offensive against the Assad forces, has now taken charge of the country and set up a caretaker government. Scepticism abounds in international circles about HTS owing to the group's terrorist credentials and Salafist ideology. However, the new Syrian authorities have declared plans to establish a political transition inclusive of all minorities and segments of Syrian society, as well as increased engagement with neighbouring countries and other foreign players, offering the international community some reassurance. One of the main demands in the current context from all sides, within Syria as well as from other states and organisations, has been to lift the complex web of international economic, financial and trade sanctions against the country. Most of these sanctions were imposed after Assad's brutal crackdown on protesters in 2011. Moreover, calls have been made to remove the designations of HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa from the international terrorist lists. Such steps are believed to be essential in addressing the significant economic and humanitarian challenges facing the country after nearly 14 years of civil war. The United States (US) imposes the most comprehensive sanctions on Syria, including secondary sanctions on foreign governments, non-US individuals and entities doing business with the Syrian government and sanctioned entities in Syria. The European Union (EU) has also imposed restrictive measures on certain Syrian economic sectors, along with asset freezes and travel bans on individuals or entities supporting the Assad regime. In January 2025, the US granted short-term waivers relating to the provision of basic services in response to requests for sanctions relief for Syria. Similarly, the EU Member States reached a political agreement to suspend certain restrictions gradually and conditionally. The UN Security Council has the authority to remove the terrorist designations of HTS and its leader from the ISIL (Da'esh)/Al-Qaida list.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Oversigt - Wider comprehensive EU Middle East strategy - 05-02-2025

Wed, 05 Feb 2025 15:31:39 GMT

In her political guidelines for 2024 to 2029, the President of the European Commission announced the need for a wider comprehensive EU Middle East strategy. The Council and the Commission are due to give statements on the issue during �Ϸ��վ's February plenary session.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Briefing - The EU's new bilateral security and defence partnerships - 24-01-2025

Thu, 23 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT

The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia's unjustified and unprovoked aggression on Ukraine –emphasised the need for robust partnerships, for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside 'acting' (operations), 'securing' (resilience) and 'investing', 'partnering' is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the adoption of the Compass, as a reinforced framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed six such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Norway, Moldova, South Korea, Japan, Albania and North Macedonia, and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, some ten areas of cooperation are common to all six. �Ϸ��վ has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass's partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. �Ϸ��վ has underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, the Western Balkans, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2025 - EP

Oversigt - Health in emergencies: EU contribution to humanitarian health initiatives worldwide - 20-11-2024

Tue, 19 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

A sharp deterioration in the population's health, as well as in healthcare systems, is often the consequence of armed conflicts, natural hazards or human-made disasters, of which there have been many in recent times. The European Union (EU), a significant global humanitarian player, views health as an essential part of its assistance.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - The Mediterranean fishing area: State of play - 12-11-2024

Mon, 11 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

The Mediterranean Sea boasts a particularly high biological diversity, including more than 500 fish species, many of which are unique to the region. However, several factors have contributed to the disturbance of the sea's habitats, with consequences for the living organisms and, hence, for the fisheries in the region. Pollution from land and sea sources, climate change, invasive species, overexploitation and the growing competition for space are among the main challenges. Traditional small-scale fishing vessels make up the vast majority of the EU fleet in the Mediterranean and account for more than half of employment in the sector. The sector as a whole is at risk of losing its economic and cultural importance, given that vessels, catches, employment and profits have all been decreasing for years. Given the high number of countries bordering the Mediterranean, it is regulated by numerous organisations and agreements in an effort to reconcile the interests of the various countries and sectors involved. The presence of numerous EU- and international-level initiatives indicates a high level of awareness regarding the problems facing the Mediterranean. While efforts to keep the exploitation of fish stocks at a sustainable level have shown results for some species, the European �Ϸ��վ has repeatedly underlined the urgent need for additional action.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Russia's 'shadow fleet': Bringing the threat to light - 08-11-2024

Thu, 07 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Following Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU), G7, and allied partners imposed extensive sanctions targeting Russia's economy, in particular the oil sector, in an effort to curb the Kremlin's revenues which finance its war effort. Key measures include an embargo on Russian seaborne oil imports and a price cap on oil and oil products that restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price. Enforcement mechanisms prevent Russia from chartering or insuring oil tankers unless they comply with these limits. In response, Russia has sought new markets and established a 'shadow fleet' to evade these restrictions. The terms 'shadow fleet', 'dark fleet' and 'grey fleet' have gained prominence following the imposition of sanctions on Russian energy exports, yet their definitions remain inconsistent among experts, leading to confusion. Analysts increasingly recognise that the broader definition, encompassing all vessels lacking Western insurance and belonging to non-EU/G7+ companies, captures the diverse tactics employed by Russia to circumvent sanctions and highlights the potential risks associated with these operations. To evade sanctions, the Russian 'shadow fleet' makes use of flags of convenience and intricate ownership and management structures while employing a variety of tactics to conceal the origins of its cargo, including: ship-to-ship transfers; automatic identification system blackouts; falsified positions; transmission of false data; and other deceptive or even illegal techniques. In addition to bolstering its war chest, Russia's 'shadow fleet', which consists of a growing number of aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations, poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks. As Russia depends increasingly on its 'shadow fleet' to maintain oil exports, the EU and allied nations have implemented measures to counter these evasive tactics. These include imposing targeted sanctions on specific vessels and enhancing international collaboration to disrupt such activities. During a plenary debate in October 2024, Members of the European �Ϸ��վ called for enhanced maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the significant environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels. �Ϸ��վ is expected to vote on a resolution on this issue during its November I 2024 plenary session.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - EU missions and operations abroad - 24-10-2024

Wed, 23 Oct 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Military operations and missions, and civilian missions, are an essential component of the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, in particular, of its common security and defence policy (CSDP). In an extremely volatile security and geopolitical environment, both at its eastern and southern borders and further afield, the EU has always sought, when launching its operations and missions abroad, to help countries and regions in crisis to restore peace, security and development. This is in the interests of their own citizens and residents as well as those of their neighbours, and is also in conformity with EU values and interests. There are currently 23 CFSP missions and operations ongoing, one of which was launched by the Council 20 years ago. Half of the military operations and missions (5 out of 10), and a quarter of the civilian missions (4 out of 16) were launched during the European �Ϸ��վ's ninth term (2019 2024). The Council also launched a new hybrid type of civilian-military mission during this period, the EU security and defence initiative for countries in the Gulf of Guinea – to address the effective or potential withdrawal of EU operations and missions from Niger and Mali. The funding of missions and operations, and selection of leaders, differs between military operations and missions and civilian missions. Military operations with an 'executive' mandate allowing the use of force are in a separate category from military training missions whose mandate is not executive. The Treaty ban on using the EU budget to fund CFSP and CSDP activities having security or defence implications has meanwhile resulted in a highly complex funding architecture for these EU operations and missions. Operation and mission staff include international staff from participating Member States and some non-EU States, in addition to local staff from the deployment countries. Women are notably absent in the highest command positions of the military operations and missions, and very few have been appointed as heads of civilian missions.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: Kaja Kallas – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission - 15-10-2024

Tue, 15 Oct 2024 08:28:55 GMT

Kaja Kallas served as the prime minister of Estonia from 2021 to 2024. In 2024, she was awarded the Walther Rathenau Prize in recognition of outstanding lifetime achievement in foreign policy. Having joined the Estonian Reform Party in 2011, Kallas has been its leader since April 2018. From 2011 to 2014, she was a member of the Estonian �Ϸ��վ (12th Riigikogu) and served as chair of its Economic Affairs Committee (2011). She was also a member of the 14th Riigikogu (2019 to 2021). As a Member of the European �Ϸ��վ from 2014 to 2018, Kallas belonged to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, now Renew Europe) political group. During this term, Kallas was Vice-Chair of �Ϸ��վ's Delegation to the EU-Ukraine �Ϸ��վary Association Committee. Kallas was born in 1977 in Tallinn. She graduated from the University of Tartu in 1999 with a degree in law and pursued postgraduate studies at the Estonian Business School in 2007. Before entering politics, Kallas worked as an attorney at law. This is one of a set of briefings designed to give an overview of issues of interest relating to the portfolios of the Commissioners designate. All these briefings can be found at: https://epthinktank.eu/commissioner_hearings_2024.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: Dubravka Šuica – Mediterranean - 15-10-2024

Tue, 15 Oct 2024 08:18:44 GMT

Dubravka Šuica has served as a Member of the European Commission and Vice-President for Demography and Democracy since 2019. She was also the co-chair of the Conference on the Future of Europe. From 2013 to 2019, Šuica was a Member of the European �Ϸ��վ, where she focused on issues relating to the environment, public health and food safety, and foreign affairs. In 2019, she was a vice-chair of the European People's Party Group in the European �Ϸ��վ. As a member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Šuica served three terms in the Croatian �Ϸ��վ, from 2000 until 2011, also holding the position of vice-chair of the EU Integration Committee. From 2001 to 2009, Šuica served two terms as the first female mayor of Dubrovnik, her hometown. In 2006, she was honoured with the World Mayor Award. From 2004 to 2009, Šuica was a board member of the Union of the Association of Towns and Municipalities of Croatia. She later served as a councillor on the Dubrovnik-Neretva County Assembly. She also served as the president of the Croatian Delegation to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe for a decade. Since 2012, she has chaired the HDZ Committee on Foreign Affairs and European Affairs, and has been the vice-president of EPP Women. Born in 1957, Šuica graduated in English and German language and literature. She started her career in education, first as a teacher and later as director of Dubrovnik High School.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Oversigt - Tunisia's 2024 presidential elections - 26-09-2024

Wed, 25 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

In a decree issued on 1 July, Tunisian President Kais Saied called a presidential election for 6 October 2024. In doing so Saied is setting himself up for probable re-election, as all but one of the opposition candidates are in prison or have been declared ineligible by the Tunisian electoral commission. A third candidate who had been approved by the electoral commission was handed a 20-month prison sentence on 19 September. Now seeking re-election for a second 5-year term, Saied was first elected to office in 2019 as an anti establishment candidate promising to root out corruption and address poverty. He took full control of the country in 2021, dismissing the elected parliament and deciding to rule by decree, a move the opposition and international community slammed as a coup. A new constitution, approved by referendum in 2022, established a presidential system and paralysed parliament. The EU is now facing a dilemma as to how to support internal democratic processes and advance implementation of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which prioritises measures against irregular migration.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - BRICS+: Economic indicators and trade with EU - 24-09-2024

Mon, 23 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Our infographic shows the overview of the BRICS+ countries’ economic and trade relations with the EU. All 9 BRICS+ states have experienced a relatively consistent increase in their GDP per capita (PPP) since 2007. Female labour force participation rates vary significantly from country to country. At the extremes are Iran with 14.4, and Ethiopia, with 74.8%. EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the BRICS+ countries has risen steadily comparatively to 2007 volumes. The BRICS+ group is now the EU's main trading partner for goods. Mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, vehicles and aircraft, and pharmaceutical products comprise about 54% of all goods exported by the EU to the BRICS+ countries.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Women's rights in Afghanistan: An ongoing battle - 16-09-2024

Sun, 15 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Since the Taliban regime overtook the country in mid-August 2021, Afghanistan's record on women's rights has been one of the worst, if not the worst, in the world. Despite promises to 'uphold women's rights in line with Sharia law', the Taliban have suppressed the rights of their citizens, with women the main target of restrictions. As well as prohibiting women and girls from travelling without a male relative, the Taliban have denied them post-primary education, banned them from numerous public places, and restricted their employment to healthcare and primary education. In December 2022, women were banned from working for non-governmental organisations in most sectors. In April 2023, the ban was extended to include Afghan women working for the United Nations mission in the country. In August 2024, the Taliban published a law codifying existing norms and introducing new ones, including a prohibition on women's voices being heard in public. This crackdown on women's rights has attracted considerable international condemnation, including from Muslim states. In response to the regressive policies, many international donors have reduced or threatened to halt their humanitarian assistance, upon which the country is strongly reliant. It is feared that women could, unintentionally, be the worst affected by this reduction or suspension of humanitarian aid. The Taliban nevertheless appears inflexible, leaving international actors with a dilemma as to how to proceed. The European Union (EU) has been engaged in Afghanistan since the mid-1980s and has prioritised the advancement of Afghan women's rights. While changing its terms of engagement, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid and to support civil society. �Ϸ��վ has followed the situation closely and recommended further action to support Afghan women and girls. This briefing analyses the current situation of women's rights in Afghanistan, taking a long view. Women's rights have been an intense battleground between different actors for over a century, with periods of promising reforms followed by resistance and often reversals of progress. This helps to explain how a country where women won voting rights in 1919 – earlier than in most of the Western world – has ended up treating its female population in a manner that possibly amounts to a crime against humanity. This briefing updates an earlier one written by the same authors in April 2023.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3): The EU's role in promoting health and well-being for all - 02-09-2024

Sun, 01 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Good health and well-being is a key indicator and a precondition for sustainable development, allowing people to enjoy fulfilling lives, receive education and be productive members of society. In contrast, the burden of disease has high economic, social and individual costs. Therefore, achieving the highest attainable level of health is of interest for all. However, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing crises, progress towards United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (UN SDG) 3 ('ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages') is off track globally, and many of its targets may not be achieved by 2030. Moreover, progress varies significantly across regions, with some of them lagging behind. The European Union (EU) is committed to implementing the SDGs, including SDG 3, both internally and globally. Within the EU, measures pertaining to SDG 3 focus on achieving more resilient, accessible and inclusive health systems; improving reproductive, maternal and child health; ending major communicable disease epidemics; and reducing non-communicable and mental disorders. They also focus on lowering behavioural and environmental health risk factors. Globally, in line with its 2022 global health strategy, the EU contributes to the attainment of SDG 3 objectives through action at global, regional and bilateral level. A vocal supporter of and major financial contributor to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the EU cooperates with the WHO to deliver universal health coverage worldwide, improve health outcomes in emergencies and enhance global health security, to give some examples. The EU also supports its African and other partners with the projects enabled through the EU's Global Gateway and through its Team Europe approach, where feasible. �Ϸ��վ is a committed supporter of stronger EU action on health, both internally and outside the EU. It has called regularly for a comprehensive and integrated approach to achieve a high level of health and well-being.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

EU-faktablade - Golfstaterne, Iran, Irak og Yemen - 25-06-2024

Mon, 03 Jun 2019 15:54:40 GMT

EU har indgået samarbejdsaftaler med Golfstaternes Samarbejdsråd (en regional organisation, der omfatter Bahrain, De Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar og Saudi-Arabien) og med Yemen samt en partnerskabs- og samarbejdsaftale med Irak. EU har ingen formelle aftaler med Iran, og der er ikke nogen EU-delegation i Teheran. Forbindelserne mellem EU og Iran er på nuværende tidspunkt baseret på bevarelsen af den fælles omfattende handlingsplan (JCPOA – atomaftalen med Iran), der blev undertegnet i Wien i juli 2015.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

EU-faktablade - De sydlige partnere - 13-06-2024

Thu, 23 May 2019 12:35:13 GMT

Den europæiske naboskabspolitik (ENP) omfatter Algeriet, Egypten, Israel, Jordan, Libanon, Libyen, Marokko, Palæstina, Syrien og Tunesien. Den består af bilaterale politikker mellem EU og de ti enkelte partnerlande samt en regional samarbejdsramme, Middelhavsunionen. Som reaktion på opstandene i dets sydlige naboskabsområde øgede EU i 2011 støtten til den demokratiske omstillingsproces inden for rammerne af ENP. EU reviderede ENP yderligere i 2015.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

EU-faktablade - Afrika - 30-05-2024

Sun, 26 May 2019 22:00:00 GMT

EU's samarbejde med afrikanske lande og Den Afrikanske Union (AU) er baseret på to særskilte rammer: dvs. a) partnerskabsaftalen/partnerskabsaftalerne med staterne i Afrika, Vestindien og Stillehavet (AVS-staterne) og b) den fælles Afrika-EU-strategi. Cotonouaftalen, der blev undertegnet i 2000 mellem EU og AVS-staterne, og som har dannet det retlige grundlag for partnerskabets politiske, økonomiske og udviklingsmæssige dimensioner i over 20 år, er blevet erstattet af en helt ny aftale, der blev undertegnet i Apia, Samoa, den 15. november 2023. Oprindeligt skulle Cotonouaftalen udløbe ved udgangen af 2020, men den blev forlænget flere gange, senest indtil december 2023, da undertegnelsen af en ny partnerskabsaftale, der blev forhandlet med henblik på at modernisere og opgradere partnerskabet, blev blokeret i Rådet i flere år. Den fælles Afrika-EU-strategi er blevet gennemført ved hjælp af de flerårige køre- og handlingsplaner, der blev vedtaget på hvert Afrika-EU-topmøde. På det seneste topmøde mellem EU og AU i februar 2022 i Bruxelles blev EU's og de afrikanske ledere enige om en fælles vision for et fornyet partnerskab baseret på solidaritet, sikkerhed, fred, bæredygtig udvikling og fælles velstand. EU er Afrikas mest betydningsfulde donor af officiel udviklingsbistand, som primært ydes gennem EU's almindelige budget gennem instrumentet for naboskab, udviklingssamarbejde og internationalt samarbejde (NDICI) – et globalt Europa.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Indgående analyse - Artificial intelligence (AI) and human rights: Using AI as a weapon of repression and its impact on human rights - 01-05-2024

Tue, 11 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT

This in-depth analysis (IDA) explores the most prominent actors, cases and techniques of algorithmic authoritarianism together with the legal, regulatory and diplomatic framework related to AI-based biases as well as deliberate misuses. With the world leaning heavily towards digital transformation, AI’s use in policy, economic and social decision-making has introduced alarming trends in repressive and authoritarian agendas. Such misuse grows ever more relevant to the European �Ϸ��վ, resonating with its commitment to safeguarding human rights in the context of digital trans-formation. By shedding light on global patterns and rapidly developing technologies of algorithmic authoritarianism, this IDA aims to produce a wider understanding of the complex policy, regulatory and diplomatic challenges at the intersection of technology, democracy and human rights. Insights into AI’s role in bolstering authoritarian tactics offer a foundation for �Ϸ��վ’s advocacy and policy interventions, underscoring the urgency for a robust international framework to regulate the use of AI, whilst ensuring that technological progress does not weaken fundamental freedoms. Detailed case studies and policy recommendations serve as a strategic resource for �Ϸ��վ’s initiatives: they highlight the need for vigilance and proactive measures by combining partnerships (technical assistance), industrial thriving (AI Act), influence (regulatory convergence) and strength (sanctions, export controls) to develop strategic policy approaches for countering algorithmic control encroachments.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Briefing - Recent threats in the Red Sea: Economic impact on the region and on the EU - 27-03-2024

Tue, 26 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Since mid-November 2023, the Iran-backed Houthi militia, which controls large parts of Yemen, has attacked numerous Western commercial ships near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea. In response, major shipping companies have temporarily suspended Suez transits and diverted their trade. This diversion coincides with decreasing freight in another maritime chokepoint, the Panama Canal, provoked by lowered water levels. Rounding South Africa via the Cape of Good Hope is the shortest alternative route for travel by ship between Asia and Europe, a route that increases shipping time by 10 to 14 days. Shipping prices had already been on the rise recently, owing to increased fuel and insurance costs. The diversion has caused delays that have disrupted global supply chains, with certain companies choosing to halt production in their factories. If the situation persists or worsens, it could further affect energy supplies and prices, all this potentially contributing to higher inflation. This could, in turn, hamper the efforts of central banks to achieve a 'soft landing'. If, in addition, United States (US) and European Union (EU) central banks decide to keep interest rates high, developing countries will have to pay premium prices for international debt, raising repayment risks for many countries in Africa that have maturity deadlines this year. The attacks have reduced income from maritime fees and could affect commodity exports for some countries in the region, worsening an already precarious economic situation. If the situation persists or worsens, it could also impact trade for other countries in east Africa and aggravate food security challenges, generating social unrest in countries in the region. In addition to the attacks on ships, there are suspicions that the Houthis have been involved in damage to submarine communications cables. This damage – to what is categorised as critical infrastructure – could represent a significant cost to the EU and other economies. Following calls by the European �Ϸ��վ and Council, the European Commission has recently adopted a recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructures.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP

Studie - Parental Child Abductions to Third Countries - 12-03-2024

Mon, 11 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Cross-border parental child abductions in the EU are governed by The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and (except for Denmark) the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Countries outside of the EU may or may not be Contracting States to ‘the Convention’, but will not be bound by Brussels II-ter. Research has found that the often negative, long-lasting impact of abduction may continue throughout the lifecycle of those who have been abducted. It may also affect future generations of society. This means that every effort to deter abduction should be made. Where that is not possible, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention should be nurtured to support its application in contemporary society. Specialist mediation should be encouraged in relation to international child abduction generally, and specifically in relation to Third Countries which are not Contracting States to ‘the Convention’. This study was commissioned by the European �Ϸ��վ’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee.

Kilde : © Den Europæiske Union, 2024 - EP