/thinktank/en Think Tank - The documents that help shape new EU legislation EN © European Union, 2025 - EP Sat, 03 May 2025 19:50:34 GMT /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)772827 Türkiye has long been a strategic partner of the EU on migration, security, and trade. However, following the attempted coup in 2016, Türkiye's democratic backsliding led the Council to freeze its accession negotiations in 2018. Although relations have since thawed, the EU is exploring a more realistic framework for bilateral relations. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) adopted its report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye on 9 April 2025. A debate and vote on the report are due to be held in plenary in May 2025. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Wed, 30 Apr 2025 10:43:25 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)772827_EN_20250430 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2025)772839 ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ played a fundamental role in reshaping the political landscape of central and eastern Europe during and after the end of the Cold War, setting out an agenda for European enlargement and substantiating European integration. Amid an atmosphere that signalled the triumph of democratic state-building in Europe, Members of the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ also saw an opportunity to advance their own agenda of further democratising and legitimising the governance structures of the European Community. The study examines how the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ strengthened its presence throughout this period in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now Czechia and Slovakia), Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the former Yugoslavia. Based on archival research and relevant literature review, the study illustrates the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s involvement in these states' path to full European Union membership, the motivations behind its policies, and the points of tension that arose during this transformative period. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Tue, 29 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_STU(2025)772839_EN_20250430 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)772833 The European Peace Facility (EPF) was created in March 2021 as a funding instrument aimed at enhancing the EU's ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security and stability. The EPF rests on two pillars. The first is to fund EU military operations and missions under the common foreign and security policy. The second is to provide assistance to countries in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the Middle East and Africa to strengthen security in their respective regions. Following Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU started using the EPF to rapidly deliver military aid to Ukraine. This support was provided alongside continued assistance to the EU's eastern neighbourhood, as well as to partners in the Middle East and Africa. The EPF has a total financial ceiling of more than €17 billion for the 2021-2027 period. As the facility is an off-budget instrument, EU Member States contribute directly to it, based on the gross national income key. Currently, the EPF lacks fresh resources to continue supporting Ukraine in facing the war. Furthermore, since March 2023, Hungary has refused to mobilise EPF funds in military aid to Ukraine. In line with the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, Russian assets held in EU banks were frozen. In May 2024, the Council of the EU allocated 90 % of the 'windfall' (extraordinary) profits from these frozen assets to the EPF. A first transfer of €1.5 billion from these profits to Ukraine took place in mid-2024. A second payment, possibly amounting to €2 billion, is expected in spring 2025. Given Hungary's veto, the EU is looking for more reliable ways to continue assistance to Ukraine than by means of the windfall profits from the Russian assets channelled through the EPF. On 24 October 2024, the EU created the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) and issued an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of €18.1 billion, the EU's part of an EU-G7 syndicated loan to Ukraine totalling €45 billion. Starting after March 2025, 95 % of the windfall profits from the Russian assets held in EU banks will be allocated to the EU budget and channelled through the ULCM to Ukraine. The remaining 5 % will be allocated to the EPF. Beyond Ukraine, for which the EPF-funded approved military support amounts to approximately €10.6 billion, the EPF has an available budget of €6.4 billion to fund, until 2027, both the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad – including its military assistance mission in support of Ukraine – and assistance measures for the armed forces of partner countries. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Mon, 28 Apr 2025 14:05:53 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)772833_EN_20250428 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)765767 The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU's relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal's implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026. On 20 November 2024, the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission's 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA. This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA's implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject. Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia's war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID 19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration's (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Wed, 23 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)765767_EN_20250424 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769584 Following increasing pressure from members of his own party and a period of low opinion poll ratings, Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau announced his resignation from the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada on 6 January 2025. Mark Carney, his successor as prime minister of Canada, and new leader of the Liberal Party, has called a snap parliamentary election for 28 April. This year's election will mark a decade of Liberal Party rule in Canada, a period with significant political, economic and diplomatic developments. In some cases, the administration continued already existing policies; in some others, it diverged significantly. While Canada's relationship with China and India has grown increasingly tense in recent years, the country has traditionally relied on close partnerships with its Western allies, particularly its southern neighbour, the United States (US). This dynamic has shifted under the second Trump administration, which has started its term in a far more bellicose tone than before. Canada's next administration will need to navigate a volatile geopolitical environment characterised by the US's trade war and weakening commitment to its role as a global leader and guarantor of the Pax Americana; China's increasingly assertive posture as a second superpower; Russia's renewed ambitions for a greater global role; and the emergence of middle powers and countries from the Global South. This briefing builds on a 2022 EPRS briefing on Canada's ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ and other political institutions. While the earlier briefing examines Canada's federal structure, parliament and levels of governance, the present one focuses more on the political, economic and external relations developments over the past decade, in light of the upcoming election. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Tue, 22 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769584_EN_20250423 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769573 Since the start of Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level. To date, the support to Ukraine from 'Team Europe' – comprising the EU and its Member States – amounts to €143 billion. This support includes macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and through the European Peace Facility, as well as support to EU Member States hosting Ukrainian refugees. The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan, an ambitious plan for reform and investment drafted by Ukraine's government and endorsed by the EU. The European Commission and the Ukrainian government publish data on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments. Those data form the basis for a Ukraine Facility Dialogue, which ensures the democratic scrutiny of the EU's support to Ukraine. In addition to the Ukraine Facility, Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a €18.1 billion EU macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine as part of a €45 billion G7 loan. Furthermore, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism was established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and the associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for in the framework agreement under the Ukraine Facility, referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792, will apply to the macro-financial assistance loan in order to ensure seamless political and financial management of both. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ has repeatedly called for the confiscation of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets as such – instead of just using the extraordinary revenues – to finance further support for Ukraine and the country's reconstruction. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Tue, 08 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769573_EN_20250409 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)765779 Following the United Kingdom's referendum on its European Union membership, in June 2016, and the UK's decision to leave the EU, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed between the EU and the UK, in 2020. The TCA, in force since 2021, provides the framework for relations between the EU and the UK. In 2025, the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ will adopt – as it did in 2023 – a report on the implementation of the TCA, this time covering the period between January and December 2024. The report will follow the European Commission's presentation of its own implementation reports of 2024 and 2025. In August 2023, the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ary Research Service (EPRS) published a European Implementation Assessment (EIA) study on 'The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence', analysing the early outcomes and benefits, risks and challenges in the TCA's implementation. The EIA supported the joint implementation report on the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement by the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) (2022/2188(INI)). Following the approval of the joint request from AFET and INTA to draft a second report evaluating the implementation of the EU-UK TCA (2024/2108(INI)), this briefing draws on and complements the findings of the EIA published in 2023. It provides an update of key developments, specifically on the work of the Partnership Council, the Trade Partnership Committee and specialised committees, EU-UK agri-food trade and a potential sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, the UK's possible accession to the PEM Convention, and mutual recognition of standards and qualifications. The briefing notes that, while the institutional structures established under the TCA are functioning and technical progress has been achieved, implementation remains uneven. Persistent tensions have been present in areas such as fisheries, SPS measures, rules of origin, labour mobility, and mutual recognition of qualifications. In the context of the upcoming review of the TCA in 2026, some committees have engaged in forward-looking discussions. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Fri, 04 Apr 2025 15:05:23 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)765779_EN_20250404 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769564 Based on its Treaties, the European Union (EU) has developed a multifaceted external action policy, and is seen as an important actor far beyond its borders. Through its institutions and Member States, the EU is active in international trade, humanitarian assistance, economic, financial, and technical and development cooperation, as well as through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP). Increasingly, the external dimension of internal EU policies has also grown, notably in the economic, climate, energy, migration and digital fields. The role of the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ in the EU's external action has increased significantly since the 1990s, and especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Although ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s powers remain relatively limited compared to other EU institutions involved in external action, especially with regard to CFSP and CSDP decision-making (which remain mostly intergovernmental), it nevertheless has considerable legislative, budgetary, agenda-setting and soft powers. Several of ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s powers cut across all policy areas. Notably, it proactively supports multilateralism and conducts extensive parliamentary diplomacy. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ contributes to policy framing through its debates, resolutions, recommendations, own-initiative reports and statements. It holds hearings, workshops, debates and organises missions. Members of the ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ exercise scrutiny of the executive, by holding hearings of and posing questions to the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's High Representative and the Council. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ co-legislates on financing the EU's external action and controls EU institutions' expenditure, including the EEAS, through the discharge procedure. The ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ acts on an equal footing with the Council when adopting numerous acts in the fields of trade, development and humanitarian aid, and often external dimensions of internal policies. Since 2009, ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s consent to legally binding international agreements is mandated by the Treaties. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Mon, 31 Mar 2025 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769564_EN_20250401 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_IDA(2025)765792 Space holds promise for both economic prosperity and the attainment of strategic goals. The EU's future role in space is contingent on fast-changing geopolitical dynamics, which can range from peaceful cooperation to heightened competition or conflict among global powers. Given the importance of this subject, the European Commission has announced plans to propose an EU space act in the second quarter of 2025. This paper aims to describe the geopolitical context of space activities that affect the EU's current and future capabilities, with a specific focus on the use of space for security and defence and the response to space-related risks. Four distinct future scenarios present contextual conditions that may shape the EU's ambitions in space. The scenarios also highlight challenges and opportunities, while considering policy considerations for EU action. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Mon, 31 Mar 2025 13:23:08 GMT EPRS_IDA(2025)765792_EN_20250331 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)765789 The US Trump administration has set its sights on Ukraine's vast mineral resources, and proposed a deal: to secure a portion of Ukraine's rare earths in exchange for US support in the war against the Russian aggressor. Ukraine is a candidate for EU membership, and an earlier 2021 strategic partnership means the EU also has a stake in the future of Ukraine's mineral sector. This briefing analyses the US and EU positions, to shed light on the potential future of rare earth mining in Ukraine. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 27 Mar 2025 06:49:59 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)765789_EN_20250327 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769546 The latest annual report from the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU external action to promote human rights and democracy covers 2023. It highlights a worsening environment marked by multiple crises and conflicts, growing social inequalities, and increasing pressure on multilateral governance and rules-based international cooperation. During its April plenary session, the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ is due to vote on its own yearly resolution on human rights and democracy in the world, responding to the High Representative's report and recommending future EU action. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Wed, 26 Mar 2025 15:06:43 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769546_EN_20250326 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769548 The EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) contributes to the Union's objectives of preserving peace, strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation, and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) adopted its annual report on the implementation of the CFSP on 30 January 2025. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ will hold a debate and vote on the report during its April plenary session. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Wed, 26 Mar 2025 08:56:08 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769548_EN_20250326 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769551 Ukraine is the second largest country on the European continent after Russia. Its oil, coal and gas reserves, as well as its geostrategic position, ensured its important role in energy trade, both during the Soviet Union and after its collapse. However, Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine (since 2014), followed by a full-scale war of aggression against the country, have had severe human and economic impacts. In the energy area, for example, Russia's strategy has been to weaponise (e.g. the occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station) or destroy (hydro and coal-fired power plants, as well as electricity grid substations) energy infrastructure. As a result, Ukraine's electricity generation capacity has been severely limited. Moreover, its choice to be less dependent on Russian energy, and to apply for EU membership, means that, within a short time frame, it must rebuild its energy grid and orient it towards a future with less fossil fuels; all this while being in a war. Energy relations between the EU and Ukraine are multifaceted (e.g. the Energy Community; the memorandum of understanding on energy in 2005, updated in 2016; the association agreement signed in 2014). In future, they are due to be reframed under the institutional arrangements for the enlargement talks (after Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022). Since the Russian invasion in 2022, to help Ukraine cope with the multiple challenges its energy grid has been facing, the EU has used several mechanisms and initiatives, such as successfully synchronising the Ukrainian grid with the Continental European Synchronous Area; the EU civil protection mechanism; the Ukraine Facility; the Ukraine Energy Support Fund; and the European Investment Bank. The outcome of the war is uncertain, and some see recent statements by the new United States administration as a significant setback for Ukraine. Others focus instead on the possibilities for further collaboration between Ukraine and the EU. They bring as examples the country's vast gas reserves and infrastructure both to transport and to store natural gas, nuclear power or green hydrogen, provided that the country engages in the development of relevant infrastructure. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Sun, 23 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769551_EN_20250324 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769552 The six countries that make up the region known as the Western Balkans differ in terms of size, population, economy, energy mix and energy import dependency. At the same time, they share common elements because of their geographical proximity, and – in some cases – common policies adopted in the past. An example is their ageing infrastructure dating back to the 1970s, which was damaged during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Another common element (except for Albania) is their reliance on solid fossil fuels (mainly coal), and their dependency on imports of fossil fuels. The EU is the leading trade partner for the countries of the Western Balkans and an important investor in the region. In addition, it is the largest provider of financial assistance to the region, supporting the six countries' development and reforms, as well as its transition towards sustainable energy, with financial and technical assistance. The EU provides assistance through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the Western Balkans Investment Framework and the European Investment Bank. While the EU has an important role in the region, Russia and China are major players, too. Russia has been active for decades in the Western Balkans, while China has started engaging more recently. Their strategy also differs, with Russia more focused on exporting its fossil fuels to the region, and China investing through its Belt and Road Initiative. Nonetheless, such involvement creates dependencies, which could hamper these countries' integration into the EU – from both a political and an energy/economic perspective – as well as the functioning of the EU itself. In this context, experts have noted what steps the EU and the countries in the region could take to lessen these dependencies, while enhancing the Western Balkan countries' energy security and helping them take the necessary steps towards the green transition. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Sun, 23 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769552_EN_20250324 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769500 The energy system is a cornerstone of the United States (US) economy and competitiveness. The country's energy mix in 2022 was well-diversified, consisting of two thirds natural gas and oil, with the rest almost equal proportions of coal, nuclear and renewables. By using its vast reserves in fossil fuels and applying new extraction technologies, the US has managed to increase its fossil fuel production significantly over the past 10 years and, since 2019, it has become a net energy exporter for the first time in decades. US fossil fuel exports have increased further since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, at a time when the EU has looked to close the gap created by its ending imports from Russia. The US is also the world's largest producer of nuclear power, accounting for about 30 % of worldwide generation of nuclear electricity. During the Biden administration, the EU and the US were close allies and shared values on energy and the importance of energy transition. In this context, they cooperated through several channels and forums. At the same time, however, their initiatives (the Inflation Reduction Act in the US, the European Green Deal in the EU) showed that, while the goal (decarbonisation and generation of energy from renewable sources) remained the same, the visions and means to achieve them differed between the US and the EU. This created the conditions for both cooperation and rivalry. Since then, the new Trump administration has shown that it intends to conduct a more aggressive, fossil fuel-based energy policy. This could reduce cooperation and create tensions in energy relations between the partners, as was the case during President Trump's previous term. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Sun, 23 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769500_EN_20250324 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769537 On 6 December 2024, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached a political agreement on a free trade agreement that would form part of a wider Partnership Agreement including political dialogue and cooperation. The 2024 text of the trade pillar seeks to adjust an earlier political agreement of 28 June 2019 to EU demands for Mercosur to make stronger sustainability commitments, notably in respect to the Paris Agreement, and to Mercosur demands for the EU to grant greater policy space for Mercosur's industrial development. Against the background of growing geo-economic uncertainty and geopolitical tension, the agreement would be a strong signal in favour of multilateralism and against power politics in trade. It would create a strategic alliance between like-minded partners for building sustainable and resilient supply chains, including for the green and digital transitions. It could also allow the EU to regain some economic ground lost to China in the past decade. However, the trade pillar faces strong headwinds, notably for its potential environmental, climate change and food safety impacts. While the agreement enjoys the support of EU industry associations and sub-sectors of EU agriculture with offensive interests, EU farmers' associations with defensive interests have criticised it as an unfair 'cars for cows' deal. After the legal review and translation of the agreement, the Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the whole Agreement, revealing its ratification modalities. Second edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Mon, 17 Mar 2025 09:49:34 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769537_EN_20250317 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698849 Germany was originally entitled to a maximum financial contribution of €25.6 billion in grants from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. The national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) for Germany does not include requests for loans. Following the latest amendment of the German NRRP in July 2024, which added a REPowerEU chapter, the EU resources devoted to the plan reached €30.3 billion. This amount corresponds to 4 % of the entire RRF and to 0.9 % of Germany's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). For most of the measures, additional funding will also come from national sources. There is a strong focus on the green transition. Measures relating to climate protection – including key actions on mobility and housing – were projected to receive 42 % of the allocation in the initial version of the plan. The modified NRRP increases this level of ambition to 49.5 % of the updated allocation. It also shows a strong digital ambition, devoting 47.5 % of the allocation (excluding REPowerEU) to digital measures across various sectors ranging from industry to education, social policy and healthcare, and public administration. Germany has so far received €19.75 billion from the RRF in the form of pre-financing and two result-based payments covering three instalments. The remaining 34.9 %, or €10.55 billion, will be paid in two other instalments once Germany has satisfactorily fulfilled the related milestones and targets identified in relation to RRF implementation. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Mon, 10 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2021)698849_EN_20250311 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)765784 In a context of high uncertainty on the future of European security, EU leaders held a special European Council meeting on 6 March 2025 to discuss common action aimed at enhancing Europe's sovereignty in the field of defence as well as to reiterate their unwavering support to Ukraine in light of the latest developments. The EU-27 took significant steps to accelerate defence preparedness, agreeing in particular on new instruments to finance defence investment at multiple levels. Regarding Ukraine, considering Hungary's refusal to agree to joint conclusions, a separate statement, 'firmly supported' by 26 of the 27 Heads of State or Government, was published, emphasising a series of principles with regard to possible peace negotiations. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Sun, 09 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)765784_EN_20250310 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)765773 The EU's integration, from the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 to the welcoming of 13 European countries in the 2004-2013 period, has been lauded for boosting economic development and living standards across the continent, bringing dynamism and new perspectives as well as enhancing Europe's geopolitical weight on the global stage. This economic development has been accompanied by dramatic improvements in life expectancy, gender equality and protection of the environment. The EU enlargement process has been a key driver of these results by expanding the single market for trade, competition, freedom of movement and investment. This briefing constructs three scenarios for the EU's future enlargement (2024-2035). The analysis finds that an EU enlargement with modest convergence (Scenario 2) could raise the EU's gross domestic product (GDP) by 8 % by 2035 compared with the status quo (Scenario 1). In an ideal state scenario, with an ambitious approach to enlargement (Scenario 3), the EU's GDP could rise by up to 24 %. The analysis finds that all EU countries would experience greater GDP growth as a result of EU enlargement, albeit of differing magnitudes. Such growth, particularly if the enlargement process is done in a smart way, could be broad-based and be reflected also in higher living standards, lower global greenhouse gas emissions and greater defence readiness for all countries. Enlargement could also promote EU competitiveness, sovereignty and shared exploitation of critical materials, and help to develop access to modern warfare and stronger defence capacity. The strengthening of democratic institutions, the reinforcement of the European pillar of social rights to boost living standards, and EU institutional reform are key elements in realising the full potential offered by enlargement. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Sun, 09 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)765773_EN_20250310 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769527 Greenland is a self-governing Arctic island within the Kingdom of Denmark, which strives for economic self-sufficiency and future independence. This representative democracy of 56 542 inhabitants will elect 31 members to Greenland's ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ on 11 March 2025. These parliamentary elections are taking place against the fraught background of rising geopolitical tensions. In the context of a heating – literally and figuratively – Arctic, Greenland is a focus of geopolitical competition and growing confrontation between major powers – the United States (US), Russia and China. The island has high strategic importance, due to its proximity to the emerging Arctic shipping routes, its strategic location in relation to security and defence activities, and its vast untapped natural resources, including mineral reserves. According to its foreign policy strategy, Greenland is open to enhanced cooperation and dialogue with partners, including the US. Indeed, the US has been an important ally of Greenland and security guarantor since 1951. Relations have strengthened and widened during the last two decades, with cooperation now encompassing not only security, but also environment, science, health, technology, trade, tourism, education, and culture. However, US President Donald Trump's rhetoric on acquiring Greenland has shocked Greenlanders, Danes and Europeans alike. Upon the island's withdrawal from the European Economic Community (EEC, now European Union) in 1985, Greenland became an Overseas Country and Territory, associated through Denmark. The main areas of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Greenland are fisheries, education, and, lately, green growth. The EU has recently stepped up its engagement with Greenland by opening an office in Nuuk in March 2024 and signing a Memorandum of Understanding for a strategic partnership to develop sustainable raw materials value chains in November 2023. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ engages with its counterparts from Greenland through meetings with the Nordic Council and West Nordic Council. In October 2021, the European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ called for the EU to establish an enhanced political dialogue on bilateral cooperation with Greenland. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Fri, 07 Mar 2025 14:34:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769527_EN_20250307 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769512 Much of the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) is set out in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which came fully into force in May 2021. The depth and complexity of relations between the EU and the UK following the latter's withdrawal on 31 January 2020 vary depending on the policy area concerned. For example, the TCA devotes many more articles to energy relations than to climate relations. This is due to a variety of reasons, but can often be partially explained by the depth of previous relationships, as well as physical infrastructure already in place (such as electricity and gas interconnectors between the UK and EU Member States). In the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK and the EU have increased their coordination, particularly on energy. At the same time, both the EU and UK are moving ahead on energy and climate issues at different paces. Concerns therefore exist that differing regulatory approaches might result in discrepancies that could hamper trade between the EU and the UK. The TCA provisions on energy cooperation will expire on 30 June 2026, unless the UK and EU jointly decide to renew them. In that context, experts have proposed several areas where the parties could renew and deepen their cooperation. This updates an EPRS briefing first published in June 2023. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 06 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)769512_EN_20250307 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769514 One of the first, and boldest, measures taken by Western countries as a response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the immobilisation of around €260 billion worth of Russian central bank assets held under their jurisdictions. In October 2024, the G7 reached an agreement on the use of the extraordinary revenues generated, to service and repay a US$50 billion loan to Ukraine from G7 countries, while the complex debate on the legality and related risks on the use of the principal capital continues. A debate on this issue, following statements by the Council and the Commission, is scheduled for the March plenary session. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 06 Mar 2025 13:55:47 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769514_EN_20250306 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769523 The Regulation establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova will provide the country with financing worth almost €1.9 billion for the 2025-2027 period. The Facility aims to invest in Moldova, accelerate its socio-economic reforms, strengthen its resilience, and advance its EU integration. ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ is scheduled to vote on the agreed text, resulting from interinstitutional negotiations, during its March 2025 plenary session. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 06 Mar 2025 11:28:59 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769523_EN_20250306 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769518 After the fall of the Assad regime, the European Union (EU) is ready to support the Syrian people through the process of transition and reconstruction, including by suspending certain restrictive measures. The Council and the Commission are due to give statements on the issue during ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾'s March plenary session. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 06 Mar 2025 11:19:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769518_EN_20250306 /thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769515 Russia's war in Ukraine led the EU to take measures for its energy security. Three years later, the results are positive, but more can be done to further lower reliance on Russian fossil fuels and nuclear energy in the EU. The Commission is due to make a statement on the issue during the March plenary session. <br /> <br /> Source : <a href="/portal/en/legal-notice" >© European Union, 2025 - EP</a> Documents - Think Tank - European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ Thu, 06 Mar 2025 11:13:30 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769515_EN_20250306