Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti /thinktank/fi Think Tank - Asiakirjat, jotka auttavat luomaan uutta EU-lainsäädäntöä FI © Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP Sun, 04 May 2025 11:45:29 GMT Lyhyesti - LUX-yleisöpalkinto: Euroopan parlamentti lähempänä ihmisiä - 18-03-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769535 LUX-yleisöpalkinto on nykyisin Euroopan unionin suurin elokuvapalkinto. Sen myöntävät Euroopan parlamentti ja European Film Academy yhteistyössä Luova Eurooppa -ohjelman Media-alaohjelman ja Europa Cinemas -verkoston kanssa. Palkintoehdokkaiksi valitaan vuosittain viisi elokuvaa. Niissä käsitellään EU:n tärkeitä yhteiskunnallisia ja poliittisia kysymyksiä ja esitellään Euroopan kiinnostavimpia elokuvantekijöitä. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Tue, 18 Mar 2025 12:58:33 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769535_FI_20250318 Briefing - Stock-taking of the 2024 European Ϸվ Elections - 13-03-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/IUST_BRI(2025)771520 In the 2024 European Ϸվ elections turnout varied significantly across EU Member States, influenced by institutional factors such as compulsory voting and concurrent elections. Socioeconomic disparities persisted; older, higher-educated, and wealthier citizens were more likely to vote, while economically disadvantaged and unemployed individuals participated less. Gender and age gaps in turnout reaffirmed the importance of role models and political efficacy in mobilization. Vote choice reflected both ideological convictions and protest voting, with established pro-EU parties retaining support while Euroskeptic and far-right parties made gains. The elections confirmed the enduring importance of economic redistribution, European integration, and climate policy as key axes of political contestation. While high-quality representation fosters legitimacy and political engagement, turnout and ideological representation disparities highlight ongoing challenges for democratic inclusivity in the EU. Key recommendations for higher quality of representation include: (1) strengthening political efficacy among women; (2) encouraging youth political engagement; (3) balancing age representation in politics; (4) simplifying electoral processes; (5) strengthening social safety nets to sustain political engagement; (6) addressing political disengagement stemming from economic dissatisfaction; (7) enhancing representation for disadvantaged groups; (8) considering candidate age in party strategies; (9) bridging climate policy divides; and (10) leveraging EU defense cooperation for political consensus. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 12 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT IUST_BRI(2025)771520_FI_20250313 Briefing - Stock-taking of the European Elections 2024 - 13-03-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/IUST_BRI(2025)771469 The European Electoral Act decrees that the Members of the European Ϸվ shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote. There is much leeway for a Member State to turn terms like “proportional representation” or “the list system” into executable rules. As a result, Member States differ considerably as to their electoral provisions. The briefing presents an overview of the vote patterns used by the Member States, of the apportionment methods to convert the votes of a domestic electorate into seats for the competing parties, and of the ways in which the seats of a party are assigned to this party's candidates. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 12 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT IUST_BRI(2025)771469_FI_20250313 Lyhyesti - Current membership of the European Council - 05-03-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)608781 The European Council consists of the 27 Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, who are voting members, together with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, who have no vote (Article 15(2) Treaty on European Union). The chart shows the current members, the national office they hold, their most recent European political affiliation, and the year their membership began. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Tue, 04 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)608781_FI_20250305 Tutkimus - Quality analysis of European Commission impact assessments - 03-02-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_STU(2025)765770 This study provides an analysis of the quality of European Commission ex-ante impact assessments (IAs) published between December 2019 and November 2024, following their appraisal by the Ex-Ante Impact Assessment Unit (IMPA) of the European Ϸվary Research Service (EPRS). Drawing on a review of 143 initial appraisals of Commission IAs, the study analyses them according to quality criteria stemming from the Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines, European Ϸվ resolutions and the Ϸվ's Impact Assessment Handbook. During the term under review, the average quality of Commission IAs has developed positively, and in several respects. This reflects the Commission's significant efforts to apply the better regulation rules and tools. At the same time, the study reveals shortcomings in certain parts of IAs, the improvement of which will need a careful and systematic approach in future, in particular the assessment of impacts, the range of feasible options, and elements such as the inclusion of operational objectives and the quantification of benefits. As regards the uptake of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) recommendations in the final IA, the intensified upstream scrutiny of the RSB appears to have benefited overall IA quality during this review term and should therefore be maintained. With this study, IMPA seeks to contribute to the joint effort to improve the quality of EU law-making. The aim is for the findings of the review to feed into the broader discussion on better regulation in the European Union, and impact assessment in particular. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Sun, 02 Feb 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_STU(2025)765770_FI_20250203 Briefing - Ϸվ's right of legislative initiative - 23-01-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)767211 The European Commission has a near monopoly on legislative initiative in the European Union (EU), with special initiative rights for other institutions applying only in certain specific cases. However, the European Ϸվ and the Council may invite the Commission to submit legislative proposals. While this 'indirect' initiative right does not create an obligation on the Commission to propose the legislation requested, the Treaty of Lisbon codified the Commission's obligation to provide reasons for any refusal to follow a parliamentary initiative. Against this backdrop, some argue that Ϸվ could take the Commission to the Court of Justice of the EU if it fails to justify a negative decision. Others see Ϸվ's increasing participation in overall political planning – particularly through negotiations on the Commission's annual work programme (CWP) – as a further channel for Ϸվ to increase its influence on EU legislation. It is thus argued that the increased role of Ϸվ in the legislative procedure should have reduced the need for its Members to make use of legislative initiatives. Notwithstanding that, there is a trend towards greater use of formal parliamentary legislative initiatives to assert greater influence on the political process. In her inaugural address in July 2019 and in her political guidelines, the then newly elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, pledged to strengthen the partnership with the European Ϸվ, inter alia, by responding with a proposal for a legislative act whenever Ϸվ, acting by a majority of its Members, adopts a resolution requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals. She added that this commitment would have to fully respect the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. President von der Leyen also said that she supported moves towards recognising a right for Ϸվ of legislative initiative. A similar commitment to strengthen cooperation with Ϸվ on the exercise of Ϸվ's indirect right of legislative initiative was expressed by Ursula von der Leyen in her 2024-2029 political guidelines. This briefing is an update of a 2013 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva, and a 2020 briefing by Silvia Kotanidis. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 22 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)767211_FI_20250123 Tutkimus - Ϸվs in the EU enlargement process: Strengthening capacities of accession country parliaments under the evolving enlargement methodology - 10-01-2025 /thinktank/fi/document/EXPO_STU(2025)754467 This study explores the role and enhancement of parliamentary capacities in the European Union (EU) enlargement process, focusing on the EU’s evolving accession methodology and its emphasis on the ‘fundamentals’ approach. It examines the European Commission’s criteria for ‘functioning democratic institutions’ in accession countries and evaluates the effectiveness of support measures from EU institutions, Member States, and international organisations. Based on desk research, mapping, and over 90 expert and stakeholder interviews, the study analyses EU democracy support initiatives for parliaments in 10 enlargement countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Kosovo. The study highlights best practices and identifies challenges that require increased attention from the European Ϸվ and the core actors involved in parliamentary capacity-building. While past efforts by the European Ϸվ, Member States, and international organisations have strengthened parliaments in these countries, ongoing democratic backsliding calls for more coherent and concerted action. Ϸվ and its Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG) play a crucial role in addressing these challenges. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2025 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 22 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT EXPO_STU(2025)754467_FI_20250110 Briefing - Euroopan parlamentti: Faktatietoja - 22-11-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)766234 Tämä on Euroopan parlamentin tutkimuspalvelun julkaisema katsaus, jossa tarjotaan laaja valikoima faktatietoja Euroopan parlamentista. Katsauksen grafiikoista saa käsityksen parlamentin jäsenistöstä sekä toimielimen rakenteista ja toiminnasta nykyiseltä vaalikaudelta (heinäkuu 2024 – kesäkuu 2029) ja edellisiltä viisivuotiskausilta kesäkuussa 1979 pidetyistä välittömistä vaaleista alkaen. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Fri, 22 Nov 2024 16:35:21 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)766234_FI_20241122 Lyhyesti - Vote of investiture for the Commission - 21-11-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)766259 During the November III plenary session, the European Ϸվ is expected to vote on the second von der Leyen Commission as a whole. This vote should be the penultimate step in the investiture process that began after the European Ϸվ elections. If the Commission obtains Ϸվ's consent – by a majority of the votes cast – the European Council will then appoint its members by qualified majority, allowing the new Commission to take up its duties for the expected starting date of 1 December 2024. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 20 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)766259_FI_20241121 Tutkimus - European Commission follow-up to European Ϸվ requests 2022–2024 - 05-11-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_STU(2024)762869 This is the third edition of a study on the European Commission's follow-up to European Ϸվ requests as expressed in non-legislative resolutions based either on ordinary own-initiative reports (INIs) or on Article 225 TFEU legislative-initiative reports (INLs). Analysing the Commission's replies in formal follow-up documents (for INIs) and in letters in reply to legislative-initiative reports (INL), this joint DG PRES and DG EPRS project seeks to support the European Ϸվ's scrutiny power over the Commission and to facilitate the monitoring of the European Commission's follow-up to parliamentary resolutions. The study analyses how and to what extent the Commission has reacted to Ϸվ resolutions in its follow-up documents, and whether it fulfilled the commitments it made in those documents. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Mon, 04 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_STU(2024)762869_FI_20241105 Briefing - Ϸվary confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: An analysis of the portfolios of the new von der Leyen Commission - 17-10-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762465 This compendium brings together a set of briefings prepared by the European Ϸվary Research Service (EPRS) to guide Members of the European Ϸվ through the parliamentary hearings of Commissioners-designate in early November 2024. These public confirmation hearings form the backdrop to Ϸվ's confirmation vote on the College of Commissioners put forward by Ursula von der Leyen, following her re-election as Commission President by the European Ϸվ in July 2024. In addition to an overview of the process, setting its historical and political context, this volume contains a briefing on each of the Commissioners-designate and their portfolios. Each of these briefings highlights some of the key issues and recent developments in the portfolio, as well as looking back on Ϸվ's activity in the area in the last parliamentary term. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Thu, 17 Oct 2024 10:12:07 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762465_FI_20241017 Briefing - Confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: A decisive step in the investiture process - 13-09-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762400 The confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the European Ϸվ's committees play a vital role in informing Ϸվ before it decides on the proposed composition of the College of Commissioners. Ahead of the autumn 2024 hearings, Ϸվ has adapted the rules for the process, which will apply for the members of the second von der Leyen College. First, the Legal Affairs Committee scrutinises the declaration of interests of each Commissioner-designate. Second, each Commissioner-designate appears before the competent parliamentary committee or committees for a single confirmation hearing. In the past, the main criticism levelled at some of the Commissioners-designate has involved their having insufficient expertise in their respective portfolios, as well as the vagueness of their answers and their reluctance to make political commitments. The existence of possible conflicts of interest in relation to the assigned portfolio and concerns regarding the integrity of the candidate have influenced the dynamics of more recent hearings. Since the 2004 investiture, Ϸվ has used its role in appointing the Commission to replace certain controversial candidates and force adjustments to certain portfolios, although according to the Treaties Ϸվ can only reject or accept the College as a whole. While some experts have advised against the excessive politicisation of the confirmation hearings, others have welcomed the increased accountability of the Commission to Ϸվ, and have praised the deepening of the political link between the two institutions as a step towards further democratisation of the EU decision-making process. Confirmation hearings have become critical for Ϸվ to hold the Commission accountable, and have gained prominence as a tool for Ϸվ to take a greater role in EU agenda-setting. This is a further updated version of a September 2019 briefing by Maria Diaz Crego, itself an update of a 2014 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Fri, 13 Sep 2024 08:54:20 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762400_FI_20240913 Selvitys - The evolving powers of the European Ϸվ - 13-09-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_IDA(2024)762399 Ϸվ has come a long way since its inception in 1951. Initially a consultative body composed of delegations of national parliaments, it has become a directly elected institution, has obtained budgetary and legislative powers, and now exercises influence over most aspects of EU affairs. Together with representatives of national governments, who sit in the Council, Ϸվ co-decides on European legislation, in what could be seen as a bicameral legislature at EU level. This publication presents Ϸվ's powers, including the most recent changes following the reform of Ϸվ's Rules of Procedure in April 2024. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Fri, 13 Sep 2024 07:48:13 GMT EPRS_IDA(2024)762399_FI_20240913 Briefing - Ϸվ's powers: Motion of censure - 12-09-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762398 Ϸվ's powers and influence have evolved significantly since its establishment. Starting out as a Common Assembly – a consultative body made up of delegations from the national parliaments of the EU Member States – in 1979 the European Ϸվ became a directly elected institution with both budgetary and legislative powers. Today, it is a fully fledged legislative body with competences in a broad range of EU policy areas, and considerable influence over the majority of EU affairs. While law-making is central to its activities, Ϸվ also has various other responsibilities stemming from its powers in areas such as the EU budget, scrutiny, appointments, agenda-setting and the constitutional foundation of the EU. From its inception, one of Ϸվ's key roles has been to scrutinise the European Commission, the EU's executive branch. Ϸվ can use a host of instruments to hold the Commission to account, such as voting on its investiture or dismissal as a collective body. According to the EU Treaties, the Commission is accountable to the Ϸվ as a body and must resign if the Ϸվ adopts a motion of censure. The Ϸվ's right to dismiss the Commission as a body is regarded as a 'nuclear option'. It has never been enforced, as the required majority of votes has never been reached, but it exerts real political pressure. In 1999, for example, the mere threat of a motion of censure led to the resignation of the entire Santer Commission. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 11 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762398_FI_20240912 Briefing - Ϸվ's new Rules of Procedure: Ϸվ 2024 reforms - 11-09-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762396 Ϸվ's new Rules of Procedure entered into force on 16 July 2024 – the first day of Ϸվ's 10th term. The 'Ϸվ 2024' reforms sought primarily to streamline legislative procedures, enhance budgetary control and improve scrutiny of the Commission. The reforms have tackled conflicts of committee competences to expedite the attribution of files to committees. To address cases of cross-cutting issues falling within the competence of more than three committees, the Conference of Presidents (CoP) can propose the setting up of a temporary legislative committee, as a last resort. Use of the urgent procedure in plenary is limited to clearly justified cases, but committees will have greater possibilities to adopt reports using simplified or accelerated procedures. There are also new rules on co-rapporteurship that will allow for up to three co-rapporteurs, as an exceptional measure. All proposals with budgetary implications will undergo a specific budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets, to ensure that Ϸվ uses its legislative and budgetary powers as effectively as possible. In addition, the Budgetary Control Committee will be involved in the consideration of any proposals involving non-traditional (i.e. 'off-budget') financial instruments, in anticipation of the discharge procedure. A new format for 'special scrutiny hearings' will enable Ϸվ 'to question one or more Commissioners on an issue of major political importance'. The rules for hearings of the Commissioners-designate (renamed 'confirmation hearings') have been clarified in time for the hearings of the new set of commissioners-designate scheduled for autumn 2024. The reforms also affect plenary, with new speaking-time attribution rules and the creation of a new plenary debate format. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Tue, 10 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762396_FI_20240911 Briefing - Ϸվ and the United Nations - 03-09-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762385 The EU has constantly affirmed its support for multilateralism, and in particular for the United Nations (UN), with which it shares core values. Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union puts respect for the principles of the UN Charter among the guiding principles of EU action on the international scene. The EU and its Member States contribute one third to the total UN budget. Although the EU's status within the UN system varies (from full member to simple observer), the EU is the regional organisation having gained the strongest voice in the UN. The EU supports the reform agenda initiated by UN Secretary-General António Guterres. Ϸվ is a strong supporter of rules-based multilateralism. It follows the EU's activity in the UN closely, and regularly adopts recommendations to the Council of the EU on the priorities to be pursued by the EU at the UN General Assembly, and at major multilateral conferences such as the UN climate change conference. Ϸվ also adopts resolutions on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals. It encourages cooperation between the EU – together with its Member States – and the UN, in particular on humanitarian aid, development assistance, peace operations and crisis management. As regards specific bodies and agencies, Ϸվ regularly reiterates its strong support for the International Criminal Court, and deplores the abuse of multilateral institutions, in particular by regimes seeking to neutralise human rights mechanisms within the UN Human Rights Council. Ϸվ's relevant committees maintain relations with UN bodies and agencies. The committees invite UN representatives and experts to exchanges of views and hearings at the European Ϸվ, and send delegations to key meetings. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Mon, 02 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762385_FI_20240903 Lyhyesti - Unfinished business from the ninth term - 16-07-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)762363 The ninth parliamentary term formally ended on 15 July 2024, ahead of the constitutive part-session of the European Ϸվ elected on 6-9 June 2024. Despite their best efforts, the co legislators had not reached agreement on a number of legislative proposals before the end of the ninth term. These will form a major part of the business that needs to be picked up again in the tenth term. To ensure continuity in its work, Ϸվ has adopted rules on how to deal with unfinished files. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Mon, 15 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)762363_FI_20240716 Briefing - Understanding the d'Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions - 05-07-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762352 To allocate seats in collegiate bodies, such as parliaments, a method is needed to translate votes proportionally into whole seats. The d'Hondt method is a mathematical formula that is used widely in proportional representation systems, although it leads to less proportional results than other seat allocation systems, such as the Hare-Niemeyer or Sainte-Laguë/Schepers methods. Moreover, the d'Hondt method tends to favour the electoral lists that win the most votes, to the detriment of those with fewer votes. However, it is effective in facilitating majority formation and therefore in securing parliamentary operability. The d'Hondt method is used by 15 EU Member States for elections to the European Ϸվ. It is also used within Ϸվ as the formula for distributing the chairs of the parliamentary committees and delegations among the political groups, and among the national delegations within some political groups. This proportional distribution of leadership positions within Ϸվ prevents the dominance of political life by just one or two large political groups, ensuring that smaller political groups also have a say in setting the political agenda. Some argue, however, that this approach limits the impact of election results on the political direction of decision-making within Ϸվ; they would call instead for a 'winner-takes-all' strategy. Many national parliaments in the EU also distribute committee chairs and other posts proportionally among political groups, either using the d'Hondt method or through more informal means. Others apply a 'winner-takes-more' approach, reserving only certain committee chair posts with particular relevance to government scrutiny for opposition groups. In the US House of Representatives, all committee chairs are selected from the majority party. This updates a 2019 briefing, which itself updated a 2016 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Thu, 04 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762352_FI_20240705 Lyhyesti - Outcome of the informal dinner of EU leaders of 17 June 2024 - 19-06-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)757831 On 17 June, the European Council members met for an informal dinner to discuss the results of the 2024 European Ϸվ elections and possible candidates for the leadership positions in the coming EU institutional cycle. The Heads of State or Government did not come to any decision on the appointments, and indeed they were not due to take any formal decision at this stage in the procedure. High-level discussions will now take place between the European Council and the European Ϸվ, as well as between the political families. The EU leaders are expected to agree on the package of high-level EU posts, and on the political priorities for the next 5 years, at the formal European Council meeting on 27 28 June 2024. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Tue, 18 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)757831_FI_20240619 Briefing - Ϸվ's role in concluding international agreements - 17-06-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762341 The roles of the EU institutions in negotiating and concluding international agreements, and the procedural steps, are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Ϸվ's role corresponds to its law-making competences under the Treaties. If an international agreement falls exclusively under common and foreign security policy (CFSP), Ϸվ has no active role, but must still be informed at all stages by the Council, the European Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. If an international agreement does not fall exclusively within the CFSP, Ϸվ's specific powers depend on whether the agreement's substantive legal basis corresponds to an area of competence covered by the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure (SLP) requiring Ϸվ's consent; if so, Ϸվ has the power to give or refuse consent to the conclusion of the agreement. If the agreement falls within the scope of an SLP where Ϸվ does not need to give consent, its role is limited to giving an opinion. Ϸվ is also entitled to call on the Court of Justice to verify ex ante whether an envisaged agreement is compatible with the EU Treaties. The 2010 framework agreement on relations between the European Ϸվ and the European Commission was a key step in developing Ϸվ's role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The agreement provides for Ϸվ to be informed from an early stage on negotiations on an international agreement, and for Members of Ϸվ to participate as observers in negotiations. The Commission undertook to keep Ϸվ informed on the entire negotiation process, with particular emphasis on agreements that fall within Ϸվ's power of consent. Ϸվ's Rules of Procedure lay down detailed procedural arrangements for the exercise of Ϸվ's competences in concluding international agreements, in particular for verification of the legal basis of an envisaged agreement that would impact on Ϸվ's powers. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Mon, 17 Jun 2024 10:44:43 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762341_FI_20240617 Lyhyesti - Outlook for the informal meeting of EU leaders on 17 June 2024 - 14-06-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)757830 The members of the European Council – the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission – will gather in Brussels for an informal meeting on Monday 17 June to consider the results of the European Ϸվ elections of 6 9 June 2024. The European Council has an important role to play at this point in the institutional cycle; the meeting marks the starting point for the appointment process to the EU's highest ranking positions (namely European Commission President, European Council President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). While no final decisions are expected, EU leaders may set out the procedure they envisage for the process, which they aim to complete at their next formal meeting, on 27 28 June 2024. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Fri, 14 Jun 2024 15:59:33 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)757830_FI_20240614 Lyhyesti - Youth, social media and the European elections - 28-05-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)762317 As social media has become the main gateway to information for many young people, how will it influence the youth vote in the 2024 European elections? The turnout among young people in the 2019 European elections was relatively high, and many hope for a repeat performance in June this year. But ahead of the 2024 elections, the main European institutions have largely 'excluded' themselves from one of the most popular video-sharing platforms among young people – TikTok – over data security concerns. Social media in itself is a difficult phenomenon to study, as recommendation algorithms mean that everyone sees different content. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Mon, 27 May 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)762317_FI_20240528 Briefing - 'Europeanising' the electoral ballot - 16-05-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762310 This briefing discusses the issue of the 'Europeanisation' of the ballot papers in Member States ahead of the 2024 European Ϸվ elections. Ϸվ has made two recent attempts at electoral reform seeking to 'Europeanise the European elections. The second of these – still to be agreed with the Council – seeks to align electoral rules across the EU Member States. With the 2024 European elections imminent, it is useful to take a closer look at the rules as they currently stand. The focus of this briefing is the notion of the 'Europeanisation' of the electoral ballot in its narrowest sense, namely whether ballot papers used in each Member State for the European Ϸվ elections can include the logos and/or names of the European political parties to which the respective national political parties are affiliated. This exploration of the issue of the visibility of European political parties on the ballot papers for European elections is broken down into three parts. The first is the rationale behind and progress in the 'Europeanisation' of the European electoral process, with a particular focus on reforms geared towards showing the affiliation of national parties to European political parties on the ballot paper. The EU institutions have taken several initiatives intended to inject mutual European features into the national political processes ahead of the elections to the European Ϸվ. The second is a discussion of the data on European features of national ballot papers for the 2014 and 2019 European Ϸվ elections. The third part analyses the current state of ballot papers in all Member States, i.e. those applicable to the 2024 European elections, examining the extent to which Member States allow or forbid the visibility of European political party logos and/or names on the ballot paper for the European elections. This last section includes a synopsis of the similarities and differences between Member States. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Wed, 15 May 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762310_FI_20240516 Briefing - Electoral thresholds in European Ϸվ elections - 26-04-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)749770 An electoral threshold for the allocation of seats is the minimum percentage of votes that a political party or a coalition is required to collect in order to gain a seat in the legislative assembly. Thresholds are said to enable a better balance between governability and representativeness, by favouring the formation of stable majorities and avoiding excessive fragmentation of the legislative assembly. Thresholds are sometimes imposed by law, but in the absence of an explicit legal requirement, they can be the de facto result of the size of the constituency and the relevant electoral law determining the apportionment of seats between constituencies. Provisions for electoral thresholds are common in proportional electoral systems, which tend to favour multipartyism. Thresholds can, however, be problematic when they limit or impede the representation of regional parties and ethnic and linguistic minorities, for instance. The current European Electoral Act contains a set of common principles to be upheld by the different domestic laws applicable to the election of the European Ϸվ. The original act of 1976 did not contain any provisions on minimum thresholds. Following modifications introduced in 2002, Article 3 allows Member States to set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats; this must not exceed 5 % of the votes cast. The electoral thresholds applied in the 2019 European elections ranged between 5 % of the valid votes cast, required in nine Member States (Czechia, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and 1.8 %, required in Cyprus, while 14 Member States set no threshold. Italy, Austria and Sweden applied a 4 % threshold; and Greece 3 %. At the time of writing, it appears that these thresholds will still be applicable for the 2024 European elections. This updates and expands on a June 2023 EPRS briefing. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Thu, 25 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2023)749770_FI_20240426 Briefing - Single Resolution Board: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term) - 25-04-2024 /thinktank/fi/document/IPOL_BRI(2020)659621 This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all external papers requested by the ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains an overview of the respective legal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the SRB. For an overview of public hearings during the 8th parliamentary term, please see here. <br /> <br /> Lähde : <a href="/portal/fi/legal-notice" >© Euroopan unioni, 2024 - EP</a> Asiakirjat - Think Tank - Euroopan parlamentti Thu, 24 Apr 2014 22:00:00 GMT IPOL_BRI(2020)659621_FI_20240425