Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments /thinktank/lv Think Tank - Dokumenti, kas palīdz izstrādāt jaunus ES tiesību aktus LV © Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP Wed, 07 May 2025 05:12:51 GMT Briefing - India's Ϸվ and other political institutions - 13-02-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2020)649330 India is a pluralistic, multi-faith, multilingual (with 22 recognised languages), and multi-ethnic country. In April 2023 it overtook China as the world's most populous country (it had a population of 1.44 billion in 2024). India's 1950 Constitution provides for a quasi-federal set-up, with powers separated between the central union and the 28 state governments. Competences are distributed by administrative level – between the Union (the Centre), the states, or 'concurrently'. The Prime Minister possesses the country's effective executive power. As 'Leader of the House' in the lower chamber, the Prime Minister also holds decisive power in deciding the House's agenda. However, the real power of initiating legislation belongs to the government, and the Ϸվ has no say on foreign affairs. India's Ϸվ is bicameral: it includes the Lok Sabha – the lower house – and the Rajya Sabha – the upper house. The two houses are equal, but the Lok Sabha dominates in deciding certain financial matters and on the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers. General elections take place for Lok Sabha members every five years. The last elections took place in April-May 2024, when Narendra Modi obtained his third mandate as Prime Minister. The Rajva Sabha is a permanent body consisting of members indirectly elected by the states, and it is not subject to dissolution. India has a common law legal system. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, headed by the Chief Justice of India. It arbitrates on any dispute between the Union and the states, as well as between states, and on the enforcement of fundamental rights. It has powers of judicial review over legislation adopted by both the Union and the states. This is an update of a briefing published in March 2020. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Wed, 12 Feb 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2020)649330_LV_20250213 Pārskats - Council Decision (EU) 2018/994 modifying the 1976 European Electoral Act: Ratification status - 12-02-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)769488 Council Decision (EU) 2018/994, amending the 1976 European Electoral act is not yet in force. According to Article 223 TFEU, Ϸվ has the exclusive right to propose amendments to the electoral rules, while the Council adopts them unanimously after Ϸվ's consent. Moreover, Member States must approve those adopted rules in accordance with their constitutional requirements. However, not all Member States have ratified the Council's 2018 decision. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Tue, 11 Feb 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2025)769488_LV_20250212 Briefing - The right to petition the European Ϸվ - 03-02-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)767225 The right to petition the European Ϸվ was formally set out in the Maastricht Treaty as one of the rights of European Union citizenship. Ϸվ's predecessors, from the beginnings of the Communities in the 1950s, had already recognised the importance of receiving petitions from citizens, and this has become a major expression of Ϸվ's role as the direct representative of EU citizens. Ϸվ's practice is based on those of national parliaments, but is often more extensive in terms of scope. The right of petition has developed substantially over time. In particular, petitions addressed to the European Ϸվ's Committee on Petitions (PETI committee) and then transferred to the European Commission can potentially lead to infringement procedures against Member States. There are, however, still some problems regarding exercise of the right of petition – particularly concerning the responsiveness of the Commission and how to involve national parliaments more effectively. The PETI committee plays a key role in the election of the European Ombudsman, as it is responsible for organising the hearings of the nominees. The committee attaches paramount importance to the examination and public discussion of petitions at its meetings and petitioners have the right to present their petitions. They frequently take the floor in the discussion, thereby actively contributing to the work of the committee. In this way, efficient communication takes place between Ϸվ, the Commission and citizens. This briefing modifies and further develops a briefing published in 2015. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Mon, 03 Feb 2025 09:36:01 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)767225_LV_20250203 Briefing - Ϸվ's right of legislative initiative - 23-01-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)767211 The European Commission has a near monopoly on legislative initiative in the European Union (EU), with special initiative rights for other institutions applying only in certain specific cases. However, the European Ϸվ and the Council may invite the Commission to submit legislative proposals. While this 'indirect' initiative right does not create an obligation on the Commission to propose the legislation requested, the Treaty of Lisbon codified the Commission's obligation to provide reasons for any refusal to follow a parliamentary initiative. Against this backdrop, some argue that Ϸվ could take the Commission to the Court of Justice of the EU if it fails to justify a negative decision. Others see Ϸվ's increasing participation in overall political planning – particularly through negotiations on the Commission's annual work programme (CWP) – as a further channel for Ϸվ to increase its influence on EU legislation. It is thus argued that the increased role of Ϸվ in the legislative procedure should have reduced the need for its Members to make use of legislative initiatives. Notwithstanding that, there is a trend towards greater use of formal parliamentary legislative initiatives to assert greater influence on the political process. In her inaugural address in July 2019 and in her political guidelines, the then newly elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, pledged to strengthen the partnership with the European Ϸվ, inter alia, by responding with a proposal for a legislative act whenever Ϸվ, acting by a majority of its Members, adopts a resolution requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals. She added that this commitment would have to fully respect the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. President von der Leyen also said that she supported moves towards recognising a right for Ϸվ of legislative initiative. A similar commitment to strengthen cooperation with Ϸվ on the exercise of Ϸվ's indirect right of legislative initiative was expressed by Ursula von der Leyen in her 2024-2029 political guidelines. This briefing is an update of a 2013 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva, and a 2020 briefing by Silvia Kotanidis. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Wed, 22 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)767211_LV_20250123 Briefing - Termination of the mandate of a Member of the European Ϸվ - 21-01-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)767204 The European Union counts representative democracy as one of its foundational tenets. In that regard, the mandate of a directly elected Member of the European Ϸվ plays a crucial role. A Member's mandate includes an immunity status, protecting Members' independence to exercise their mandate freely. This legal status can prevent legal action, measures or even criminal investigation against the Member suspected of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this parliamentary immunity is not an individual entitlement putting Members beyond the reach of the legal system, but rather an institutional privilege of the Ϸվ. Members' parliamentary immunity is not however fully harmonised under EU law, which refers some aspects of parliamentary immunity to the Member States. The diverse national understanding of parliamentary immunity can significantly influence, among other things, when and how a Member's mandate might end. More specifically, national legal variations can affect criminal proceedings against a Member that, if leading to a conviction, represent the most obvious reason for the involuntary end of a Member's parliamentary mandate (termination of mandate) in many Member States. In addition to differing levels of parliamentary immunity, there are differences in the reasons allowed nationally for ending national parliamentary mandates. Since EU law permits Member States to apply their own reasons when terminating a Member's mandate, national laws come into play once again. To analyse this complex web of legal settings applying to the end of a Member's mandate and resulting from the combination of EU law and diverse national rules potentially applicable to Members by analogy, this briefing draws upon national responses to a survey carried out for the European Centre for Ϸվary Research and Documentation. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Mon, 20 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2025)767204_LV_20250121 Briefing - Commitments made at the confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate 2024-2029 - 10-01-2025 /thinktank/lv/document/IPOL_BRI(2025)700896 Commitments made at the confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate 2024-2029 <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2025 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Thu, 09 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT IPOL_BRI(2025)700896_LV_20250110 Pētījums - Review clauses in EU legislation adopted during the second half of the ninth parliamentary term (January 2022-September 2024) - A Rolling Check-List - 20-12-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_STU(2024)762858 Reviews of existing legislation provide an evidence-based assessment of the performance of policies and legislation. Review findings support political decision-making and inform the design of possible future revisions. The systematic review of legislation has become a key policy-making tool at the EU level, most notably in the context of the EU's better regulation agenda. This rolling check-list has been published periodically since 2014. It contributes to the European Ϸվ's scrutiny of the European Commission's reporting duties by analysing all review clauses contained in EU legislative acts adopted during a certain time period. This ninth edition covers all review clauses in legislative acts adopted during the second half of the ninth parliamentary term (i.e. January 2022-September 2024), complementing the previous eighth edition, which covers the first half of the ninth term. The complete dataset of review clauses is preceded by an initial analysis that places review clauses within the broader context of better law-making and explores the main features of the review clauses included in the dataset, reflecting the choices of the co-legislators during the second half of the ninth parliamentary term. In an effort to show the evolution of review clauses over the past decade, the analysis also compares data of the ninth with those of the eighth term. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Thu, 19 Dec 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_STU(2024)762858_LV_20241220 Briefing - Eiropas Parlaments: fakti un skaitļi - 22-11-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)766234 Šī Eiropas Parlamenta Izpētes dienesta publicētā pārskata mērķis ir sniegt dažādus galvenos faktus un skaitļus par Eiropas Parlamentu. Pārskata plašajā diagrammu klāstā atainota informācija par Eiropas Parlamenta deputātiem, kā arī iestādes struktūrām un darbību gan pašreizējā Parlamenta pilnvaru termiņā (no 2024. gada jūlija līdz 2029. gada jūnijam), gan iepriekšējos piecu gadu pilnvaru termiņos kopš pirmajām tiešajām vēlēšanām 1979. gada jūnijā. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Fri, 22 Nov 2024 16:35:21 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)766234_LV_20241122 Briefing - Confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: A decisive step in the investiture process - 13-09-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762400 The confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the European Ϸվ's committees play a vital role in informing Ϸվ before it decides on the proposed composition of the College of Commissioners. Ahead of the autumn 2024 hearings, Ϸվ has adapted the rules for the process, which will apply for the members of the second von der Leyen College. First, the Legal Affairs Committee scrutinises the declaration of interests of each Commissioner-designate. Second, each Commissioner-designate appears before the competent parliamentary committee or committees for a single confirmation hearing. In the past, the main criticism levelled at some of the Commissioners-designate has involved their having insufficient expertise in their respective portfolios, as well as the vagueness of their answers and their reluctance to make political commitments. The existence of possible conflicts of interest in relation to the assigned portfolio and concerns regarding the integrity of the candidate have influenced the dynamics of more recent hearings. Since the 2004 investiture, Ϸվ has used its role in appointing the Commission to replace certain controversial candidates and force adjustments to certain portfolios, although according to the Treaties Ϸվ can only reject or accept the College as a whole. While some experts have advised against the excessive politicisation of the confirmation hearings, others have welcomed the increased accountability of the Commission to Ϸվ, and have praised the deepening of the political link between the two institutions as a step towards further democratisation of the EU decision-making process. Confirmation hearings have become critical for Ϸվ to hold the Commission accountable, and have gained prominence as a tool for Ϸվ to take a greater role in EU agenda-setting. This is a further updated version of a September 2019 briefing by Maria Diaz Crego, itself an update of a 2014 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Fri, 13 Sep 2024 08:54:20 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762400_LV_20240913 Padziļināta analīze - The evolving powers of the European Ϸվ - 13-09-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_IDA(2024)762399 Ϸվ has come a long way since its inception in 1951. Initially a consultative body composed of delegations of national parliaments, it has become a directly elected institution, has obtained budgetary and legislative powers, and now exercises influence over most aspects of EU affairs. Together with representatives of national governments, who sit in the Council, Ϸվ co-decides on European legislation, in what could be seen as a bicameral legislature at EU level. This publication presents Ϸվ's powers, including the most recent changes following the reform of Ϸվ's Rules of Procedure in April 2024. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Fri, 13 Sep 2024 07:48:13 GMT EPRS_IDA(2024)762399_LV_20240913 Briefing - Ϸվ's powers: Motion of censure - 12-09-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762398 Ϸվ's powers and influence have evolved significantly since its establishment. Starting out as a Common Assembly – a consultative body made up of delegations from the national parliaments of the EU Member States – in 1979 the European Ϸվ became a directly elected institution with both budgetary and legislative powers. Today, it is a fully fledged legislative body with competences in a broad range of EU policy areas, and considerable influence over the majority of EU affairs. While law-making is central to its activities, Ϸվ also has various other responsibilities stemming from its powers in areas such as the EU budget, scrutiny, appointments, agenda-setting and the constitutional foundation of the EU. From its inception, one of Ϸվ's key roles has been to scrutinise the European Commission, the EU's executive branch. Ϸվ can use a host of instruments to hold the Commission to account, such as voting on its investiture or dismissal as a collective body. According to the EU Treaties, the Commission is accountable to the Ϸվ as a body and must resign if the Ϸվ adopts a motion of censure. The Ϸվ's right to dismiss the Commission as a body is regarded as a 'nuclear option'. It has never been enforced, as the required majority of votes has never been reached, but it exerts real political pressure. In 1999, for example, the mere threat of a motion of censure led to the resignation of the entire Santer Commission. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Wed, 11 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762398_LV_20240912 Briefing - Ϸվ's new Rules of Procedure: Ϸվ 2024 reforms - 11-09-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762396 Ϸվ's new Rules of Procedure entered into force on 16 July 2024 – the first day of Ϸվ's 10th term. The 'Ϸվ 2024' reforms sought primarily to streamline legislative procedures, enhance budgetary control and improve scrutiny of the Commission. The reforms have tackled conflicts of committee competences to expedite the attribution of files to committees. To address cases of cross-cutting issues falling within the competence of more than three committees, the Conference of Presidents (CoP) can propose the setting up of a temporary legislative committee, as a last resort. Use of the urgent procedure in plenary is limited to clearly justified cases, but committees will have greater possibilities to adopt reports using simplified or accelerated procedures. There are also new rules on co-rapporteurship that will allow for up to three co-rapporteurs, as an exceptional measure. All proposals with budgetary implications will undergo a specific budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets, to ensure that Ϸվ uses its legislative and budgetary powers as effectively as possible. In addition, the Budgetary Control Committee will be involved in the consideration of any proposals involving non-traditional (i.e. 'off-budget') financial instruments, in anticipation of the discharge procedure. A new format for 'special scrutiny hearings' will enable Ϸվ 'to question one or more Commissioners on an issue of major political importance'. The rules for hearings of the Commissioners-designate (renamed 'confirmation hearings') have been clarified in time for the hearings of the new set of commissioners-designate scheduled for autumn 2024. The reforms also affect plenary, with new speaking-time attribution rules and the creation of a new plenary debate format. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Tue, 10 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762396_LV_20240911 Pētījums - 10 years of parliamentary scrutiny over the Single Supervisory Mechanism - 27-08-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/IPOL_STU(2024)755728 We first discuss why and how banking supervisors should be held accountable for their activities, then consider the case of the ECB /SSM to report on the academic debate on its faults and merits. We also review the main accountability channels between the ECB and the EP, showing how they have been used since 2014. Finally, we outline some possible steps to improve the ECB’s accountability in the short term. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Mon, 26 Aug 2024 22:00:00 GMT IPOL_STU(2024)755728_LV_20240827 Pārskats - Eiropas Parlamenta deputāti 2024.–2029. gadā - 19-07-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)762356 2024. gada jūnijā Eiropas pilsoņi ievēlēja Eiropas Parlamentā savus pārstāvjus, kuri nākamos piecus gadus aizstāvēs viņu intereses Eiropas Savienībā. Vēlētāju aktivitāte šā gada vēlēšanās bija 51,1 % — nedaudz lielāka nekā iepriekšējās vēlēšanās (50,7 %) 2019. gadā. Sākoties jaunajam sasaukumam, politisko grupu skaits ir palielinājies no septiņām līdz astoņām. Puse no ievēlētajiem deputātiem Eiropas Parlamentā darbosies pirmo reizi. 38,5 % visu EP deputātu ir sievietes. Šis īpatsvars ir par 2,1 procentpunktu mazāks nekā iepriekšējā sasaukumā (40,6 %). Tas nozīmē, ka pirmo reizi kopš 1979. gada deputāšu īpatsvars ir samazinājies. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Fri, 19 Jul 2024 07:06:23 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)762356_LV_20240719 Pārskats - Unfinished business from the ninth term - 16-07-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)762363 The ninth parliamentary term formally ended on 15 July 2024, ahead of the constitutive part-session of the European Ϸվ elected on 6-9 June 2024. Despite their best efforts, the co legislators had not reached agreement on a number of legislative proposals before the end of the ninth term. These will form a major part of the business that needs to be picked up again in the tenth term. To ensure continuity in its work, Ϸվ has adopted rules on how to deal with unfinished files. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Mon, 15 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_ATA(2024)762363_LV_20240716 Briefing - Understanding the d'Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions - 05-07-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762352 To allocate seats in collegiate bodies, such as parliaments, a method is needed to translate votes proportionally into whole seats. The d'Hondt method is a mathematical formula that is used widely in proportional representation systems, although it leads to less proportional results than other seat allocation systems, such as the Hare-Niemeyer or Sainte-Laguë/Schepers methods. Moreover, the d'Hondt method tends to favour the electoral lists that win the most votes, to the detriment of those with fewer votes. However, it is effective in facilitating majority formation and therefore in securing parliamentary operability. The d'Hondt method is used by 15 EU Member States for elections to the European Ϸվ. It is also used within Ϸվ as the formula for distributing the chairs of the parliamentary committees and delegations among the political groups, and among the national delegations within some political groups. This proportional distribution of leadership positions within Ϸվ prevents the dominance of political life by just one or two large political groups, ensuring that smaller political groups also have a say in setting the political agenda. Some argue, however, that this approach limits the impact of election results on the political direction of decision-making within Ϸվ; they would call instead for a 'winner-takes-all' strategy. Many national parliaments in the EU also distribute committee chairs and other posts proportionally among political groups, either using the d'Hondt method or through more informal means. Others apply a 'winner-takes-more' approach, reserving only certain committee chair posts with particular relevance to government scrutiny for opposition groups. In the US House of Representatives, all committee chairs are selected from the majority party. This updates a 2019 briefing, which itself updated a 2016 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Thu, 04 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762352_LV_20240705 Briefing - The Hungarian Ϸվ and EU affairs - 03-07-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762351 Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament, the Országgyűlés (National Assembly). The structure and functioning of Hungary's political system are determined by the Fundamental Law of 25 April 2011, which has been amended 12 times since its entry into force in 2012. The National Assembly elects the President of the Republic (head of state), whose role is primarily representative but entails some complementary and controlling competences vis-à-vis the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister, proposed by the President and elected by the National Assembly. The Prime Minister chooses the ministers, who together with him/her, compose the government. The Prime Minister also defines the government's general policy. Ministers are accountable for their actions to both the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. Only the Prime Minister can dismiss them, and the government's mandate is linked to that of the Prime Minister. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States' national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:16:16 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)762351_LV_20240703 Briefing - European Ϸվ's scrutiny of the European Council: The use of Ϸվ resolutions - 27-06-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)757839 Resolutions are an essential way for the European Ϸվ to express its views on political processes, EU policies and developments in the world. Ϸվ also uses them to scrutinise other EU institutions, including the European Council. The need for accountability and increased scrutiny of the European Council has been a constant theme in the European Ϸվ's resolutions throughout the 2019-2024 legislative term. The increased need to scrutinise the European Council also results from the changing role of the institution over recent years. Based on an analysis of Ϸվ's resolutions, this briefing will present the need for democratic oversight of the European Council and outline the different tools at Ϸվ's disposal to do so. It provides a unique overview of the content of Ϸվ's resolutions addressing the European Council and the messages it sends to EU leaders. Finally, the briefing identifies potential ways of further strengthening Ϸվ's scrutiny of the European Council. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Wed, 26 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)757839_LV_20240627 Briefing - Ϸվary scrutiny of the SRB - Discretion in applying the resolution objectives and mechanisms for accountability to Ϸվ - 07-06-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/IPOL_BRI(2024)755734 The Single Resolution Board (SRB) possesses statutory, formal independence by law, and its decisions are guided by a set of objectives whose application requires interpretation and trade-offs. The resulting discretion is balanced by accountability to the EU Institutions, and in particular, to the European Ϸվ. To support parliamentary scrutiny of the SRB during the 10th parliamentary term, this briefing presents the provisions on accountability in the SRB’s founding legislation and analyses the objectives that the SRB has to pursue - and against which its actions can be judged. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Thu, 06 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT IPOL_BRI(2024)755734_LV_20240607 Padziļināta analīze - Recovery and Resilience Plans: the involvement of stakeholders and their view - 30-04-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/IPOL_IDA(2022)699530 This paper presents findings from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) midterm evaluation, with a particular focus on assessments from various stakeholders regarding its setup and initial implementation. It also builds on the latest activities and assessments by previously published papers summarizing the stakeholders views at the EU, national, regional, and local levels in connection with the national Recovery and Resilience Plans. Additionally, it offers a collection of the most recent opinions and assessments from EU stakeholders, as well as other pertinent institutions and bodies, on the execution of these plans. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Mon, 29 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT IPOL_IDA(2022)699530_LV_20240430 Padziļināta analīze - Examples of Ϸվ's impact: 2019 to 2024 - Illustrating the powers of the European Ϸվ - 13-03-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_IDA(2024)760359 As the European Union's only directly elected institution, the European Ϸվ stands at the heart of European representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. Since its creation, the Ϸվ's powers have evolved significantly, and it is now a fully fledged legislative body and forum for discussion and engagement, whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity. This paper offers an overview of the European Ϸվ's main powers, demonstrating how they interact, and illustrating through practical examples from the ninth parliamentary term (2019-2024) the various ways in which Ϸվ uses those powers in its daily work. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Tue, 12 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_IDA(2024)760359_LV_20240313 Pētījums - European Ϸվ work in the fields of impact assessment and European added value - Activity Report for 2023 - 07-03-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_STU(2024)757795 This activity report summarises and explains the work undertaken by the European Ϸվ in the fields of impact assessment and European added value between January and December 2023. It details the support given by the Directorate for Impact Assessment and Foresight within the European Ϸվary Research Service (EPRS) to assist parliamentary committees in their oversight and scrutiny of the executive in the fields of ex-ante impact assessment, European added value, and ex post evaluation of EU law and policy in practice. It also outlines the wider horizontal support offered to the institution as a whole with regard to the policy cycle. During the 12 months under review, the Directorate published 120 substantive pieces of work, all of which can be accessed via hyperlinks in this report. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Thu, 07 Mar 2024 11:46:44 GMT EPRS_STU(2024)757795_LV_20240307 Briefing - Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2024 - 06-03-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)760348 One hundred years after women won the right to vote in elections or were first elected to parliament in some EU Member States, they continue to be under-represented in politics and public life. This is true whether looking at the composition of the European Ϸվ or that of national parliaments, governments and local assemblies. On the other hand, gender balance in politics benefits not only women and female politicians but also political parties themselves and the rest of society. Women form half the population and deserve to be better represented in power structures. There is now solid evidence about what hinders or enables women's participation and representation, with political parties and the media serving a dual role in this respect. The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation as a matter of justice, equality and democracy. Practical recommendations have been made for achieving this goal, including specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media. A number of pivotal elections are taking place across the world this year, leading to a renewed focus on gender equality and women's participation in politics. Gender equality is one of the issues expected to take centre stage in political debates. Mainstream parties are pushing for further progress in this area, while some populist and radical political forces are campaigning for a renewed emphasis on family and traditional social roles for women and men. Women's rights (for instance, reproductive rights), could even prove decisive in determining the outcome of certain elections. This is an update of a briefing from March 2023 by Rosamund Shreeves and Ionel Zamfir. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Tue, 05 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)760348_LV_20240306 Briefing - Ϸվ's powers: Designating the seats of EU decentralised agencies - 29-01-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)757625 There are no provisions in the EU Treaties or in secondary EU law on the procedure for deciding on the location of an EU agency. Article 341 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) refers only to the EU institutions. This legal vacuum has generated different practices over time and power struggles among the Member States. The most recent example of conflicting national interests was the case of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, representatives of the governments of the Member States decided to relocate the agency from London to Amsterdam, but the decision was challenged by Italy and the Municipality of Milan. Subsequent rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) clarified its lack of jurisdiction over decisions of Member States' government representatives. These political decisions have no legal effect under EU law. The Court nevertheless took the opportunity to provide clear indications about how Article 341 TFEU should be interpreted. According to the Court, it is for the EU legislature, and not the Member States, to decide on the location of the EU agencies, because Article 341 TFEU is applicable to EU institutions only, and they are clearly listed in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). While the decision of the EU legislature implies a certain degree of political choice, it is nevertheless subject to judicial review. The Court's clarification was welcomed by Ϸվ, which in two resolutions, in 2018 and 2019, had complained about its lack of involvement in the selection procedure for locating agency's seats, and demanded a role in the evaluation of criteria, on an equal footing with the Commission and the Council. At the time of writing, the European Ϸվ and the Council are in the process of deciding the location of the Anti-Money-Laundering Agency (AMLA). <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Sun, 28 Jan 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)757625_LV_20240129 Briefing - Priority dossiers under the Belgian EU Council Presidency - 08-01-2024 /thinktank/lv/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)757593 The Kingdom of Belgium is a federal constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy, with the monarch as Head of State and a prime minister as Head of Government. The current monarch, King Philippe/Filip has been on the throne since 21 July 2013, his heir apparent is Princess Elisabeth, the daughter of the monarch. The King has wide legislative powers constitutionally but is relieved of all responsibility, with his ministers signing the bills and royal decrees. It is the King's task to appoint the prime minister, who is usually the leader of the majority coalition after legislative elections. The King is the symbol of the unity of the nation. Upon appointment by the King, the prime minister has to be approved by the parliament’s Chamber of Representatives. The current prime minister is Alexander De Croo of the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld) party, which sits in the Renew Group in the European Ϸվ. <br /> <br /> Avots : <a href="/portal/lv/legal-notice" >© Eiropas Savienība, 2024 - EP</a> Dokumenti - Think Tank - Eiropas Parlaments Sun, 07 Jan 2024 23:00:00 GMT EPRS_BRI(2024)757593_LV_20240108