Dokumenti - Think Tank - Parlament Ewropew

Studju - European �Ϸ��վ diplomacy and the end of the Cold War: The integration of central and eastern European countries - 30-04-2025

Tue, 29 Apr 2025 22:00:00 GMT

�Ϸ��վ played a fundamental role in reshaping the political landscape of central and eastern Europe during and after the end of the Cold War, setting out an agenda for European enlargement and substantiating European integration. Amid an atmosphere that signalled the triumph of democratic state-building in Europe, Members of the European �Ϸ��վ also saw an opportunity to advance their own agenda of further democratising and legitimising the governance structures of the European Community. The study examines how the European �Ϸ��վ strengthened its presence throughout this period in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now Czechia and Slovakia), Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the former Yugoslavia. Based on archival research and relevant literature review, the study illustrates the European �Ϸ��վ's involvement in these states' path to full European Union membership, the motivations behind its policies, and the points of tension that arose during this transformative period.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - �Ϸ��վ in EU external action - 01-04-2025

Mon, 31 Mar 2025 22:00:00 GMT

Based on its Treaties, the European Union (EU) has developed a multifaceted external action policy, and is seen as an important actor far beyond its borders. Through its institutions and Member States, the EU is active in international trade, humanitarian assistance, economic, financial, and technical and development cooperation, as well as through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP). Increasingly, the external dimension of internal EU policies has also grown, notably in the economic, climate, energy, migration and digital fields. The role of the European �Ϸ��վ in the EU's external action has increased significantly since the 1990s, and especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Although �Ϸ��վ's powers remain relatively limited compared to other EU institutions involved in external action, especially with regard to CFSP and CSDP decision-making (which remain mostly intergovernmental), it nevertheless has considerable legislative, budgetary, agenda-setting and soft powers. Several of �Ϸ��վ's powers cut across all policy areas. Notably, it proactively supports multilateralism and conducts extensive parliamentary diplomacy. �Ϸ��վ contributes to policy framing through its debates, resolutions, recommendations, own-initiative reports and statements. It holds hearings, workshops, debates and organises missions. Members of the �Ϸ��վ exercise scrutiny of the executive, by holding hearings of and posing questions to the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's High Representative and the Council. �Ϸ��վ co-legislates on financing the EU's external action and controls EU institutions' expenditure, including the EEAS, through the discharge procedure. The �Ϸ��վ acts on an equal footing with the Council when adopting numerous acts in the fields of trade, development and humanitarian aid, and often external dimensions of internal policies. Since 2009, �Ϸ��վ's consent to legally binding international agreements is mandated by the Treaties.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - Greenland: Caught in the Arctic geopolitical contest - 07-03-2025

Fri, 07 Mar 2025 14:34:00 GMT

Greenland is a self-governing Arctic island within the Kingdom of Denmark, which strives for economic self-sufficiency and future independence. This representative democracy of 56 542 inhabitants will elect 31 members to Greenland's �Ϸ��վ on 11 March 2025. These parliamentary elections are taking place against the fraught background of rising geopolitical tensions. In the context of a heating – literally and figuratively – Arctic, Greenland is a focus of geopolitical competition and growing confrontation between major powers – the United States (US), Russia and China. The island has high strategic importance, due to its proximity to the emerging Arctic shipping routes, its strategic location in relation to security and defence activities, and its vast untapped natural resources, including mineral reserves. According to its foreign policy strategy, Greenland is open to enhanced cooperation and dialogue with partners, including the US. Indeed, the US has been an important ally of Greenland and security guarantor since 1951. Relations have strengthened and widened during the last two decades, with cooperation now encompassing not only security, but also environment, science, health, technology, trade, tourism, education, and culture. However, US President Donald Trump's rhetoric on acquiring Greenland has shocked Greenlanders, Danes and Europeans alike. Upon the island's withdrawal from the European Economic Community (EEC, now European Union) in 1985, Greenland became an Overseas Country and Territory, associated through Denmark. The main areas of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Greenland are fisheries, education, and, lately, green growth. The EU has recently stepped up its engagement with Greenland by opening an office in Nuuk in March 2024 and signing a Memorandum of Understanding for a strategic partnership to develop sustainable raw materials value chains in November 2023. �Ϸ��վ engages with its counterparts from Greenland through meetings with the Nordic Council and West Nordic Council. In October 2021, the European �Ϸ��վ called for the EU to establish an enhanced political dialogue on bilateral cooperation with Greenland.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Immobilised Russian central bank assets - 06-03-2025

Thu, 06 Mar 2025 13:55:47 GMT

One of the first, and boldest, measures taken by Western countries as a response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the immobilisation of around €260 billion worth of Russian central bank assets held under their jurisdictions. In October 2024, the G7 reached an agreement on the use of the extraordinary revenues generated, to service and repay a US$50 billion loan to Ukraine from G7 countries, while the complex debate on the legality and related risks on the use of the principal capital continues. A debate on this issue, following statements by the Council and the Commission, is scheduled for the March plenary session.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Accelerating the phase-out of Russian gas and other Russian energy commodities in the EU - 06-03-2025

Thu, 06 Mar 2025 11:13:30 GMT

Russia's war in Ukraine led the EU to take measures for its energy security. Three years later, the results are positive, but more can be done to further lower reliance on Russian fossil fuels and nuclear energy in the EU. The Commission is due to make a statement on the issue during the March plenary session.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - EU sanctions against Russia 2025: State of play, perspectives and challenges - 11-02-2025

Tue, 11 Feb 2025 14:07:17 GMT

In response to Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union swiftly adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in close cooperation with partners including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. The rapid succession of 15 packages of EU sanctions adopted since then have resulted in an unparalleled set of measures targeting Russian political elites and key sectors of the Russian economy. New sanctions have also been adopted against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their involvement in Russia's war of aggression. Furthermore, in 2024 the EU adopted two new regimes of sanctions, addressing human rights violations and repression in Russia (May 2024), and responding to Russia's destabilising activities ('hybrid attacks') abroad (October 2024). The unprecedented nature of the sanctions imposed on Russia, in scale and scope, has created new implementation challenges. Member States and EU institutions have renewed efforts to improve the enforcement of sanctions and to close loopholes to prevent circumvention, including reinforcing cooperation with third countries. A specific anti-circumvention tool was included in the 11th package of sanctions (June 2023), followed by additional measures in the successive packages, including those to counter Russia's 'shadow fleet'. Furthermore, a newly adopted EU directive (April 2024) obliges the EU Member States to introduce minimum criminal offences and penalties for violating and circumventing EU sanctions. It also aims to improve cross-border cooperation on investigations, prosecutions and sentencing of EU sanctions violations. Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, the European �Ϸ��վ has been a vocal advocate of severe sanctions. It has unequivocally condemned Russia's unjustified aggression against Ukraine, demanded broader and better-enforced sanctions and called for the confiscation of Russian assets frozen by the EU to pay for Ukraine's reconstruction. �Ϸ��վ has demanded a full review of more centralised EU-level oversight of sanctions implementation and a full ban on liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, among other measures. This briefing updates and complements a previous briefing published in September 2023.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - Baltic Sea fishing area: Current challenges - 10-01-2025

Thu, 09 Jan 2025 23:00:00 GMT

The Baltic has several unique features, comprising a mixture of saline and fresh water and a shallow depth, enabling a broad variety of habitats. Its fish species are rather limited in number, with the bulk of fish stocks spread among cod, herring and sprat. The sea's characteristics make it particularly vulnerable to environmental changes and many habitats and species of the Baltic Sea are not in good condition. The environmental deterioration is caused by several factors, including excessive nutrient input, pollution, climate change, invasive species and over-exploitation. The worrying situation of the Baltic Sea habitats is leading to a dramatic decline in some commercial fish stocks, with fisheries losing economic and cultural importance. A range of promising measures for specific fish species have been taken at EU level, the results of which could however be jeopardised if habitats cannot be restored. �Ϸ��վ has previously expressed concern about the state of the Baltic Sea over many years, and has played an important role in adopting measures to alleviate the situation.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - Russia's 'shadow fleet': Bringing the threat to light - 08-11-2024

Thu, 07 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Following Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU), G7, and allied partners imposed extensive sanctions targeting Russia's economy, in particular the oil sector, in an effort to curb the Kremlin's revenues which finance its war effort. Key measures include an embargo on Russian seaborne oil imports and a price cap on oil and oil products that restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price. Enforcement mechanisms prevent Russia from chartering or insuring oil tankers unless they comply with these limits. In response, Russia has sought new markets and established a 'shadow fleet' to evade these restrictions. The terms 'shadow fleet', 'dark fleet' and 'grey fleet' have gained prominence following the imposition of sanctions on Russian energy exports, yet their definitions remain inconsistent among experts, leading to confusion. Analysts increasingly recognise that the broader definition, encompassing all vessels lacking Western insurance and belonging to non-EU/G7+ companies, captures the diverse tactics employed by Russia to circumvent sanctions and highlights the potential risks associated with these operations. To evade sanctions, the Russian 'shadow fleet' makes use of flags of convenience and intricate ownership and management structures while employing a variety of tactics to conceal the origins of its cargo, including: ship-to-ship transfers; automatic identification system blackouts; falsified positions; transmission of false data; and other deceptive or even illegal techniques. In addition to bolstering its war chest, Russia's 'shadow fleet', which consists of a growing number of aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations, poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks. As Russia depends increasingly on its 'shadow fleet' to maintain oil exports, the EU and allied nations have implemented measures to counter these evasive tactics. These include imposing targeted sanctions on specific vessels and enhancing international collaboration to disrupt such activities. During a plenary debate in October 2024, Members of the European �Ϸ��վ called for enhanced maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the significant environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels. �Ϸ��վ is expected to vote on a resolution on this issue during its November I 2024 plenary session.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Outcome of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia - 08-11-2024

Thu, 07 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Under Russia's presidency, BRICS (acronym for the founding states – Brazil, Russia, India and China) held its first summit following the group's expansion on 1 January 2024, from 22 to 24 October in Kazan (Russia). With more than 30 delegations, 22 heads of state or government and several representatives of international organisations including United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres attending, the summit was a diplomatic success for Russia: it offered President Vladimir Putin the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not isolated. For the first time, a NATO member, Türkiye, attended the summit, and applied to join BRICS. The meeting in Kazan underlined BRICS's ambition to foster relations with the Global South, and its aim of shaping an alternative multipolar world order, particularly in the global financial and trade system.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Russia's strategy for Latin America: Strengthening ties in the light of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (Russia) - 18-10-2024

Thu, 17 Oct 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula, it has been seeking to foster relations with countries in the Global South that are not firmly aligned with the Western world. In 2023, a change in Russia's foreign policy of 2016 placed a greater emphasis on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Africa, where the Kremlin has been building influence since the Soviet era. Russia's strategic goal is to counter the United States presence in the neighbourhood and to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remain geopolitically neutral. Russia is also pursuing the goal of building a new multipolar world order. Russia's longstanding political and security partners in LAC are Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, each under an authoritarian regime. Russia is also trying to strengthen its political ties with other LAC countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and El Salvador. With all LAC countries, Russia works through bilateral agreements and intergovernmental forums, in particular BRICS and the G20. From an economic perspective, Russia's footprint in the region is very limited: its trade with LAC countries accounts for a mere 2 % of its global trade. Nevertheless, Russia has gained political leverage through its economic ties, especially due to key LAC countries' reliance on Russian fertilisers and diesel. In addition to political and economic relations, Russia has signed several military cooperation agreements with Latin American countries over the past two decades. Currently, military cooperation is primarily limited to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Russian arms sales to the region have steadily declined since Russia's invasion of Crimea and are now insignificant. Alongside political, economic and military ties, Russia employs disinformation campaigns to undermine liberal democracies and promote Russian propaganda narratives.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - BRICS+: Economic indicators and trade with EU - 24-09-2024

Mon, 23 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Our infographic shows the overview of the BRICS+ countries’ economic and trade relations with the EU. All 9 BRICS+ states have experienced a relatively consistent increase in their GDP per capita (PPP) since 2007. Female labour force participation rates vary significantly from country to country. At the extremes are Iran with 14.4, and Ethiopia, with 74.8%. EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the BRICS+ countries has risen steadily comparatively to 2007 volumes. The BRICS+ group is now the EU's main trading partner for goods. Mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, vehicles and aircraft, and pharmaceutical products comprise about 54% of all goods exported by the EU to the BRICS+ countries.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3): The EU's role in promoting health and well-being for all - 02-09-2024

Sun, 01 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Good health and well-being is a key indicator and a precondition for sustainable development, allowing people to enjoy fulfilling lives, receive education and be productive members of society. In contrast, the burden of disease has high economic, social and individual costs. Therefore, achieving the highest attainable level of health is of interest for all. However, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing crises, progress towards United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (UN SDG) 3 ('ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages') is off track globally, and many of its targets may not be achieved by 2030. Moreover, progress varies significantly across regions, with some of them lagging behind. The European Union (EU) is committed to implementing the SDGs, including SDG 3, both internally and globally. Within the EU, measures pertaining to SDG 3 focus on achieving more resilient, accessible and inclusive health systems; improving reproductive, maternal and child health; ending major communicable disease epidemics; and reducing non-communicable and mental disorders. They also focus on lowering behavioural and environmental health risk factors. Globally, in line with its 2022 global health strategy, the EU contributes to the attainment of SDG 3 objectives through action at global, regional and bilateral level. A vocal supporter of and major financial contributor to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the EU cooperates with the WHO to deliver universal health coverage worldwide, improve health outcomes in emergencies and enhance global health security, to give some examples. The EU also supports its African and other partners with the projects enabled through the EU's Global Gateway and through its Team Europe approach, where feasible. �Ϸ��վ is a committed supporter of stronger EU action on health, both internally and outside the EU. It has called regularly for a comprehensive and integrated approach to achieve a high level of health and well-being.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Skedi Informattivi dwar l-UE - Tliet ġirien tas-Sħubija tal-Lvant: l-Ukrajna, il-Moldova u l-Belarussja - 26-06-2024

Mon, 27 May 2019 22:00:00 GMT

Il-politika tal-UE dwar is-Sħubija tal-Lvant, li ġiet stabbilita fl-2009, tkopri sitt Stati post-Sovjetiċi: l-Armenja, l-Ażerbajġan, il-Belarussja, il-Georgia, il-Moldova u l-Ukrajna. Is-Sħubija nħolqot biex issostni l-isforzi ta’ riforma politika, soċjali u ekonomika f’dawn il-pajjiżi, bl-għan li jissaħħew id-demokratizzazzjoni u l-governanza tajba, is-sigurtà tal-enerġija, il-ħarsien tal-ambjent u l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u soċjali. Il-membri kollha għajr il-Belarussja jipparteċipaw fl-Assemblea Parlamentari Euronest.F’Ġunju 2023 il-Moldova u l-Ukrajna ngħataw l-istatus ta’ pajjiż kandidat tal-UE. Dan kien segwit mid-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill Ewropew tal-14 ta’ Diċembru 2023 li jinfetħu n-negozjati tal-adeżjoni maż-żewġ pajjiżi ladarba l-aħħar passi leġiżlattivi pendenti jiġu implimentati b’mod sodisfaċenti.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Skedi Informattivi dwar l-UE - Ir-Russja - 17-06-2024

Sun, 30 Jun 2019 22:00:00 GMT

Ir-relazzjonijiet bejn l-UE u r-Russja ilhom fi kriżi mill-2014 minħabba l-annessjoni illegali tal-Krimea mir-Russja, l-appoġġ tar-Russja lil gruppi separatisti fil-Lvant tal-Ukrajna, il-politiki ta’ destabbilizzazzjoni fil-viċinat, il-kampanji ta’ diżinformazzjoni u interferenza, kif ukoll il-ksur intern tad-drittijiet tal-bniedem. Wara li, fl-24 ta’ Frar 2022, ir-Russja nediet il-gwerra ta’ aggressjoni mhux provokata, mhux ġustifikata u illegali tagħha kontra l-Ukrajna, il-kooperazzjoni politika, kulturali u xjentifika li kien għad fadal ġiet sospiża.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Ukraine Plan conditionality: What is expected and how does it compare with similar programmes? - 05-06-2024

Wed, 05 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT

This paper outlines the main elements related to conditionality included in the Ukraine Plan, and compares it with the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s approach to conditionality, in particular with respect to the group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) that currently includes Ukraine.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Skedi Informattivi dwar l-UE - Tliet ġirien tas-Sħubija tal-Lvant fil-Kawkasu tan-Nofsinhar - 04-06-2024

Mon, 03 Jun 2019 15:53:05 GMT

Il-politika tal-UE dwar is-Sħubija tal-Lvant, mibdija fl-2009, tkopri sitt stati post-Sovjetiċi: l-Armenja, l-Ażerbajġan, il-Belarussja, il-Georgia, il-Moldova u l-Ukrajna. Is-Sħubija nħolqot biex tappoġġja l-isforzi ta’ riforma politika, soċjali u ekonomika f’dawn il-pajjiżi, bl-għan li jiżdiedu d-demokratizzazzjoni u l-governanza tajba, is-sigurtà tal-enerġija, il-ħarsien tal-ambjent, u l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u soċjali. Il-pajjiżi parteċipanti kollha (minbarra l-Belarussja, li s-sħubija tagħha ġiet sospiża) jibagħtu delegazzjonijiet fl-Assemblea Parlamentari Euronest.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Analiżi fil-Fond - Artificial intelligence (AI) and human rights: Using AI as a weapon of repression and its impact on human rights - 01-05-2024

Tue, 11 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT

This in-depth analysis (IDA) explores the most prominent actors, cases and techniques of algorithmic authoritarianism together with the legal, regulatory and diplomatic framework related to AI-based biases as well as deliberate misuses. With the world leaning heavily towards digital transformation, AI’s use in policy, economic and social decision-making has introduced alarming trends in repressive and authoritarian agendas. Such misuse grows ever more relevant to the European �Ϸ��վ, resonating with its commitment to safeguarding human rights in the context of digital trans-formation. By shedding light on global patterns and rapidly developing technologies of algorithmic authoritarianism, this IDA aims to produce a wider understanding of the complex policy, regulatory and diplomatic challenges at the intersection of technology, democracy and human rights. Insights into AI’s role in bolstering authoritarian tactics offer a foundation for �Ϸ��վ’s advocacy and policy interventions, underscoring the urgency for a robust international framework to regulate the use of AI, whilst ensuring that technological progress does not weaken fundamental freedoms. Detailed case studies and policy recommendations serve as a strategic resource for �Ϸ��վ’s initiatives: they highlight the need for vigilance and proactive measures by combining partnerships (technical assistance), industrial thriving (AI Act), influence (regulatory convergence) and strength (sanctions, export controls) to develop strategic policy approaches for countering algorithmic control encroachments.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Russia's 2024 presidential election: What is at stake and what is not - 13-03-2024

Tue, 12 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT

On 15-17 March 2024, more than two years into the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression on Ukraine, and one month after the sudden death in custody of the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Russia will hold its presidential election. Over 110 million Russian citizens, including more than 6 million living in Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia, are invited to take part in what is largely seen as a carefully staged legitimisation ritual for Vladimir Putin's reappointment to a fifth term in office, until 2030. Putin has been in power, as either president or prime minister, since the last day of 1999; and Russia has been at war for 19 of his 24 years at the helm. The constitutional changes of 2020 allowed Putin to stand for a fifth term, and possibly for a sixth term in 2030. He is running for re election without any meaningful opposition, after barring the two anti-war candidates who stood for election despite the restrictions, and against a backdrop of a virtually total closure of the civic space, draconian repression of public dissent and suppressed freedom of expression. The reappointment of Vladimir Putin seems inexorable. The objective of the Kremlin, however, is not just victory, but a landslide result, both in turnout and percentage of votes. This would legitimise Putin's legacy and his war of aggression, relegating the remaining opposition to an even more marginalised role, and allowing Putin to implement, unchecked, his vision for the next six years. Recent changes to Russia's electoral laws make it virtually impossible to conduct any meaningful monitoring, and have significantly restricted the role of the media. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe will not be present, as was previously the case with the September 2021 parliamentary elections. A number of civil society organisations and personalities have called on the international community not to recognise the results as legitimate; this demand was also made by the �Ϸ��վary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in October 2023.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Studju - Parental Child Abductions to Third Countries - 12-03-2024

Mon, 11 Mar 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Cross-border parental child abductions in the EU are governed by The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and (except for Denmark) the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Countries outside of the EU may or may not be Contracting States to ‘the Convention’, but will not be bound by Brussels II-ter. Research has found that the often negative, long-lasting impact of abduction may continue throughout the lifecycle of those who have been abducted. It may also affect future generations of society. This means that every effort to deter abduction should be made. Where that is not possible, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention should be nurtured to support its application in contemporary society. Specialist mediation should be encouraged in relation to international child abduction generally, and specifically in relation to Third Countries which are not Contracting States to ‘the Convention’. This study was commissioned by the European �Ϸ��վ’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Alexei Navalny: Anti-corruption campaigner, opposition leader and Kremlin victim - 23-02-2024

Fri, 23 Feb 2024 16:38:24 GMT

The sudden death of political activist and Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny on 16 February 2024, in a maximum-security Russian penal colony where he was serving a draconian jail sentence, has met with widespread international condemnation and a wave of mourning both inside and outside the Russian Federation. Yulia Navalnaya – Navalny's widow – is due to address the European �Ϸ��վ during the February II plenary session, and MEPs will subsequently debate and vote on a resolution on Navalny's murder and the need for the EU to support political prisoners and oppressed civil society in the Russian Federation.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Russia in Africa: An atlas - 13-02-2024

Mon, 12 Feb 2024 23:00:00 GMT

This series of maps illustrates Russia's expanding diplomatic, economic and military engagement across the African continent. It also provides a visual representation of the deployment of hybrid tools, such as information manipulation campaigns, and the multi faceted presence of the paramilitary company Wagner, both of which are integral parts of Russia's current strategy in Africa. Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the subsequent open confrontation with the West in all arenas, has put the spotlight on the African continent again as an area of geopolitical rivalry. Russia's current engagement on the continent seeks to break the diplomatic and economic isolation imposed by the West, to reassert its own relevance on the international stage as the champion of the new 'polycentric world', and to advance its geo strategic ambitions in mining, energy and military presence in key areas, such as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia made significant diplomatic efforts to ensure a high turnout at the second Russia Africa summit, held in Saint Petersburg in July 2023, which was well attended but by significantly fewer Heads of State than the first summit, in 2019. However, the 2023 summit failed to address several African leaders' concerns about the impact of the war in Ukraine on their countries' economies. As evidenced in votes on recent United Nations (UN) resolutions, the African countries' positions on the war vary greatly. Russia's expanding influence in Africa also plays out through non official channels, such as the use of private military companies (such as the Wagner Group) and information manipulation campaigns. Russia has concluded military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries, and is a major, though declining, arms supplier to Africa. This cooperation is not linked to democratic pledges, and in multiple African countries hit by coups, Russia has continued or strengthened its military cooperation. Beyond arms, Russia's trade with Africa is relatively insignificant compared with other trade partners. Russia's presence is stronger in the African mining and energy markets, notably through mining concessions to Wagner associated companies, and it has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 20 countries, with plans to build nuclear plants in Egypt and Nigeria.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Russia's war on Ukraine: Implications for the Arctic - 11-01-2024

Wed, 10 Jan 2024 23:00:00 GMT

Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine may not be taking place geographically in the Arctic, but it has already had a plethora of impacts on the circumpolar north, the repercussions of which are likely to spread well beyond the region. First, the war has negatively affected cooperation, as activities with Russia in the framework of regional forums such as the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council (BEAC), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Northern Dimension have either been significantly scaled down or suspended. The repercussions of curtailed scientific cooperation, which has been a hallmark of Arctic exceptionalism for decades, are feared to be especially serious, in a context where unprecedented climate change necessitates urgent joint circumpolar action. In parallel, Russia's war on Ukraine has had a negative impact on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, with those living in Russia most affected. With the return of full-blown war to European soil, as well as the implications of climate change, heated geopolitics has also returned to the 'high north'. Russia's aggression has been a catalyst for two Nordic countries – Finland and Sweden – to apply for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), reinforcing the Arctic dimension of the alliance. This development is set to strengthen NATO in the region; however, the intensifying hybrid threats and a non-conventional military build-up by Russia are likely to further increase tensions in the Arctic. Russia's isolation and the effects of economic sanctions imposed owing to its military aggression also create room for possible new dynamics and alliances in the region in the context of the changing power balance and China's rising ambitions there. These developments are of great concern for the EU, which – in line with its Arctic policy outlined in successive Commission communications and Council conclusions – has been actively involved in matters relevant to the Arctic. The consequences of scaled-down cooperation on climate change, the environment and livelihoods, and the changes in the security environment and China's ambitions, all touch upon core interests of the EU. Through its resolutions, the European �Ϸ��վ has been advocating for enhanced protection for the Arctic region, for 'peaceful cooperation while taking into account the new security realities', and for a stronger EU policy in the Arctic that is better adapted to the current geopolitical situation.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling - 14-12-2023

Wed, 13 Dec 2023 23:00:00 GMT

More than 90 % of people who cross the external borders of the European Union (EU) irregularly do so with the assistance of migrant smugglers. The facilitation of irregular migration is a highly profitable criminal activity, given the relatively low risks incurred by the perpetrators. Detections of irregular border crossings are at their highest levels since 2016, yet demand for migration facilitation services has also risen to a new high. This high demand is not only due to the fact that people in severe distress – whether because of genuine fear for their lives or for economic reasons – keep trying to reach the EU, by irregular means if necessary. Demand is also high because it has become harder to cross the EU's external borders illegally, because of increased external border controls and other measures put in place to prevent irregular migration. This is where migrant smuggling networks step in. Migrant smugglers are among some of the most agile criminals. They go to great lengths to avoid getting caught, quickly adapting the routes and methods they use to smuggle migrants into, within or beyond the EU. The facilitation of irregular migration is a complex crime, interconnected with many other criminal activities, such as document fraud, trafficking in human beings and other types of illicit smuggling. The criminal organisations involved in smuggling migrants are increasingly sophisticated, professional and violent. Although people willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders, they do so at great personal risk. Too many lose their lives, or are at risk of serious harm or exploitation. Preventing and combating migrant smuggling and related crimes is therefore one of the key priorities of EU action against irregular migration and organised crime. �Ϸ��վ has repeatedly called for more and better operational cooperation, data sharing and legal migration channels. The European Commission has just proposed new legislation to break the smugglers' business model. This is an update of a briefing from 2021.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2023 - PE

Briefing - Preventing EU funds from ending up with individuals or companies tied to the EU-Russia sanctions lists - 25-10-2023

Thu, 16 Mar 2023 23:00:00 GMT

This briefing will give a brief overview of the EU-Russia sanctions framework, before discussing existing EU tools for protecting its financial interests, access to beneficial ownership data and EU initiatives to ensure sanctions enforcement. It serves as background information for the CONT Committee workshop of 6 November 2023 on ‘Preventing EU funds from reaching sanctioned individuals or entities’.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2023 - PE

Studju - Cross-border claims to looted art - 16-10-2023

Sun, 15 Oct 2023 22:00:00 GMT

This study addresses cross-border restitution claims to looted art, considering Nazi-looted art and colonial takings, but also more recent cultural losses resulting from illicit trafficking. Although these categories differ considerably, commonalties exist. The study highlights blind spots in the legal and policy frameworks and formulates recommendations on how these could be bridged. This study was commissioned by the European �Ϸ��վ’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2023 - PE