Dokumenti - Think Tank - Parlament Ewropew

Briefing - EU and Ukraine: Potential for stronger energy cooperation on the path to integration - 24-03-2025

Sun, 23 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT

Ukraine is the second largest country on the European continent after Russia. Its oil, coal and gas reserves, as well as its geostrategic position, ensured its important role in energy trade, both during the Soviet Union and after its collapse. However, Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine (since 2014), followed by a full-scale war of aggression against the country, have had severe human and economic impacts. In the energy area, for example, Russia's strategy has been to weaponise (e.g. the occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station) or destroy (hydro and coal-fired power plants, as well as electricity grid substations) energy infrastructure. As a result, Ukraine's electricity generation capacity has been severely limited. Moreover, its choice to be less dependent on Russian energy, and to apply for EU membership, means that, within a short time frame, it must rebuild its energy grid and orient it towards a future with less fossil fuels; all this while being in a war. Energy relations between the EU and Ukraine are multifaceted (e.g. the Energy Community; the memorandum of understanding on energy in 2005, updated in 2016; the association agreement signed in 2014). In future, they are due to be reframed under the institutional arrangements for the enlargement talks (after Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022). Since the Russian invasion in 2022, to help Ukraine cope with the multiple challenges its energy grid has been facing, the EU has used several mechanisms and initiatives, such as successfully synchronising the Ukrainian grid with the Continental European Synchronous Area; the EU civil protection mechanism; the Ukraine Facility; the Ukraine Energy Support Fund; and the European Investment Bank. The outcome of the war is uncertain, and some see recent statements by the new United States administration as a significant setback for Ukraine. Others focus instead on the possibilities for further collaboration between Ukraine and the EU. They bring as examples the country's vast gas reserves and infrastructure both to transport and to store natural gas, nuclear power or green hydrogen, provided that the country engages in the development of relevant infrastructure.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Future of European defence - 06-03-2025

Wed, 05 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT

Significant progress in bolstering EU defence has been made in recent years. However, the shift in United States (US) policy on Ukraine has prompted European leaders to convene several times, to coordinate their response. �Ϸ��վ is due to discuss the future of European defence during the March plenary session.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Outcome of the European Council video-conference call of 26 February 2025 - 03-03-2025

Sun, 02 Mar 2025 23:00:00 GMT

On 26 February 2025, the EU held a video-conference call to prepare for the upcoming special European Council meeting on 6 March 2025, dedicated to EU defence and Ukraine. They were briefed by the French President, Emmanuel Macron, on his recent visit to Washington and his talks with United States President Donald Trump.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - Displaced Ukrainians: Challenges and outlook for integration in the EU - 19-02-2025

Wed, 19 Feb 2025 14:27:09 GMT

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 forced millions of people to flee Ukraine. To date, approximately 6.8°million people have had to seek refuge, mostly in the EU and its neighbourhood. The EU responded rapidly in March 2022, activating the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time ever. The TPD's emergency mechanism offers swift protection and rights to those in need who arrive in large numbers, preventing Member States' asylum systems from becoming overwhelmed. Rights under the TPD include access to a residence permit, employment, housing, medical and social welfare assistance, and education for children and adolescents. For those fleeing Ukraine, these rights also include travel within the EU, and to and from Ukraine. Currently, the largest number of beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine reside in Germany, Poland and Czechia. Among them are nearly 1.3 million children, with 50 % still awaiting enrolment in their host countries' education systems. Many pupils attend online classes delivered from Ukraine, as parents prefer to keep ties with their home country. The EU and its Member States have made efforts and funds available to support the integration of displaced people from Ukraine in terms of employment, housing, education and healthcare. Research indicates that Ukrainian refugees have a high employment rate in host countries, reflecting the circular mobility pattern observed among Ukrainians prior to 2022, when they were the largest non-EU workforce within the EU. However, with no end to the war in sight, the situation of Ukrainian refugees remains uncertain. There is currently no EU-level strategy regarding the status of refugees from Ukraine beyond the extension of temporary protection until March 2026. By April 2024, an estimated 1.2 million Ukrainians had already returned to their country despite the war. While most only go for brief visits to see family or tend to their properties, some intend to return permanently. Both the EU and Ukrainian policymakers face questions about the potential scale of and reasons for returns, as they seek to adapt and prepare their policies.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - Russia's war on Ukraine: Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children - 11-02-2025

Mon, 10 Feb 2025 23:00:00 GMT

The invasion of Ukraine enters its 4th year in 2025, resulting in further displacement. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights. The pair are accused of the 'war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation'. According to the ICC, there are reasonable grounds to believe that President Putin 'committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others', or that he failed to properly control 'civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility'. Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evidence has been collected about core international crimes committed against Ukrainian children. Multiple reports consider Russia to be in breach of the obligations set in several international treaties and instruments to which Russia is party, and of customary international law. It is well documented that, since the start of the invasion, certain categories of individuals, including women and children, have been disproportionately affected by the conflict. International organisations, institutional actors and civil society organisations have repeatedly warned about the great burden on children, including but not limited to trafficking, sexual exploitation, abduction and illegal adoption. Beyond the strictly legal consequences of the arrest warrant, some commentators argue that the arrest warrant against Putin may help to undermine the Russian leader's war efforts, as the international community universally sees the abduction of children as unacceptable. No matter what the geopolitical arguments are, removing children from their families or from care facilities and forcibly transferring them is universally considered a reprehensible act of violence. This is an update of a 2023 publication written by Micaela Del Monte with Nefeli Barlaoura.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2025 - PE

Briefing - The Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and exceptional macro-financial assistance - 11-12-2024

Wed, 11 Dec 2024 08:27:49 GMT

Since the start of the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level, including macro-financial assistance, financial support via the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from its Member States and through the European Peace Facility. Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a new macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine and establishes a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM). That loan and the ULCM are part of a G7 initiative adopted at the G7 summit in Apulia in June 2024 to support Ukraine with loans of up to US$50 billion (€45 billion). The purpose of the G7 initiative is to provide Ukraine with sufficient and continuous financial support to address the immediate needs inflicted on the country by Russia's ongoing aggression. The ULCM will provide Ukraine with non-repayable financial support to assist it in repaying loans provided by G7 partners. Given the urgent nature of Ukraine's financing needs, the MFA will be available in 2024. According to the annex to the final agreement between G7 finance ministers of 25 October 2024, the EU's share of the G7 loan will be €18.115 billion. Extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states will be used to repay those loans and the associated interest costs. The ULCM will collect the extraordinary revenues and use them to repay the loans. �Ϸ��վ adopted the proposal on 22 October 2024 and Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 entered into force on 29 October 2024.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Study in Focus: EU contingent financial liabilities - 14-11-2024

Wed, 13 Nov 2024 23:00:00 GMT

The original full study tracks the evolution of EU contingent liabilities. Contingent liabilities for the EU budget have grown considerably in their magnitude and complexity and will continue to increase under the MFF 2021-2027. We explain the risks they might impose on the EU budget and analyse risk management practices to address them. We forecast total contingent liabilities will more than double by 2027, reaching EUR 612 billion. This increase will be driven mainly by RRF loans and to a lesser extent by financial support to Ukraine.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Reinforcing Europe's defence industry - 08-11-2024

Fri, 08 Nov 2024 07:50:06 GMT

Russia's war on Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the European defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. Europe's defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capability. The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia's war on Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total expected to reach €350 billion a year in 2024. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation also provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos, by agreeing a joint defence procurement instrument (the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) and an initiative to build up ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production). These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine's needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry, and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy and a defence industry programme to implement it. Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from Europe's defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity. This updates a previous edition, published in 2023.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Analiżi fil-Fond - IMF Lending to Ukraine: State of Play and the Road Ahead - 30-10-2024

Tue, 29 Oct 2024 23:00:00 GMT

This paper provides an overview of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s lending to Ukraine, particularly focusing on the IMF response to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, given the challenging macroeconomic circumstances. If further analyses the key elements of the IMF’ Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme for Ukraine, including the evolution of core assumptions, risks, fiscal sustainability and conditionality.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine - 16-10-2024

Wed, 16 Oct 2024 11:35:56 GMT

The EU will provide a new macro-financial assistance (MFA) loan of up to €35 billion to Ukraine as part of a G7 initiative to support Ukraine with a loan of up to US$50 billion (€45 billion). The new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism will provide revenues originating from immobilised Russian sovereign assets, so that Ukraine can service and repay loans from the EU and other G7 lenders. �Ϸ��վ is expected to adopt the proposal during its October II plenary sitting.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Plenary round-up – October I 2024 - 11-10-2024

Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:00:00 GMT

The first plenary session of October 2024 saw Members mark one year since the 7 October Hamas terrorist attack, as well as holding a debate on a statement by the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, on the escalation of violence in the Middle East and the situation in Lebanon. Members also held a debate with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, current holder of the Council Presidency. �Ϸ��վ adopted resolutions on Georgia's increasingly authoritarian trajectory and its effect on the country's EU membership prospects, as well as one condemning Russian interference in Moldova. Members also debated the situation in Sudan and the outcome of the Summit of the Future. And they discussed the preparation of the European Council meeting set for 17 18 October 2024 with the Council and Commission. Debates took place following Commission statements on wildfires in southern Europe, in the Balkans, and in the Amazon. Members also debated Commission statements on: fighting systemic gender-based violence; combating fake news, populism and disinformation; strengthening external border security; preventing drug-related crime; the 2024 annual rule of law report; and protecting the EU budget and ensuring that EU funds do not benefit terrorist entities or individuals. In addition to marking World Mental Health Day, Members debated the urgent need to revise the Medical Devices Regulation.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Ukraine, the European Peace Facility and additional financing - 02-09-2024

Sun, 01 Sep 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Two and a half years after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU military aid under the European Peace Facility (EPF) is still falling behind, with fresh money needed despite the increased EPF budget reserved for Ukraine. The new plan set in place by the EU and its G7 partners to use windfall profits from frozen Russian assets only began to provide military and reconstruction support for Ukraine with the first payment on 26 July 2024. The EU will use the EPF to channel its military aid under this recent EU-G7 plan, amid persisting legal and (geo)political uncertainties.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Temporary Protection Directive - 23-07-2024

Mon, 22 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, over 6.5 million people have been forced to seek refuge, mostly in the European Union (EU) and its neighbouring countries. Reacting swiftly when the invasion began, the EU decided to grant Union-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine. By April 2024, nearly 4.2 million third-country nationals had benefited from this possibility. The EU Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) allows EU Member States to move swiftly to offer protection and rights to people in urgent need of assistance, while also preventing national asylum systems from becoming overwhelmed during mass arrivals of displaced persons. Despite being invoked several times in the past, the directive had never been put into action. However, Russia's military aggression prompted a unanimous decision in the Council to grant temporary protection to people fleeing the war in Ukraine, thereby activating the directive. Initially, temporary protection was granted for 1 year and later extended twice; it is now set to expire in March 2025. Due to the ongoing volatility in Ukraine and the absence of safe and durable conditions for displaced persons to return, in June 2024 the Council decided to extend temporary protection for another year, until 4 March 2026. It remains to be seen how a smooth transition from temporary protection to other legal protection statuses will be ensured beyond this date. This document updates and expands upon a briefing from 2022.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Ukraine Facility: State of play - 16-07-2024

Mon, 15 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT

The Ukraine Facility is the EU's flagship programme to support Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction and modernisation following Russia's full-scale war of aggression. The facility as defined by Regulation (EU) 2024/792 consists of three pillars and will mobilise up to €50 billion to ensure stable and predictable financial support for Ukraine between 2024 and 2027 and assist the country on its path towards EU membership. The Ukraine plan guides implementation of the facility's Pillar I: it sets the conditions and serves as framework for disbursing funds, and outlines the reform pathway for Ukraine's reconstruction and EU accession. Two tranches of exceptional bridge financing totalling €6 billion and pre-financing worth €1.9 billion have so far been transferred to Ukraine. Regular transfers of quarterly instalments from the Ukraine Facility are planned until 2027. Disbursal is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine plan quantitative and qualitative reform steps, and adhering to EU values.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Outcome of the 50th G7 Summit, held in Apulia, Italy - 03-07-2024

Tue, 02 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT

G7 leaders gathered under the Italian presidency from 13 to 15 June 2024 in Apulia, Italy, for the 50th G7 Summit. The summit was a demonstration of the G7's unity and determination in the face of intense challenges to the rules-based multilateral order and international peace and security: Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the war in Gaza. In the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the leaders agreed to provide US$50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine from frozen Russian sovereign assets. The leaders also backed the comprehensive deal on Gaza outlined by United States (US) President Joe Biden. The Italian presidency put special focus on energy cooperation with Africa as a priority for the G7.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024 - 02-07-2024

Mon, 01 Jul 2024 22:00:00 GMT

The European Council took two important decisions on 27 June for the new institutional cycle: one on the EU's institutional leadership, the other on the EU's political priorities for the next five years. EU leaders elected António Costa as the next European Council President, proposed Ursula von der Leyen as the candidate for Commission President, and nominated Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They also adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, security and defence, and competitiveness. Other topics addressed were migration, the Black Sea, Moldova, Georgia, hybrid threats, and the fight against antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. The European Council also agreed on a roadmap for future work on internal reforms.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - European Council response to third-country conflict - 13-06-2024

Wed, 12 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT

As Article 24(1) of the Treaty on the European Union states, the EU's common foreign and security policy is 'defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council'. The intergovernmental method is used in decision-making on foreign affairs issues; the European Council is therefore a key forum for foreign affairs discussions at European Union (EU) level. The European Council also plays a crucial role as the EU's crisis manager. Since 2009, the European Council has been operating in a permanent state of crisis – addressing economic, migration, foreign affairs and health crises – some simultaneously. These crises have varied in their cause as well as their impact on the EU. Some, even though external (e.g. Libya and Syria), had knock-on effects that impacted the European continent or were linked to other crises the EU faced (e.g. migration). The level of attention paid to and the type of response given at European Council level has therefore varied. As has been demonstrated since the institutionalisation of the European Council with the Treaty of Lisbon, when an urgent or sensitive decision needs to be taken at EU level, the European Council is the best equipped institution to do so (for example, during the sovereign debt crisis). This briefing analyses the European Council response to two conflicts involving third countries: Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine in February 2022 and the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2023. Although the two situations are very different and the backgrounds are quite complex, a comparison provides an opportunity to assess the role of the European Council as a crisis manager on the international scene. The escalation of both conflicts has resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, led to precarious humanitarian situations, and has had an impact on the EU to varying degrees. This paper focuses on the European Council's response in the first three months of these crises. It considers the type of European Council meetings and their frequency, the agenda, the invitation letters, statements and conclusions, as well as European Council members' visits to the territories involved in the conflict and the EU Member States' votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions in relation to those conflicts.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Ukraine Plan conditionality: What is expected and how does it compare with similar programmes? - 05-06-2024

Wed, 05 Jun 2024 22:00:00 GMT

This paper outlines the main elements related to conditionality included in the Ukraine Plan, and compares it with the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s approach to conditionality, in particular with respect to the group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) that currently includes Ukraine.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - European defence industry programme (EDIP) - 31-05-2024

Thu, 30 May 2024 22:00:00 GMT

On 24 February 2022, Russia's unjustified aggression against Ukraine signalled the return of high-intensity warfare to Europe. In response, and to ensure the EU's long-term goal of achieving defence industrial readiness, the European Commission adopted the first-ever European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) on 5 March 2024. As an immediate and central step to deliver the strategy, the Commission put forward a proposal for a European defence industry programme (EDIP) regulation, also on 5 March 2024. EDIP – with a proposed budget of €1.5 billion – seeks to achieve defence industrial readiness by bridging the gap between short-term emergency measures that have been implemented since 2023 and will end in 2025 and a more structural, long-term approach. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Reception and integration of displaced people from Ukraine - 26-04-2024

Thu, 25 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, more than 4 million Ukrainians have been welcomed under the temporary protection scheme in the EU. From the beginning of the war, the European Commission, national, regional and local authorities, together with civil society and international organisations, have worked to facilitate the reception and the integration of people fleeing the war in Ukraine.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Plenary round-up – April II 2024 - 26-04-2024

Thu, 25 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT

In the final plenary session of this term, over 80 files were adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. The April II 2024 session also saw a formal sitting marking the 20th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement. Leaders of all 10 accession states from that time were invited to speak before the �Ϸ��վ, and discuss with young people from those countries born 20 years ago. Members debated the conclusions of the recent European Council meetings, in particular on a new European Competitiveness deal and the EU strategic agenda 2024-2029, the La Hulpe declaration on the future of social Europe, 'Forging a sustainable future together: economic, social and territorial challenges for a competitive, cohesive and inclusive Europe', and recent attempts to deny dictatorships and the risk of Europe returning to totalitarianism. On external relations, Members tackled the EU's response to the repeated killing of humanitarian aid workers, journalists and civilians by the Israel Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip, Iran's unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response, the use of Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine's victory and reconstruction, attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society, the EU-Egypt strategic and comprehensive partnership, the situation in Haiti, and pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Ukraine - 23-04-2024

Tue, 23 Apr 2024 13:24:58 GMT

The EU is providing Ukraine with strong political and economic support, and future EU accession should support its reconstruction and modernisation, the cost of which is currently estimated at over €450 billion. This year's Ukraine Recovery Conference will seek to improve coordination and cooperation among its allies.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Briefing - Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 17-18 April 2024 - 22-04-2024

Sun, 21 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT

The special meeting of 17-18 April was the last European Council meeting before the European elections on 6-9 June. The EU Heads of State or Government concentrated on competitiveness, the situation in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. The discussions on competitiveness – informed by a report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta on the future of the internal market – were lengthy and difficult. Whereas EU leaders agreed on the need for a new European competitiveness deal, the outcome was less ambitious on measures towards convergence of the business environment and more centralised supervision of financial markets. On Ukraine, the most salient topics discussed were the provision of air defence for Ukraine and of ammunition more generally, and the use of frozen Russian assets. On the Middle East, EU leaders condemned the Iranian attack on Israel, reiterated their previous statements on Palestine, called for be avoidance of further escalation of tensions in the region, and committed to increase support for Lebanon.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Draft amending budget No 1/2024: Amendments required following MFF revision - 16-04-2024

Tue, 16 Apr 2024 15:27:36 GMT

The revision of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) necessitates amendments to the EU's 2024 general budget. Draft amending budget No 1/2024 (DAB 1/2024) will raise the 2024 budget by €5.83 billion in commitment appropriations and €4.14 billion in payment appropriations. The MFF headings affected are Heading 5 (Security and defence – €376 million) and Heading 6 (Neighbourhood and the world – €501 million). The new Ukraine Reserve will also be mobilised, with €4.8 billion in commitment appropriations and €3.8 billion in payment appropriations. �Ϸ��վ's plenary vote on the Council's position is planned for the April II session.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE

Mad-Daqqa t’Għajn - Extension of EU trade benefits to Ukraine - 16-04-2024

Mon, 15 Apr 2024 22:00:00 GMT

During its April II plenary session, �Ϸ��վ is expected to vote on the extension for an additional year of the autonomous trade measures (ATM) that liberalised Ukrainian exports to the EU, to support Ukraine's economy. The proposal includes reinforced safeguards to protect EU farmers in case of market disruption.

Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2024 - PE