MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIONon Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud
22.11.2024-()
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Assita Kanko, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra, Roberts Zīle, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
See also joint motion for a resolutionRC-B10-0179/2024
10‑0184/2024
European Ϸվ resolution on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud
()
Ϸվ,
–having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Georgia, most notably its resolution of 25April2024 on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society[1],
–having regard to the European Council decision of December 2023 to grant Georgia EU candidate status,
–having regard to the recommendations of the Commission’s staff working document of 8November2023 entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),
–having regard to the international standards and principles for democratic elections that ensure free, fair and transparent processes, which Georgia is expected to uphold,
–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas on 26October2024 Georgia held parliamentary elections in which the Central Election Commission of Georgia reported that the ruling Georgian Dream party had won with 53.92% of the vote, more than in the previous parliamentary elections in 2020 and 2016, enabling it to form a government; whereas the official election results have been rejected by the opposition and many international observers and monitors, who found that the election did not meet international standards and that the results do not accurately reflect the true will of the Georgian people;
B.whereas almost all the polls held before the election showed the opposition parties to be leading Georgian Dream by a wide margin;
C.whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zurabishvili, and opposition parties refused to recognise the results of the elections, asserting that acknowledging the outcome would be tantamount to ‘accepting Georgia’s subjugation to Russia’; whereas the President of Georgia described the election process as a ‘Russian special operation’ and characterised it as a new form of hybrid warfare targeting the Georgian people and state; whereas she appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging violations of the constitutional principles of secrecy of the vote and universal suffrage during the 26October2024 parliamentary elections and is demanding that the final results be declared unconstitutional;
D.whereas the scale of electoral fraud and manipulation was unprecedented, based on independent exit polls conducted by Edison Research and HarrisX, along with credible reports from the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, My Vote and other independent domestic observation missions, and whereas statistical analyses reveal severe electoral interference;
E.whereas independent reports claim over 120000 cases of compromised ballot secrecy documented by international observers, over 15000 reported cases of fraudulent identification practices, approximately 50000 instances of potential identity theft identified through voter list analysis, with 82% of election commission members being found to have direct ties to the ruling party, with systematic obstruction of more than 2500 genuine observers across polling stations, and unauthorised video surveillance in 60% of polling stations, directly violating Article8 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
F.whereas this level of malpractice supports the claims that there was a ‘large scheme’ to rig the 2024 parliamentary elections, involving multiple violations that also included a pre-election climate of fear and intimidation of civil society, including the passage of the ‘foreign agents law’, reports of vote buying, coercion and pressure on voters, violations of voter privacy, physical altercations, imprisonment of the leader of the main opposition party and controversial changes to election administration rules prior to the vote;
G.whereas an international election observation mission consisting of 529 observers from 42 countries, including an official electoral delegation from the European Ϸվ, reported that the elections were marred by entrenched polarisation and expressed concerns over recently adopted legislation and its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society; whereas the international election observation mission also noted highly divisive campaign rhetoric and widespread reports of pressure on voters amid deepening political divisions, significant imbalances in financial resources and the many advantages enjoyed by the ruling party that contributed to an already uneven playing field;
H.whereas the election results have been met with significant domestic unrest while opposition parties and President Salome Zurabishvili called for new elections;
I.whereas protests in Tbilisi initially erupted on 28October2024, with thousands gathering to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party’s declared victory; whereas the demonstrations continued on 4November2024, growing in scale and intensity;
J.whereas since then protests in Tbilisi have continued, with politicians from many EU countries – including the Baltic states, Finland, France, Germany, Poland and Sweden – joining the protests, signalling international support and concern over the legitimacy of the outcome of the elections and Georgia’s political trajectory;
K.whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party has taken numerous actions that directly undermine the Georgian people’s European aspirations, the most notable example being a law of 28May2024 on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ (‘foreign agents law’), which has largely been seen as based on an infamous law that Russia has used extensively to crack down on dissent;
L.whereas there is still an exceptionally high level of support among the Georgian population for joining the EU, with over 80% of people in favour;
M.whereas the founder of the Georgian Dream party, dominant oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, openly returned to active politics on 30December2023, becoming ‘honorary chair’ of the party; whereas, as honorary chair, the updated party statute bestows upon Ivanishvili a range of prerogatives, thus formalising the concentration of power in his hands, without outlining any accountability mechanisms;
N.whereas Mikheil Saakashvili, who served as President of Georgia from 2004 until 2013 and is a leader of the largest opposition party, has been detained since October2022, has been mistreated in prison and been subjected to humiliating treatment during court hearings, representing a clear and present threat to the integrity of Georgia’s democratic credentials;
O.whereas Georgia’s recent elections exposed many of the problems that have been hindering the country’s democratisation process over the last few years;
P.whereas Georgian Dream’s narrative is that the West is trying to push Georgia into a renewed war with Russia, which invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy part of its territory; whereas this anti-Western communication strategy was used by the Georgian Dream party to justify its avoidance of aligning with EU statements against Belarus or Iran and its refusal to support Moldova and Ukraine’;
1.Reiterates its steadfast support for Georgia’s democratic development and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its people;
2.Underlines that numerous credible reports by both domestic and international monitors and election observers of election intimidation, vote buying and irregularities are serious and widespread enough to call the legitimacy of Georgia’s election results into question as not reflecting the will of the Georgian people;
3.Remains concerned about the Georgian Dream government’s human rights abuses and anti-democratic actions; strongly condemns Georgian Dream’s conduct throughout the parliamentary elections; underlines that such attempts to politically control or curb the activities of civil society undermine democratic values and are contrary to Commission recommendations;
4.Stands in full solidarity with the Georgian people and Georgia’s vibrant civil society, which traditionally has played a very active and central role in bringing the country closer to the West, promoting democratisation and pushing for Euro-Atlantic integration in line with the desires of the Georgian people; in this regard, deplores the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the ruling party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the United States, the European Union, including its MEPs and officials, and its promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;
5.Is alarmed by the continuous and highly disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the opposition, as well as by the threats of further repression voiced by Georgian Dream leadership, including oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, to outlaw the democratic pro-Western opposition and silence dissent;
6.Calls for the EU to initiate a comprehensive international assessment of the 2024 elections through an EU Election Follow-up Mission working in coordination with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) to thoroughly investigate electoral fraud, evaluate the integrity of the electoral institutions, give recommendations for future elections, and reiterate that the EU accession process for Georgia has stalled as a result of the government’s policies prior to the elections and to the conduct of the parliamentary elections;
7.Calls for the EU to suspend all formal EU-level communications with the existing Georgian Government and Ϸվ, including cancellation of EU-Georgia Association Council meetings, suspension of high-level political dialogue, freezing of technical cooperation mechanisms, introduction of visa requirements for Georgian officials travelling to the EU, redirecting of the financial assistance (approximately EUR120million annually) for the government to Georgian non-governmental organisations and the independent media and to support programmes promoting democratic resilience and electoral integrity;
8.Calls on the Commission to step up and broaden its support for civil society in Georgia, especially in the light of the increasingly draconian measures being imposed on the Georgian people;
9.Calls on all pro-democratic political parties that have received support from the Georgian electorate to formalise their coordination and to create a unified structure that would represent the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people domestically and abroad;
10.Expresses its concern over the series of brutal beatings of political figures, civil society leaders and journalists during and in the aftermath of the demonstrations against the foreign agents law this spring; expresses its concern that not a single perpetrator has been detained, charged or even identified, and calls upon the Georgian authorities to bring the perpetrators of such beatings to justice;
11.Is deeply concerned by the increasing Russian influence in the country, as well as by the actions of the Georgian Dream government, which has pursued rapprochement with Russia – in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory, and its aggression against Ukraine – by strengthening trade ties despite EU sanctions and refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow;
12.Urges Georgia, as an EU candidate country, to honour its commitments by imposing sanctions on Russia in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and by implementing measures to avoid the circumvention of European sanctions, as it has committed to doing;
13.Reminds the Georgian Government that a large majority of the population strongly supports the country’s pro-Western course and its accession to the EU;
14.Welcomes the personal sanctions imposed on Georgian Dream officials by the United States; calls for the EU to impose similar travel bans on those involved in the adoption of the foreign agents law and those implicated in election malpractice, and to extend such bans to other high-ranking members of the ruling party as well as to judges passing politically motivated sentences and those responsible for sanction circumvention as well as serving Russia’s military, economic and political goals;
15.Strongly condemns the destructive personal role played by Georgia’s dominant oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in orchestrating the ongoing political crisis and systematically sabotaging the country’s pro-Western trajectory in favour of alignment with Russia; deplores his continuous efforts to erode Georgia’s democratic institutions and betray the aspirations of its people; strongly reiterates its call for the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his direct involvement in undermining Georgia’s political process and acting against the country’s fundamental interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;
16.Underlines that suspending the visa liberalisation agreement with Georgia should be considered only after personal sanctions against members of the ruling party and dominant oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili are put in place;
17.Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate and unconditional release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds so he can seek medical treatment abroad; calls on President Salome Zourabishvili to use her pardoning powers; emphasises that the Georgian Government bears full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him;
18.Regrets that MEPs have not been allowed to visit former President Saakashvili in the past to assess the conditions in which he is imprisoned; calls on the Georgian authorities to reverse its stance and allow visits by MEPs;
19.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the President, Government and Ϸվ of Georgia.