MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIONÌýon the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025
20.1.2025Ìý-Ìý()
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge MartÃn FrÃas, Silvia Sardone, Nikola Bartůšek, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, António Tânger Corrêa, EnikÅ‘ GyÅ‘ri
on behalf of the PfE Group
µþ10‑0068/2025
European ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾ resolution on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025
()
ºÏ·¨²©²ÊÍøÕ¾,
–Ìýhaving regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela,
–Ìýhaving regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.Ìýwhereas there is incontrovertible evidence that Edmundo González Urrutia is the undisputed winner of the presidential election held in Venezuela on 28 July 2024; whereas his candidacy received the most votes by an insurmountable margin; whereas the will of the people proclaimed Edmundo González Urrutia the legitimate newly elected President of Venezuela;
B.Ìýwhereas previous elections in Venezuela, including the 2018 presidential contest, have not received official recognition, amid allegations of widespread intimidation, irregularities and massive fraud by Nicolás Maduro’s regime;
C.Ìýwhereas since the presidential election, Maduro’s regime has escalated its crackdown on the political opposition;
D.Ìýwhereas, according to data from the authorities, peaceful mobilisations of citizens against the fraudulent election result have led to more than 2Ìý500 arrests by the regime; whereas, according to the non-governmental organisation Foro Penal, more than 80 citizens have been arrested since the beginning of 2025; whereas Foro Penal estimates that around 1Ìý700 political prisoners remain in prison;
E.Ìýwhereas on 2ÌýSeptemberÌý2024, the office of Venezuela’s attorney general announced that a court had issued an arrest warrant against the opposition leader Edmundo González Urrutia, accusing him of conspiracy and other crimes; whereas the Maduro regime’s repression of the opposition drove Edmundo González Urrutia to leave the country and seek asylum in Spain, with the aim of protecting his freedom, his integrity and his life;
F.Ìýwhereas on 10 January 2025, Venezuelan opposition leader MarÃa Corina Machado led the protests in Caracas and was violently kidnapped; whereas she was subsequently freed following an international outcry and condemnation by leaders all around the world;
G.Ìýwhereas the latest actions of the Venezuelan regime merely replicate the patterns of abuse and waves of repression already used by Nicolás Maduro and his allies; whereas past elections have been overshadowed by violence and intimidation of potential voters by gangs and other armed groups loyal to the Venezuelan regime;
H.Ìýwhereas armed groups have spread fear in both rural and urban areas, attacking voters and candidates, manipulating election results and restricting access to voting centres by imposing absolute territorial control; whereas these armed groups include the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Patriotic Forces of National Liberation (FPLN) and groups that emerged from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), operating mostly in border states and brutally enforcing curfews and regulations governing everyday activities;
I.Ìýwhereas over the past years, Nicolás Maduro’s regime has built a system of governance characterised by an alliance between the government and organised crime networks; whereas this is a symbiotic relationship, whereby non-state armed groups provide senior members of the regime with access to and total control over their areas of influence and, in return, the regime tolerates, and in some cases actively protects, the activities of these groups; whereas this system of governance is effectively sustaining Nicolás Maduro, Delcy RodrÃguez, Tarek William Saab and other members of the regime in power;
J.Ìýwhereas on 10 January 2025, the EU adopted a new package of targeted sanctions against 15 high-ranking members of the Venezuelan regime; whereas these high-ranking individuals include Diosdado Cabello, Venezuelan interior minister, Caryslia RodrÃguez, President of the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela (TSJ), Fanny Márquez, Vice-President of the TSJ, and Alexis RodrÃguez Cabello, new head of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and relative of the interior minister;
K.Ìýwhereas the Venezuelan regime is supported by international actors and countries, such as Cuba, Colombia and Nicaragua, most of them represented in the Foro de São Paulo and the Grupo de Puebla; whereas Russia and Iran are also important political and military allies of Venezuela;
L.Ìýwhereas for many years the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and its international fact-finding mission have documented numerous killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and instances of torture and ill treatment of opponents of the Maduro regime, which can be considered crimes against humanity;
M.Ìýwhereas the Venezuelan authorities have in recent years been harassing, persecuting and arbitrarily jailing politicians and members of civil society, such as union workers, journalists and human rights defenders, among many others;
N.Ìýwhereas the Venezuelan regime has stigmatised, harassed and repressed the media, closing dissenting outlets; whereas the civil society organisation Espacio Público reported 261 violations of freedom of expression in 2023, with censorship and intimidation the most common;
O.Ìýwhereas political prisoners in Venezuela face inhumane prison conditions and systematic torture, and the regime is denying them critical healthcare;
P.Ìýwhereas on 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro was fraudulently sworn in as President of Venezuela, which should be considered a coup d’état by the international community;
1.ÌýAcknowledges Edmundo González Urrutia as the newly elected and legitimate President of the Republic of Venezuela and strongly condemns the coup d’état staged by Nicolás Maduro on 10 January 2025;
2.ÌýStrongly condemns the extensive institutional repression and the systematic violations of human rights perpetrated by the Venezuelan regime following the presidential elections on 28 July 2024;
3.ÌýCalls for the EU, in particular the Vice-President of the CommissionÌý/ÌýHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, and the Member States to recognise Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate President of the Republic of Venezuela;
4.ÌýDeplores the Venezuelan regime’s continuous repression, over many years, of opposition figures, including torture, enforced disappearances and killings; reiterates its firm and unconditional support for the Venezuelan people;
5.ÌýRequests the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners unjustly and arbitrarily imprisoned by the Venezuelan regime; expresses concern for the state of health of those imprisoned, such as Alberto Trentini, an Italian volunteer helping people with disabilities;
6.ÌýDeplores Venezuela’s alignment with Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran and other dictatorial regimes;
7.ÌýCalls for the international community, the EU, in particular the VP/HR, and the Member States to impose further targeted sanctions against those members of the Venezuelan regime and its proxies responsible for violating the human rights of the Venezuelan people; calls for the EU to suspend all funds and projects destined for Venezuela; calls for the EU to freeze and confiscate, under a sound legal regime, all funds and economic resources on EU territory belonging to or owned, held or controlled by Nicolás Maduro or the Venezuelan state, or by any other members of the Venezuelan regime responsible for violations of human rights and electoral fraud;
8.ÌýInstructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the CommissionÌý/ÌýHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.
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