–having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,
–having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas in January2024, the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) carried out raids, interrogations and detentions targeting over 200 family members of current and former political prisoners as well as beneficiaries of the ‘INeedHelpBY’ initiative on ‘extremism’-related charges; whereas the majority are mothers and wives of political prisoners, including Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich, Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets, and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik;
B.whereas additional charges were brought in absentia against 20 political analysts, journalists and sociologists dubbed ‘Tsikhanouskaya’s analysts’, who face confiscation of property and revocation of citizenship if convicted;
C.whereas political prisoners, including party leaders Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour;
D.whereas the latest crackdown precedes the parliamentary and local ‘elections’ on 25February2024; whereas the 2023 ‘law on political parties’ is preventing democratic opposition parties from participating in the elections;
1.Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;
2.Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights;
3.Reiterates its position on the lack of transparency, freedom and fairness ahead of the parliamentary and local ‘elections’ in Belarus and calls for the EU, its Member States, and the international community not to recognise the results;
4.Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to respond by imposing stronger sanctions on the Lukashenka regime, including against goods involving political prisoners’ forced labour, stricter financial sanctions, and sanctions on individuals responsible for serious human-rights violations, including high-level officials and members of the security forces; calls for a further reduction of the diplomatic presence of Belarus in the EU, continued support for regime victims through special instruments allowing them to obtain EU visas and residence permits and addressing cases of statelessness;
5.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further support the documentation of human rights violations in Belarus, to back turning the OHCHR examination of the human rights situation in Belarus into a fully independent investigative mechanism, to uphold the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus, and to further accountability through extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction;
6.Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Belarus and its support for their legitimate aspirations for a democratic and European future and remains committed to working tirelessly with democratic forces, civil society and independent media to benefit the people of Belarus;
7.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, Member States, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces, the de facto Belarusian authorities, the UN and the OSCE.
Increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou
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European Ϸվ resolution of 8 February 2024 on the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou ()
–having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas over 800 individuals were executed in Iran in 2023, the highest figure since 2015, and over 500 protesters were killed as part of the ongoing suppression of the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement; whereas minorities are disproportionately affected;
B.whereas the appeal by Mohammad Ghobadlou, a 23-year-old with intellectual disabilities, against his death sentence was rejected on 23January2024 and he was executed; whereas his unfair trial was marred by torture allegations and secrecy;
C.whereas the UNHRC reported that at least 54 people were executed in January2024; whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, at least 11 prisoners, including Anwar Khezri, Kamran Sheikheh and Khosrow Basharat, are currently at risk of imminent execution;
D.whereas Iran routinely uses hostage diplomacy as a foreign policy tool;
1.Strongly condemns the executions of peaceful demonstrators in Iran, including that of Mohammad Ghobadlou; deplores the regime’s extensive use of the death penalty to terrorise society and stamp out dissent; stresses that it amounts to state-sanctioned killing; urges Iran to commute all death sentences and completely abolish the death penalty; reiterates its firm opposition to the death penalty at all times under all circumstances; fully supports the abolition campaign launched by imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner Narges Mohammadi; reiterates its continued support for Iran’s ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;
2.Calls for the unconditional and immediate release of everyone arbitrarily on death row and all prisoners of conscience, including EU nationals, notably Ahmadreza Djalali and Johan Floderus;
3.Calls for a new and bold EU strategy on Iran, including countering its hostage diplomacy;
4.Reiterates its unwavering call on the Council to designate the IRGC a terrorist organisation and impose further EU sanctions on officials and entities involved in serious human rights violations, including the Supreme Leader, the President and the Prosecutor-General;
5.Reiterates its condemnation of Iran’s brutal repression of peaceful protesters, in particular women and minorities; calls for an impartial, independent and transparent investigation into allegations of human rights violations against protesters;
6.Calls on Iran to uphold due process; condemns the appalling detention conditions, widespread use of torture, including sexual violence, and lack of access to medical treatment and legal representation;
7.Urges the Member States to monitor trials and organise visits to prisons where prisoners of conscience are detained, including EU nationals, in line with the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders;
8.Calls on the Member States to initiate criminal investigations into officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including under universal jurisdiction;
9.Urges the Commission to increase technical and budgetary support for a strong and independent Iranian civil society; calls on the Member States to facilitate visas, asylum and emergency grants for those who need to flee Iran;
10.Calls on the Member States to support the renewal of the mandates of the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission at the upcoming UN Human Rights Council session;
11.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR and the Iranian authorities.
Recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria
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European Ϸվ resolution of 8 February 2024 on the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria ()
–having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas the security situation in Nigeria has been aggravated by an escalation of religious, ethnic and intercommunal conflicts, particularly in the country’s Middle Belt, where the conflict between farmers and nomadic herders over land and water resources has resulted in an unprecedented death toll since Christmas;
B.whereas between 23 and 25December2023, gunmen launched a large-scale attack on more than 160 villages in the Bokkos, Barkin Ladi and Magu authority areas of Plateau State, causing the deaths of over 335 people, including at least 200 members of Christian communities;
C.whereas many of the displaced are currently living in temporary camps with limited access to water, sanitation, food, medication and healthcare, including mental health services;
D.whereas according to Nigerian NGOs, 52000 Christians and 34000 Muslims have been killed since 2009, and 18000 churches and 2200 Christian schools have been destroyed;
E.whereas violence by Islamic terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province, who target both Christians and Muslims in north-east Nigeria, has already displaced over two million people;
F.whereas the factors fuelling the clashes overlap and are rooted in, among other things, territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, access to scarce resources and environmental degradation;
1.Strongly condemns the acts of violence over Christmas targeting Christians and other communities, which resulted in an unprecedented number of deaths, injuries and displacements, and expresses its solidarity with those affected;
2.Calls on the Nigerian authorities to take action against militant Islamist groups exploiting the farmer-herder conflict, and urges them to address its root causes; warns that the conflict may be instrumentalised to spread religion-based hatred; acknowledges the role of climate change, competition for scarce resources and the disappearance of effective mediation schemes in aggravating the farmer-herder conflict, pushing the herders to move south;
3.Calls on the Nigerian authorities to conduct a thorough, independent investigation of the Christmas attacks and ensure that those responsible are held to account;
4.Urges all humanitarian actors to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to addressing the crisis;
5.Welcomes the Nigerian Ϸվ’s debate on the issue and encourages the Nigerian Government to enhance the security of communities, to foster dialogue and conflict mediation and to reaffirm its commitment to socio-economic recovery;
6.Welcomes the strong partnership between the EU and Nigeria and calls for it to be deepened further in the areas of security, mediation, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, and peace-building; encourages the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to visit Nigeria; welcomes the announcement of a EUR900million Global Gateway package for Nigeria in October2023;
7.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Government and Ϸվ of Nigeria.
Automated data exchange for police cooperation (“Prüm II”)
European Ϸվ legislative resolution of 8 February 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Ϸվ and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (“Prüm II”), amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, 2019/817 and 2019/818 of the European Ϸվ and of the Council ((COR1) – C9-0455/2021 – )
–having regard to the Commission proposal to Ϸվ and the Council ((COR1)),
–having regard to Article294(2) and Article16(2), Article87(2), point(a), and Article88(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Ϸվ (C9‑0455/2021),
–having regard to Article294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
–having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29November2023 to approve Ϸվ’s position, in accordance with Article294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
–having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,
–having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0200/2023),
1.Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;
2.Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Ϸվ again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;
3.Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Position of the European Ϸվ adopted at first reading on 8 February 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Ϸվ and of the Council on the automated search and exchange of data for police cooperation, and amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Ϸվ and of the Council (the Prüm II Regulation)
–having regard to the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women and its priority theme, ‘Accelerating the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls by addressing poverty and strengthening institutions and financing with a gender perspective’,
–having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 15September1995 and the outcomes of its review conferences,
–having regard to the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
–having regard to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
–having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the principle of ‘leaving no one behind’ and, in particular, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 which seeks to end poverty, SDG 5 which seeks to achieve gender equality and improve living conditions for women, SDG 8 which seeks to achieve sustainable and economic growth,
–having regard to the EU action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (GAP III),
–having regard to the EU gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 of 5March2020,
–having regard to its resolution of 22June2022 on a common European action on care(1),
–having regard to its resolution of 24June2022 on women’s poverty in Europe(2),
–having regard to Article 157(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
–having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on the EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (O-000056/2023 – B9-0005/2024 and O-000057/2023 – B9-0006/2024)),
–having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
–having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,
A.whereas ensuring women’s rights and gender equality is a fundamental principle of the EU enshrined in Article2 of the Treaty on European Union and Article23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting are important tools for reaching this aim and integrating these principles in all EU policies, measures and actions, including in its external dimensions;
B.whereas 189 countries across the world, including the European Union and its Member States, committed to work towards gender equality and empowering all women and girls at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995; whereas SDG 5 of the Sustainable Development Agenda adopted by UN Member States in 2015 sets 2030 as the deadline for achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity;
C.whereas the EU needs to acknowledge its responsibility to include gender perspectives in all areas of its external policies, such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid, trade, agriculture, climate and migration, in order to have an impact on the eradication of global female poverty;
D.whereas the feminist foreign policy concept aims to empower women and girls, resolving crises and reducing negative impact on women, girls and gender equality, including fighting female poverty; whereas the EU should strive to follow such a holistic approach in its external action;
E.whereas the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action stressed that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and the fulfilment of their human rights, are critical factors in the eradication of poverty; whereas there is a strong mutual interdependence between poverty, and social and political exclusion; whereas women’s poverty is a complex, multidimensional problem, with origins in both the national and international domains; whereas for this reason, combating all root causes and manifestations of women’s poverty is key; whereas these limit their ability to realise their full potential and enjoy their rights in society in order to lead sustainable livelihoods;
F.whereas women and girls continue to be disproportionately affected by poverty and the risk of social exclusion compared to men, in particular women and girls who experience intersectional forms of discrimination, based on sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, sexual orientation,(3) gender, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics; whereas, globally, 383 million women and girls are estimated to live on less than USD1,90 a day, compared with 368 million men and boys(4); whereas the female poverty rate is higher than that of men (12,8 vs 12,3%)(5);
G.whereas women’s poverty and the pay and pension gaps are the results of the accumulation of systemic and structural inequalities and discrimination; whereas harmful gender stereotypes and social norms still influence the division of labour at home, in education, in the workplace and in society and access to power, resources including access to finance or credit through various sources such as venture capital including women’s investment networks, land ownership and inheritance, and decision-making; whereas unpaid care and domestic work impose a disproportionate burden on women and girls, and those domestic and care responsibilities are not appropriately recognised;
H.whereas access to services, including childcare and long-term care services, affect women and girls in particular as they often fill the gaps in caregiving and family support, perpetuating women’s disproportionate responsibility for unpaid care;
I.whereas globally, women make up over 70% of workers in the health and care sector(6); whereas these kinds of jobs have systematically been undervalued because they have been, and still are, performed for free by women within households; whereas women are employed more on part-time contracts due to their disproportionate burden of unpaid care; whereas women are suffering in-work poverty that leads to social exclusion; whereas social, gender equality and economic impacts of those with care responsibilities should be urgently addressed;
J.whereas female-dominated sectors such as health and care are systemically underpaid and undervalued; whereas the promotion of economic independence requires recognising and implementing appropriate measures to ensure women’s equal participation in labour markets, equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, access to decent work opportunities as well as recognising the link between undervalued and underpaid work in female-dominated sectors;
K.whereas poverty exacerbates the impacts of gender-based violence on women and girls as increased economic difficulties make it harder for women in abusive relationships to leave their partner; whereas gender-based violence is a structural and societal problem that can be found across all socio-economic groups and is independent of origin or belief; whereas gender-based violence also contributes to poverty and social exclusion as violence dramatically affects health and can lead to the loss of one’s job and homelessness;
L.whereas poverty puts women at greater risk of trafficking and sexual exploitation as it makes them and their families economically dependent on their abusers;
M.whereas it is important to understand the links between poverty and access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR); whereas poverty together with other practical, legal, financial, cultural and social barriers can both lead to and be a result of inaccessibility of SRHR services for women, including safe and legal abortion and modern contraception; whereas delaying and denying access to safe and legal abortion care constitutes a form of violence against women and girls; whereas several human rights bodies have asserted that the denial of safe and legal abortion may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
N.whereas prevention, early detection, and treatment of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs), reproductive cancers, including cervical cancer, and fertility care and treatment are essential for saving lives;
O.whereas access to sanitary and period products is hindered by gender-biased taxation of period products deepening the issue of period poverty; whereas shame, untreated menstrual pain and discriminatory traditions and lack of water and sanitation facilities for menstrual hygiene management lead to school drop outs and lower attendance rates of girls at school and women at work;
P.whereas women’s economic independence and empowerment, ensuring equal pay for equal work and work of equal value, and the ability to participate equally in the labour market and in economic decision-making, are not only central to achieving gender equality, guaranteeing the realisation of women’s rights and ending poverty, but also beneficial to the economy and society as a whole; whereas equal pay for equal work and work of equal value, and the ability to participate equally in the labour market and in economic decision-making are prerequisites for equal economies and societies; whereas the promotion of economic independence requires, among other things, boosting women’s entrepreneurship and self-employment and should be accompanied by appropriate measures;
Q.whereas gender equality in the labour market is an important instrument in eliminating women’s poverty that benefits not only women but the economy as a whole, with a positive impact on GDP, employment levels and productivity; whereas improving gender equality would lead to an increase in the EU’s GDP per capita between 6,1 and 9,6% and an additional 10,5 million jobs, by 2050;
R.whereas crises, including climate change and all associated consequences including biodiversity loss, natural disasters, pandemics and armed conflicts, disproportionately affect women; whereas women and girls in vulnerable situations have less access to or control over resources needed to cope with and overcome crises; whereas crises are not-gender neutral and worsen social and gender inequalities; whereas parental and, in particular, maternal poverty often leads to child poverty;
S.whereas, since 2021, inflation has increased sharply, driven primarily by high energy and food costs; whereas wages are not projected to increase as fast as inflation, thus creating a cost of living crisis; whereas this crisis acutely threatens women’s livelihoods, health, well-being, economic independence, while limiting their ability to purchase basic necessities including food, housing and exacerbating energy poverty;
T.whereas the progress made in recent years in the EU in empowering women and fostering an equal society, with initiatives such as transparent recruitment procedures in companies or pay transparency, must be enhanced as they are essential to achieve gender equality, which is particularly important during times of crisis;
U.whereas investing in policies that empower women also improves the living conditions of their families, and in particular of their children; whereas single-parent families, the majority of which are headed by mothers, are at greater risk of poverty and bear a higher probability of transmission of generational poverty;
1.Addresses the following recommendations to the Council:
(a)
to reconfirm the EU’s unwavering commitment to the Beijing Platform for Action and subsequent review conferences and to the range of actions for gender equality outlined therein;
(b)
to ensure the full involvement of Ϸվ and its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in the decision-making process on the EU’s position at the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, to ensure that Ϸվ has adequate and timely information and access to the EU position document ahead of the negotiations, and to improve further interinstitutional cooperation and informal consultation, including prior to and during the negotiations, so that Ϸվ’s priorities are properly incorporated;
(c)
to underline the importance of a positive outcome of the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, to be held from 11 to 22March2024, including through the adoption of a set of forward-looking and ambitious commitments outlined in the political declaration;
(d)
to pledge its strong support for the work of UN Women, which is a central actor in the UN system for advancing the rights of women and girls in all their diversity and bringing together all relevant stakeholders in order to generate policy change and coordinate actions; to call on all UN member states, together with the EU, to ensure adequate funding for UN Women;
(e)
to ensure that the EU leads by example and shows strong leadership, while taking a unified position on the importance of empowering women and girls in all their diversity and achieving gender equality worldwide;
(f)
to ensure equal opportunities in education, in the labour market, as well as in political and economic decision-making, with equal access to economic and financial services;
(g)
to advocate for women’s and girl’s leadership and their full, equal and meaningful participation at all levels of decision-making, as the involvement of women in public and political life and decision-making is essential to good governance and policy making;
(h)
to apply gender mainstreaming as well as gender budgeting in all EU and Member State policy areas as these are globally acknowledged tools to implement women’s rights and reach gender equality;
(i)
to create and adjust the EU’s internal and external policies and programmes to better empower women and girls in all their diversity, and to respect, protect and fulfil their rights and ensure gender equality;
(j)
to address the multiple systemic root causes of women’s poverty globally, such as women’s over-representation in low-paid, precarious and part-time jobs, women’s career breaks to care for children and other family members, lack of access to labour markets and employment, the gender pay and pension gap, as well as under-representation of women in political and economic decision-making;
(k)
to point out the importance of promoting women’s and girl’s empowerment through education, training and lifelong learning, which are vital to fight harmful stereotypes and combat persisting inequalities that lead to poverty together with addressing women’s employment rate and under-representation in certain sectors like science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and artificial intelligence (AI);
(l)
to support and promote women’s entrepreneurship at all levels, by increasing their participation in the labour market, improving their financial independence, and recognising and promoting women as role models, mentors and job creators;
(m)
to ensure that concrete actions and adequate budget commitments are included in future EU strategies, programmes and policy initiatives to address the various aspects and causes of women’s poverty as flagged within the EU Gender Equality Strategy;
(n)
to stress and raise awareness of the devastating consequences of gender-based violence in society and in armed conflicts on women’s social exclusion and poverty and to underline the need for strong legislative national and international frameworks and for accountability of the perpetrators of such violence to be brought to justice and the right of victims to effective remedies and reparation;
(o)
to tackle and combat harmful traditional practices such as child and forced marriages and female genital mutilation;
(p)
to ensure measures to prevent girls from missing school during their periods by improving water sanitation, hygiene services and menstrual hygiene facilities on school premises and by tackling period poverty and combating stigmatisation in this area, including education and training for all; to ensure greater synergies between programmes addressing health, SRHR and water, sanitation and hygiene services in schools and personal support for girls;
(q)
to apply the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights through the implementation of a rights-based approach to guarantee fundamental social protection;
(r)
to ensure that Member States implement strong social security schemes, including the exploration of a minimum income, to ensure a safety net for all women, particularly for the most at risk of poverty and social exclusion, following the demands expressed by the EU citizens in the Conference on the Future of Europe;
(s)
to ensure that Member States prioritise the investment in social infrastructures and green jobs in order to assure the well-being and empowerment of women;
(t)
enhance public services including health services, quality and affordable public education and public transport and to recognise the vital role of accessible and reliable public transportation in enabling women’s participation in work and society;
(u)
to promote green jobs and invest in women’s full participation in the green transition as it is essential to advance towards a sustainable economy while ensuring gender equality in new and emerging sectors;
(v)
to recognise that energy poverty affects women disproportionately and put forward specific measures to support those in vulnerable situations while ensuring everyone has access to electricity, heating and cooling in the green energy transition;
(w)
to ensure access to SRHR, including age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality and relationship education for all, affordable modern contraception, safe and legal abortion care and other SRHR services as quality maternal health services;
(x)
to advocate, support and take concrete measures to realise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including by ensuring universal access to SRHR;
(y)
to take strong action to unequivocally denounce the current backlash and attacks against gender equality and SRHR, including from extreme right organisations and anti-democratic movements, to undermine women’s fundamental rights, their autonomy and emancipation in every field;
(z)
to strengthen and support civil society organisations and NGOs that are supporting women’s rights and their empowerment;
(aa)
to accelerate the implementation of international commitments already made, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Istanbul Convention, ILO Convention 190 and UNSCR 1325; to support new measures to empower women and girls and thus combat their poverty and social exclusion;
(ab)
to work to promote the concept of combating multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, throughout all UN bodies and the EU and its Member States;
(ac)
to reiterate the need for the EU to play a leading role at multilateral level in promoting feminist diplomacy in order to implement international agreements pertaining to the rights and empowerment of women and girls; calls for the EU, its Member States, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to commit to advancing towards a feminist foreign, security and development policy that entails a gender-transformative vision and to make gender equality a core part of their external actions and priorities;
(ad)
to take into account the need to strengthen gender mainstreaming and to utilise the principles of gender budgeting more effectively, also in EU external policies, to address gender inequality worldwide;
(ae)
to fully implement the EU Gender Action Plan III and ensure that 85% of all new actions throughout external relations by 2025 will contribute to gender equality and women’s empowerment; to apply the holistic and sustainable approach of a feminist foreign policy in all its external actions and policies;
(af)
to ensure comparable and age, sex, gender disaggregated data capturing of the situation of people facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination so as to improve data analysis and to inform the design and implementation of policies since less than half of the data required to monitor SDG 5 is currently available;
2.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights.
–having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 10May2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Serbia(1),
–having regard to the EU’s previous statements on Serbia, in particular the joint statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi of 19December2023 on the parliamentary elections,
–having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the international election observation mission (I-EOM) to the early parliamentary elections in Serbia of 17December2023,
–having regard to the joint opinion of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission of 19December2022 on the constitutional and legal framework governing the functioning of democratic institutions in Serbia – electoral law and electoral administration,
–having regard to the election observation report of the Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Ϸվary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 17January2024 entitled ‘Observation of the early parliamentary elections in Serbia (17December2023)’,
–having regard to the speech on the elections in Serbia of 17January2024 delivered by the Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Josep Borrell, in the Ϸվ plenary,
–having regard to the open letter on the post-election situation in Serbia signed by the chairs of the Committees on Foreign Affairs of several EU countries,
–having regard to its co-facilitated parliamentary dialogue process in Serbia,
–having regard to Serbia’s 2006 Constitution and its 2022 Law on Election of Members of Ϸվ,
–having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 01/2022 of 10January2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,
–having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas following the mass shootings in Belgrade and near Mladenovac in May2023, mass protests under the slogan ‘Serbia against violence’ were organised across Serbia; whereas on 1November2023, the President of Serbia cited demands by the opposition for early elections to dissolve the parliament; whereas he scheduled early parliamentary elections for 17December2023;
B.whereas since 2012, all parliamentary elections in Serbia but one have been early elections; whereas these were the third parliamentary elections in less than four years;
C.whereas following the sudden and simultaneous resignation of 65 mayors from the ruling party, including the Mayor of Belgrade, and the Assembly of the Autonomous region of Vojvodina’s decision to dissolve itself, despite stable majorities, early local elections in a third of Serbia’s municipalities and provincial elections in Vojvodina were called for the same day, 17December2023; whereas it is not good, long-standing practice to hold partial local and parliamentary elections on the same day; whereas numerous observers see the early partial local elections as a tool for the consolidation of power by the current government and a misuse of the voting rights of local communities;
D.whereas the elections unfolded amid heightened social polarisation and intense competition among contrasting political agendas; whereas they were marked by an unprecedented level of negative campaigning and fearmongering, as well as attacks against political opponents and journalists;
E.whereas prior to the election day, Serbia had failed to implement key recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, including those on ensuring a level playing field, measures to prevent the misuse of public office and state resources, separation between official duties and campaign activities, and effective mechanisms to prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, including vote buying;
F.whereas the overall campaign was characterised by even more extreme polarisation, aggressive rhetoric, personal discreditation, verbal abuse and inflammatory language; whereas pressure on public sector employees, misuse of public resources and voter inducement schemes raised concerns about voters’ abilities to make a choice free from undue pressure; whereas these practices, in addition to some challenges in accessing public venues for the opposition, tilted the playing field and blurred the line between the state and the governing party, at odds with international standards; whereas Russian-sponsored outlets Sputnik Serbia and Russia Today Balkan actively contributed to spreading disinformation, essentially about opposition candidates;
G.whereas the campaign was overwhelmingly dominated by the incumbent President Vučić, who despite not being a candidate for these elections, assumed a central role in daily campaigning through heavy involvement in events of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS); whereas the SNS-led list was named after Mr Vučić;
H.whereas the campaign and electronic media oversight bodies remained largely ineffective in deterring violations during the election period;
I.whereas an I-EOM was conducted by the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Ϸվary Assembly, the Ϸվary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Ϸվ in order to determine whether the elections complied with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections and with national legislation;
J.whereas voter lists were updated through the unified voter register and the final number of voters stood at 6500666; whereas it was alleged that numerous deceased persons remained on the register;
K.whereas voter turnout was 58,58%, slightly higher than for the previous elections, held in 2022;
L.whereas despite the fact that 43% of the 2817 parliamentary candidates were women and that efforts to promote women’s participation have been made, women remain generally under-represented in elected and appointed offices;
M.whereas the elections were, overall, conducted smoothly, but the day was marked by numerous procedural deficiencies, including the inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, numerous instances of group voting and isolated physical attacks;
N.whereas according to the Serbian Republic Election Commission (REC) the SNS won 46,75% of the votes, while the largest opposition coalition, ‘Serbia against Violence’ won 23,66%, the Socialist Party of Serbia won 6,55%, the NADA coalition won 5,02%, ‘We – the Voice of the People’ won 4,69% and five minority lists won a combined total of 3,68%;
O.whereas the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the I-EOM highlighted that ‘the 17December early parliamentary elections, though technically well-administered and offering voters a choice of political alternatives, were dominated by the decisive involvement of the President which together with the ruling party’s systemic advantages created unjust conditions’; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR final report is expected to be published in the coming weeks;
P.whereas the main allegations of irregularities during election day concern Belgrade in particular, where ‘phantom voters’ from other Serbian municipalities that were not holding elections that day, as well as from neighbouring countries, were being registered by the authorities at apartments where they did not live; whereas there were multiple allegations of voters living abroad being organised and bussed to Serbia by the ruling party to cast their ballots for local elections in Belgrade;
Q.whereas Serbian civil society organisation CRTA carried out an in-depth analysis, based on limited data and resources, and made the very conservative estimate that inaccuracies in the voter register account for at least 30000 voters; whereas they have firm evidence that this inaccuracy was part of a strategy of illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering to influence the election results and distort the will of the voters; whereas people were being transported from all over Serbia and abroad (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) to vote in municipal elections in Belgrade; whereas even government officials and politicians from BiH openly voted in the Belgrade municipal elections; whereas the Serbian Government has defended this practice as legitimate;
R.whereas other substantive allegations of irregularities include vote buying, media bias, pressure on public sector employees and socially vulnerable groups, misuse of public resources, intimidation and ballot-stuffing;
S.whereas the Serbian authorities deny any irregularities; whereas both the Serbian President and Kremlin-controlled media have alleged that other countries have interfered in the electoral process in Serbia in brutal ways, but have not provided substantiated evidence for these claims; whereas Prime Minister Brnabić publicly thanked the Russian intelligence services for providing information on the planned activities of the opposition; whereas the dissemination of Russian disinformation and narratives are a profound and persistent problem in Serbia, in particular during election campaigns; whereas the Kremlin has condemned the public protests against Serbia’s defrauded general elections as Western attempts to overthrow the government and orchestrate another ‘Maidan coup’;
T.whereas independent Serbian organisations denouncing the irregularities during the recent elections have been subjected to continuous attacks from government officials; whereas despite the fact that they brought to light a lot of concrete evidence pointing to election fraud, the Serbian authorities have so far refused to investigate these claims of irregularities and have instead tried to discredit and intimidate the election observers who published accounts of the irregularities; whereas since the elections, leading Serbian politicians, including the President, have unjustly vilified Members of the European Ϸվ and other members of the I-EOM;
U.whereas the results of the elections, especially the municipal elections in Belgrade, were challenged by the opposition, leading to large peaceful demonstrations initiated by the opposition coalition ‘Serbia against Violence’ and the non-partisan association ProGlas to demand the annulment of the elections and the holding of a new ballot; whereas the REC has rejected the opposition’s complaints; whereas the opposition has called for the annulment of the election results before the Constitutional Court due to allegations of widespread fraud;
V.whereas a protest on 24December2023 turned violent when some of the protesters stormed the Belgrade City Assembly, after which police arrested 38 people, including students, who were prosecuted for challenging the constitutional order and of whom some still remain under house arrest; whereas several peaceful demonstrators claimed that masked hooligans had infiltrated the demonstrations; whereas the peaceful demonstrators also denounced the police’s disproportionate use of force;
W.whereas over the past decade since President Vučić came to power, there has been a continuous erosion of media freedom in Serbia, characterised by political pressure, threats and even physical attacks against journalists; whereas Reporters Without Borders has placed Serbia among the lowest in Europe in its World Press Freedom Index, with the country dropping 12 places to 91 in 2023;
X.whereas the rule of law and the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions remain a core challenge for Serbia’s EU accession process;
1.Deplores the fact that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17December2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections, owing to the incumbents’ persistent and systematic abuse of institutions and media in order to gain an unfair and undue advantage; considers that these elections cannot be deemed to have been held in fair conditions; is alarmed by reports of the widespread and systematic scale of fraud that compromised the integrity of the elections in Serbia;
2.Notes that the I-EOM stated that the election was conducted smoothly, but that the day was marked by numerous procedural deficiencies, including the inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches of voting secrecy, and numerous instances of group voting; expresses its serious concern over those irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology;
3.Notes with serious concern the extensive evidence collected by the international and domestic observers showing activities leading up to and during election day that may have altered the outcome of the elections and may have critically impacted the results of the Belgrade municipal elections, in particular, and seriously undermined the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections;
4.Calls for an independent international investigation by respected international legal experts and institutions into the irregularities of the parliamentary, provincial and municipal elections, with special attention to the elections to the Belgrade City Assembly, as certain allegations, including those regarding organised voter migration at local level, go beyond the scope covered by the OSCE/ODIHR reports; supports the prompt deployment of an ad hoc fact-finding mission to Serbia, with the participation of Ϸվ;
5.Urges the Commission to launch an initiative to send an expert mission to Serbia to assess the situation as regards the recent elections and post-election developments in an effort to facilitate the preconditions for establishing a necessary societal dialogue to attempt to restore the public’s trust and confidence in institutions, and to assess and address the systemic rule of law issues in Serbia, looking at the example of the ‘Priebe Reports’;
6.Deplores the lack of institutional response to the serious allegations of the incumbents’ involvement in electoral manipulation and abuse, which contributes to an atmosphere of impunity and ensures the continuation of these practices; Notes, with concern, that some of the election irregularities leading up to the December2023 elections constitute potential breaches of Serbian law and its Constitution; stresses that, if allowed to persist without any repercussions, this practice will continue to undermine trust in Serbia’s electoral process and institutions, irrevocably hindering democratic rule and further European integration; stresses the importance of thoroughly investigating all election-related complaints, including the recent request to annul the Belgrade City Assembly elections of 17December2023, which was filed with the Constitutional Court by an official of the ‘Serbia against Violence’ coalition;
7.Deplores the lack of prosecutions and sanctions related to offences during the elections, including serious allegations of unlawful manipulation of the voter register and voting rights, pressure and intimidation against citizens and election candidates, cases of corruption, the forging of citizens’ signatures, clientelism, the illegitimate and unlawful abuse of citizen data, abuses of state office and a lack of effective mechanisms to prevent incumbents from gaining an unfair institutional advantage in elections;
8.Urges the Serbian authorities to investigate, prosecute and bring to justice those responsible for any criminal offences during the elections, and any attacks on students;
9.Condemns the orchestrated attacks by Serbian officials on election observers, including Members of the European Ϸվ and calls for a return to respectful and constructive discourse, emphasising the importance of mutual respect in the democratic process; is deeply concerned by the attempts to discredit and intimidate the observers; urges the Serbian authorities to take all necessary steps to avoid any further disinformation campaigns against election observers and to establish conditions that allow national and international election observers to effectively do their work, as well as to protect them from any violence, threats, retaliation, adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of their legitimate exercise of their rights and freedoms; commends the work of the domestic observers from the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA) and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID);
10.Is concerned about the ‘passivisation’ of the residential addresses of certain categories of citizens, including in Belgrade and southern Serbia, which deprives them of the right to vote; calls on the responsible authorities to remedy these serious violations of electoral rights without further delay;
11.Urges the Republic of Serbia to address concerns about the participation of national minorities in the electoral process, ensuring the consistent application of criteria for minority status and addressing vulnerabilities to pressure and vote buying;
12.Calls on the Serbian authorities to provide institutional solutions to overcome the current problems; calls for the Serbian Ϸվ and Government to make every effort to function effectively, free from the constant cycle of campaigns and frequent snap elections;
13.Urges the Serbian authorities to restore the electorate’s confidence in the entire process, lay out fully transparent election procedures and ensure accountability on the part of authorities, whether they are conducting elections or interfering with them; calls on Serbian authorities to fully and substantially cooperate with the ODIHR, the EU and the Council of Europe and to facilitate an inclusive process to shore up election-related rights and freedoms, institutions and processes, with the participation of domestic election observers and political parties; welcomes any genuine steps in this direction;
14.Notes, with concern, that Serbia has not implemented many long-standing OSCE/ODIHR recommendations on major issues in the electoral process, despite being repeatedly urged to do so, including by the Commission; takes note of the recent amendments that selectively addressed some of the previous OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations, notably those referring to the legal framework for election campaign finance;
15.Looks forward to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR I-EOM; urges Serbia to implement the recommendations set out in the joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 19December2022 on the constitutional and legal framework governing the functioning of democratic institutions in Serbia, in consultation with expert civil society organisations and well ahead of the next elections, in order to prevent new irregularities and fraud while guaranteeing the democratic functioning of the country, in particular those regarding the competing candidates’ access to the media, the enhanced transparency and accountability of campaign finance, measures to tackle pressure on voters and the misuse of administrative resources;
16.Calls on Serbia to implement the OSCE/ODIHR recommendation to conduct a comprehensive audit of the unified voter register to address concerns about accuracy, including allegations of voter migration and entries of deceased persons; is concerned about over allegations that the unified voter register has already recorded significant increases of voters in cities where local elections will take place later in 2024;
17.Urges the REC to take the necessary steps to address concerns about the transparency and efficiency of its functioning, including the timely publication of monitoring results during the campaign period;
18.Condemns the absence of media pluralism during the election campaign, as well as disinformation and the widespread unethical and biased media reporting in favour of the incumbents; notes, with concern, that a large number of media outlets are influenced or controlled by the government, which resulted in an uneven playing field for opposition candidates during the campaign; condemns the attacks instigated by media outlets close to the government against critical journalists; deplores the President of Serbia’s overwhelming public exposure before and during the campaign, as it erased the lines between the institution of the president, the state and the political party in power;
19.Is concerned that despite new laws on electronic media and on public information and media, the conditions and pluralism in the media have deteriorated; strongly regrets that the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) neglected its obligations under the law to scrutinise the campaign in the media, report on its findings and sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, that the REM has only published monitoring results for the public broadcaster and private cable channels, but not for private national channels close to the ruling party;
20.Expresses its concerns about cases of abusive attacks and language combined with harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, in some instances coming from government officials, particularly prior to the elections; urges the Serbian authorities to counter foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, to strongly improve the protection of independent journalism and to ensure a transparent media landscape; underlines that the EU institutions must do more to ensure that the rights and freedoms of Serbian journalists and media are protected; points out that access to pre-accession funding should be used as a tool to stop the media freedom situation from deteriorating further;
21.Calls for a reform of the effectiveness of the campaign oversight mechanisms, including of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the ad hoc Committee for Campaign Oversight, to ensure timely and transparent handling of complaints related to the misuse of public resources;
22.Highlights that Serbia, as a candidate country for EU membership, lacks sufficiently implemented basic EU and international democratic standards; calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure that there are enough democratic guarantees in place to hold the next regular local elections in 2024, as well as future elections;
23.Notes that all Serbian Ϸվs in the past 12 years but one were dissolved early and that the continuation of unnecessary snap elections undermines political stability; underlines that constant early elections, permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments do not contribute to efficient democratic governance of the country, but instead weaken the parliament and lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy;
24.Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and acknowledges that everyone has the right to express their views and participate in peaceful protests; condemns, in this context, the disproportionate use of police violence against peaceful demonstrators protesting against electoral fraud; is concerned about allegations that agent provocateurs infiltrated the protests to trigger the intervention of the police; is concerned about assessments that some participants in the protest on 24December2023 received disproportionately harsh treatment by the police and the judiciary, in stark contrast to the practices of the Serbian police in previous protests in the country; urges the EU and Member States’ diplomatic missions to continue monitoring the ongoing legal cases related to the protests;
25.Strongly condemns the Serbian authorities’ unsubstantiated claims that EU Member States were involved in organising post-election protests; regrets that the protests have been used as an excuse to spread anti-EU narratives in the media close to the ruling party;
26.Regrets the lack of vocal criticism by the Commission, notably by the Commissioner for Enlargement, regarding the numerous allegations of voter fraud in the Serbian elections, and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings that have led to these allegations without delay;
27.Reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should advance only if the country makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, including full implementation of the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply strict conditionality; calls on the Commission to follow up thoroughly on the reports of the European Court of Auditors and to immediately start the audit of the funding provided to the Serbian Government under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance III (IPA III) and other financial instruments; underlines that if the Serbian authorities are unwilling to implement key election recommendations or if the findings of this investigation indicate that the Serbian authorities were directly involved in the voter fraud, calls for the suspension of EU funding on the basis of severe breaches of the rule of law in connection with Serbia’s elections;
28.Undertakes to closely monitor post-electoral developments in Serbia and commits to supporting reforms that strengthen democracy and help Serbia to advance on the path towards EU accession; stresses that it has always endeavoured to support political pluralism and the reinforcement of an inclusive election environment in Serbia through all its activities, in particular through the inter-party dialogue and the parliamentary dialogue process; underlines the importance of continuing the inter-party dialogue and the parliamentary dialogue process; calls for the EU to co-facilitate an internal and meaningful dialogue in Serbia between the government and the opposition in order to overcome the current climate of deep political polarisation; considers Ϸվ, against this background, to be the most suitable institution to act as a constructive facilitator;
29.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Ϸվary Assembly, and the Ϸվary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
–having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
–having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
–having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the related case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
–having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
–having regard to the judgment of the CJEU of 5June2018 in case C-673/16,
–having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
–having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (‘the Istanbul Convention’), which was ratified by the European Union on 28June2023,
–having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to the UN Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
–having regard to the Yogyakarta Principles and on the application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics,
–having regard to the Commission communication of 12November2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (),
–having regard to its resolution of 14September2021 on LGBTIQ rights in the EU(1),
–having regard to the Commission’s progress report on the implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025,
–having regard to its resolution of 11March2021 on the declaration of the EU as an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone(2),
–having regard to its resolution of 17September2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law(3),
–having regard to its resolution of 8July2021 on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Ϸվ(4),
–having regard to its resolution of 20October2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(5),
–having regard to its resolution of 20April2023 on the universal decriminalisation of homosexuality in the light of recent developments in Uganda(6),
–having regard to the Commission proposal of 7December2022 for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood (),
–having regard to the study by its Directorate-General for Ϸվary Research Services ofDecember2023 entitled ‘The LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 – Implementation overview’(7),
–having regard to the EU Guidelines for Strategies and Action Plans to Enhance LGBTIQ Equality prepared by the Commission in 2022,
–having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/442 of 24January2024 on the request for registration, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Ϸվ and of the Council, of the European citizens’ initiative entitled Ban on conversion practices in the European Union(8),
–having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12December2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,
–having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0030/2024),
A.whereas LGBTIQ+ rights are fundamental rights, and checks and balances as regards the rule of law and democracy are crucial for the protection of LGBTIQ rights; whereas the safety and dignity of LGBTIQ+ people is the safety and dignity of all of us;
B.whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter, and should be fully respected;
C.whereas equality and the protection of minorities are among the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;
D.whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes that every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;
E.whereas all Member States have assumed obligations and duties under international law and the EU Treaties to respect, guarantee, protect and fulfil fundamental rights;
F.whereas progress has been made in protecting and promoting LGBTIQ+ rights in some Member States;
G.whereas discrimination based on actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) persists throughout the EU;
H.whereas developments in some Member States have shown that progress on LGBTIQ+ rights cannot be taken for granted;
I.whereas in 2022, the Commission together with Ϸվ and 15 Member States, referred Hungary to the CJEU over violations of LGBTIQ rights;
J.whereas Latvia should join the LGBTIQ Equality Subgroup set up under the High-Level Group on Nondiscrimination, Equality and Diversity – as the last Member State to do so after Cyprus recently expressed its interest – with the goal to enhance implementation of the LGBTIQ strategy in all Member States;
K.whereas Ϸվ condemned, in the strongest possible terms, discriminatory laws, policies and practices against LGBTIQ+ people, such as the ‘Anti-Homosexuality Bill’ in Uganda;
L.whereas on 30November2023 Russia’s Supreme Court banned the ‘international LGBT movement’ declaring it an extremist organisation; whereas this decision is a severe attack against LGBTIQ+ people and human rights defenders in Russia and it will have a grave impact on their situation; whereas LGBTIQ+ people in China have experienced increased harassment and censorship, including online;
M.whereas the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) Europe’s 2023 Annual Review has documented the highest numbers of acts of violence against LGBTIQ+ persons in 12 years;
N.whereas the growth of anti-rights rhetoric, including by elected politicians has contributed to creating a hostile environment for LGBTIQ+ persons and those advocating LGBTIQ+ rights;
O.whereas building safe, free, inclusive societies for LGBTIQ+ persons implies addressing multiple and intersectional manifestations of discrimination, exclusion and violence;
P.whereas LGBTIQ+ persons face discrimination and violence worldwide;
Q.whereas the European Union has made commitments to promote and protect LGBTIQ+ rights worldwide;
R.whereas all forms and manifestations of hatred and intolerance, including hate speech and hate crime, are incompatible with the EU values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU;
S.whereas so-called ‘conversion practices’ can rely on different methods such as electroshocks, taking hormones or exorcism rites that amount to practices of torture; and it is estimated that 2% of LGBTIQ+ persons in the EU have been actually submitted to such ‘conversion practices’ and 5% have been offered conversion, although the real figures could be much higher;
T.whereas the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) entitled ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’ was submitted to the Commission on 27November2023; whereas it calls for the EU to take action to propose a binding legal ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ citizens in the European Union; whereas the Commission fully registered this ECI on 21January2024;
Main conclusions
1.Welcomes the Commission’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, adopted by the European Commission on 12November2020 (), and its recent Progress Report on the implementation of the Strategy; notes the European Commission’s commitment to support Member States in their implementation of the Strategy, expresses deep concern about the disparities in openness to the Strategy between the Member States; welcomes the efforts by the European Commission to advance equality for LGBTIQ+ persons in all fields included in the Strategy; regrets that certain key actions originally envisaged by the Commission have not been implemented so far;
2.Acknowledges the progress made for the implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 while stressing that real equality for LGBTIQ+ persons in the EU is still far away from current reality; expresses concern about the discrimination and violence suffered by LGBTIQ+ persons in the EU and their consequences for the full enjoyment of free and dignified lives;
3.Deplores the fact that the horizontal anti-discrimination directive has been blocked in the Council since 2008; considers that any update to this proposal by the Commission must build on Ϸվ’s position, address intersectional discrimination and explicitly prohibit discrimination on any combination of grounds listed in the Charter; regrets that the Council has ignored these requests and urges the Council to integrate them in its mandate and to take all appropriate actions to fight discrimination in the EU;
4.Calls for the inclusion of all the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics in the EU anti-discrimination legislation, based on a broad interpretation of the grounds of sexual orientation and sex and the principle of equality between women and men set forth in the Treaties; notes that this will ensure legal certainty and comprehensiveness of the protection of LGBTIQ+ people;
5.Underlines that LGBTIQ+ persons are disproportionately affected by homelessness, poverty and socio-economic exclusion; expresses concern with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost of living and housing crisis over the lives of LGBTIQ+ people; reiterates that housing is a fundamental right;
6.Regrets that despite EU legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment and occupation, LGBTIQ+ persons still face barriers to accessing employment, in particular decent jobs; expresses the view that LGBTIQ+ rights are workers’ rights;
7.Underlines that discrimination on the grounds of actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex still has a significant impact on LGBTIQ+ people’s physical, mental and sexual health and well-being; regrets that LGBTIQ+ people still face discrimination in accessing healthcare; underlines that access to healthcare should be offered as a universal, timely and accessible public service;
8.Emphasises the need for an inclusive and safe education for LGBTIQ+ persons in all Member States, especially for LGBTIQ+ youths;
9.Regrets that LGBTIQ+ people still face discrimination in some Member States regarding access to social protection, social security, access to the supply of goods and other sectors or services;
10.Regrets that older LGBTIQ+ people are particularly affected by the lack of LGBTIQ+ rights, further exacerbating a sense of social isolation and barriers to access to essential services; highlights that the older LGBTIQ+ population is often neglected in the design of public policies and of projects, including in those tailored for LGBTIQ+ people; underlines that the older LGBTIQ+ population is disproportionately affected by poverty and the lack of access to decent housing and adequate care networks; underlines that a European LGBTIQ Freedom Zone cannot leave anyone behind;
11.Stresses that care services for LGBTIQ+ people must always ensure the dignity, independence, autonomy, well-being and participation in social life of those receiving it, including the possibility of home-care and of community-based services;
12.Notes that LGBTIQ+ people in rural, peripheral and outermost regions face particular challenges and barriers to their access to essential services;
13.Expresses deep concern over LGBTIQ+ persons needing to exercise their right to request asylum in the European Union; expresses concern that trans and intersex persons face additional obstacles in the process of applying for asylum; underlines the importance that the situation of LGBTIQ+ persons is taken into account when designing the Union's asylum and migration policy;
14.Expresses deep concern with the rise of hate speech, hate crimes and violence against LGBTIQ+ persons, including in online platforms, where it could lead to breaching privacy rights of viewers of LGBTIQ+ content; recalls the need for preventive and protective public policy regarding bias-motivated hate speech, hate crimes and violence against LGBTIQ+ persons; recognises there is an under-reporting of cases of hate speech and crimes against LGBTIQ+ people, due to a lack of trust and confidence in public authorities to tackle such crimes;
15.Condemns the fact that the rise of far-right political forces has motivated an increase in the stigmatisation, harassment, violence and persecution of LGBTIQ+ persons and LGBTIQ+ civil society organisations and activists; condemns the increasing scapegoating of the LGBTIQ+ community and the harmful designation of the promotion of LGBTIQ+ rights as an ‘ideology’;
16.Underlines the need for the EU to address the situation of LGBTIQ+ persons in formal negotiations with candidate countries and to support all enlargement countries to close legislative gaps and secure fundamental rights of LGBTIQ+ persons;
17.Insists that the EU needs to take a common approach to the legal recognition of same-sex marriages and partnerships, and of rainbow parents, including trans parents, and to legal gender recognition, to ensure the best interests of children in line with CJEU and ECtHR case law;
18.Highlights the challenges faced by trans, non-binary and intersex people in the EU, particularly as regards their socio-economic and sociodemographic status; underlines how the absence of legal gender recognition procedures or barriers to accessing them in Member States violate the rights and hinder the aspirations of trans, non-binary and intersex people across the Union;
19.Insists that rainbow families have a right to free movement in the EU, and the children of rainbow families should not be discriminated against in acquiring EU citizenship;
20.Expresses concern that facial recognition and profiling technology might create greater risks for LGBTIQ+ people, in particular for trans and non-binary and intersex people;
21.Regrets the lack of a cohesive overview of EU funding for LGBTIQ+ equality under the different programmes supporting the Strategy;
22.Emphasises the urgency for the Commission to ensure access to funding for civil society organisations (CSOs) working for the human rights of LGBTIQ+ persons in the Union and in third countries; notes that adequate and flexible funding to CSOs advocating for LGBTIQ+ rights is an essential enabling condition for the protection and promotion of LGBTIQ+ rights, in the European Union and in third countries;
23.Welcomes EU initiatives directed at protecting LGBTIQ+ human rights defenders and at facilitating their work of defending fundamental rights; emphasises the need for the EU to continue tackling the stigmatisation, intimidation, harassment of LGBTIQ+ human rights defenders across the world: welcomes the Commission’s support of LGBTIQ+ activists in Ukraine, especially through the ‘direct award’ modality since the start of the Russian invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine;
24.Recalls that European humanitarian aid should be gender-, age-, protection- and LGBTIQ+-sensitive, while taking into consideration intersectionality as a cross-cutting principle, and in line with humanitarian principles;
25.Underlines that the EU must leave no one behind in the protection of fundamental rights;
Recommendations
26.Calls for the EU and the Member States to ensure the true mainstreaming of LGBTIQ+ rights across all EU policies; calls for policies to cover grounds of multiple and intersectional discrimination, which can be based on, among other grounds, socio-economic status, age, race, religion, actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics or disability; calls for policies to consider the particular contexts of rural, peripheral and outermost regions;
27.Calls for the EU and the Member States to include SOGIESC in the grounds taken into account in the EU anti-discrimination legislation, in line with Ϸվ’s mandate on the proposal for a directive on standards for equality bodies(9);
28.Calls for the EU and the Member States to involve LGBTIQ+ persons in policymaking, including in the design and implementation of socio-economic and housing and education policies; calls on the Member States to tackle the cost of living and housing crisis, including by defining specific measures for the LGBTIQ+ people;
29.Calls on the Member States to implement the Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation;
30.Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood to protect the rights of all children by ensuring that their parental ties, including particularly same-sex parents, established in one Member State are recognised in all EU Member States; asks the Commission to explore the potential of other legal bases in the Treaties, notably Article 19 and 21 TFEU, to ensure that LGBTIQ+ persons’ marriages, partnerships, parenthood and family lives are fully and unconditionally recognised by all Member States without discrimination and obstacles to free movement;
31.Welcomes the Commission decision of 15July2021 to start legal action against Member States for violations of fundamental rights of LGBTIQ+ people; calls on the Commission to continue to monitor closely the implementation of EU law in the Member States and to launch infringement procedures in cases where the fundamental rights of LGBTIQ+ persons have been violated under Article 2 TEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights or secondary legislation, where applicable; calls on the Commission to systemically have recourse to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before CJEU;
32.Calls on the Commission to ensure that Member States comply with the judgments of the CJEU and ECtHR, by addressing cases of non-compliance using the actions under Article 260(2) TFEU and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, in particular on LGBTIQ+ persons and rainbow families crossing borders within the EU;
33.Calls on all Member States to adhere to the Guidelines for Strategies and Action Plans to Enhance LGBTIQ Equality(10) as prepared by the LGBTIQ Equality Subgroup;
34.Calls on the Member States to expand coverage of healthcare services, allowing LGBTIQ+ persons to seek specific care, including sexual and reproductive health and technologies; urges the Commission and the Member States to adopt measures to combat discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons in the health sector;
35.Calls on the Member States to provide greater funding for the provision of services for victims of gender-based violence and for them to support LGBTIQ+ victims, in particular LGBTIQ+ women, addressing their specific needs and experiences;
36.Recalls the need to ensure that facial recognition and profiling technologies are guided by the principles of transparency, explainability, fairness, and accountability in order to address the biases and risks created for LGBTIQ+ people;
37.Calls for the EU to give access to asylum to LGBTIQ+ persons, including those from third countries classified as safe countries;
38.Calls on the Commission to ensure support for LGBTIQ+ equality in action under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, as announced in the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and include said support in the Work Programme 2023-2025;
39.Calls on the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to swiftly finalise its practical guidance on applicants with SOGIESC and for Member States to then adhere to this guidance;
40.Calls on the Commission to monitor the impacts and fund CSOs and academic projects investigating the anti-gender movement, in order to effectively address it;
41.Calls on the Commission and Member States to draw from the empirical and systematic knowledge built by CSOs and academic researchers when designing policies and programmes to support LGBTIQ+ people in Europe and around the world;
42.Calls for the Union and Member States to recognise actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics as bias-motivations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to address hate speech, hate crimes and violence motivated by SOGIESC bias, including online; welcomes the Commission’s initiative to extend the list of EU crimes in Article 83(1) TFEU to hate speech and hate crimes, which would allow for establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions applicable in all EU Member States; highlights the need to ensure a robust EU criminal law response to hate speech and hate crime; strongly regrets that almost two years have passed since the publication of the Commission communication and that the Council has made no progress on it, even though it was able to swiftly expand the list of EU crimes for other purposes; regrets such inaction in the light of the increase in hate speech and hate crimes; reiterates its call on the Council to work diligently towards a consensus so that the Commission can initiate the second stage of the procedure;
43.Urges the Commission to take forward a programme of work to raise awareness and encourage the reporting of SOGIESC bias-motivated hate crimes; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure police and judicial officers receive training on LGBTIQ+ issues, to better support LGBTIQ+ people and adequately investigate and prosecute cases of hate crimes;
44.Calls on the Commission to explore the EU legal framework and the possible avenues that could be followed to counter and ban conversion practices at EU level, and push Member States to ban ‘conversion practices’ on the grounds of SOGIESC;
45.Welcomes, as a first step, the Commission’s formal registration of the ECI entitled ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’, as doing so recognises the legal grounds at European level to act on this issue; expresses its support for this ECI; calls on the Commission to act on it and to propose legal acts based on the Treaties and the ECI Regulation(11);
46.Calls for a ban on genital mutilation, in particular intersex genital mutilation and female genital mutilation;
47.Calls on Member States to continue to exchange best practices on safeguarding the fundamental rights of intersex children;
48.Calls for a ban on forced abortions and on forced sterilisations; underlines the importance of LGBTIQ+ persons’ right to self-determination, autonomy and physical and mental health; underlines that the position of Ϸվ on the proposal for a directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence includes adding FGM, IGM and forced sterilisation to the list of EU crimes;
49.Calls on the Member States to recognise marriage and parenthood of same-gender couples for the purposes of exercising rights derived from EU law, as required by the CJEU;
50.Calls on the Member States to put in place accessible legal gender recognition legislation and procedures, with the support of the Commission;
51.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote safe and inclusive environments in education, culture, sports and other sectors;
52.Calls on the Member States to take further steps to guarantee equal rights for LGBTIQ+ people with disabilities, through explicit protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity that are needed in all areas of life including employment, housing, education, public accommodations, and credit;
53.Calls on the Member States to implement the Council Recommendations on Pathways to School Success, and especially to include measures against the discrimination of LGBTIQ+ persons, particularly LGBTIQ+ youths, to ensure safe and inclusive education;
54.Urges the Commission and the Member States to step up measures to address bullying and harassment of LGBTIQ+ children and young people in schools and to raise awareness of those cases; underlines that such situations contribute to social exclusion;
55.Calls on the Commission to expand the Erasmus+ funding under the topic ‘Promoting LGBT+ equality’ through active communication efforts in cooperation with national authorities;
56.Calls for the EU to set an example and assume a leadership role on the promotion of LGBTIQ+ rights around the world, in line with its human rights guidelines on non-discrimination in external action;
57.Calls on the Commission to instate a Special Representative for LGBTIQ+ Equality in the European External Action Service in order to ensure a horizontal implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 abroad;
58.Expresses concern about the state of LGBTIQ+ rights worldwide; calls on the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS) to use development policy as a tool to enforce reforms in developing countries, to address the setback in the recognition and protection of these rights and to ensure rights for LGBTIQ+ persons;
59.Calls on the Commission to ensure that LGBTIQ+ persons are given support as part of budgetary and funding instruments, as well as of wider development aid programmes;
60.Calls on the Commission to support candidate countries and potential candidate countries in the implementation of EU legislation, including in the field of LGBTIQ+ rights, and monitor their progress;
61.Calls on the Commission to further improve the possibility of regranting and to provide flexible funding to enable small, grassroots human rights defenders and other civil society actors working on the promotion of LGBTIQ+ rights to access such funding, in the Union and in third countries, in accordance with EU law;
62.Calls on the Commission to further improve its communication about funding opportunities to promote LGBTIQ+ equality, particularly in Member States where equality has faced setbacks;
63.Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States manage EU funds in compliance with the Charter, with the inclusion of the right to non-discrimination, as required by a horizontal ‘enabling condition’ under the Common Provisions Regulation(12) (CPR); stresses that no expenditure can be reimbursed by the Commission until the applicable enabling conditions have been fulfilled;
64.Calls for the EU to continue tackling the stigmatisation and harassment of LGBTIQ+ human rights defenders (HRDs) and protecting HRDs in third countries; urges the EU to extend such mechanism to human rights defenders in the EU, allowing protecting LGBTIQ+ HRDs in Member States;
65.Urges the EU to extend such protections to HRDs in EU Member States;
66.Calls on the Commission to step up data collection on discrimination based on SOGIESC and to use this data in making inclusive public policies tailored for LGBTIQ+ persons and to support the Member States’ use of this data;
67.Calls on all Member States to self-assess their progress in implementing the LGBTIQ Strategy and share their results with the Commission and Ϸվ;
68.Calls on all Member States to adopt national LGBTIQ+ action plans and strategies until 2025;
69.Calls on the Commission to draw up a new LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy for 2025-2030, based on strong commitments, reflecting the Charter, the calls and expectations of Ϸվ, of CSOs and of LGBTIQ+ persons in Europe and around the world; ask the Commission to communicate a time line on the next LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy before the 2024 European Ϸվ elections;
70.Calls on the Commission to ensure that the next LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy is driven by a more robust instrument, accompanied by a target-oriented implementation plan, a strong mainstreaming structure ensuring LGBTIQ+ rights are mainstreamed across all EU policies including all grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics and resource allocation; to include a timeline and milestones, ensuring the monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning processes, including the consultation of LGBTIQ+ organisations; further calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to groups in vulnerable situations, such as LGBTIQ+ children and youth;
71.Calls on the Commission to secure a portfolio for an Equality and Diversity Commissioner in the next term;
72.Encourages the introduction of an LGBTIQ+ rights coordinator in the EU Commission;
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73.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and candidate countries, and the subnational parliaments and local authorities of the Member States and candidate countries.
Commission proposal of 7December2022 for a directive of the European Ϸվ and of the Council on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and deleting Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC and Article 11 of Directive 2010/41/EU ().
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27November2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16).
Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24June2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159).
Association agreements for the participation of third countries in Union programmes
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European Ϸվ resolution of 8 February 2024 on association agreements for the participation of third countries in Union programmes ()
–having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and particularly Article 218 thereof,
–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Ϸվ and of the Council of 28April2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013(1) (the Horizon Europe Regulation), and to the statement on association agreements made in Ϸվ’s position at first reading of 17April2019 on that Regulation(2),
–having regard to the Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part(3),
–having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the participation of New Zealand in Union programmes(4),
–having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part, on the participation of the Faroe Islands in Union programmes(5),
–having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/1526 of 9September2022 authorising the opening of negotiations with Canada for an Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Canada in Union programmes and on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027)(6),
–having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2023/1081 of 15May2023 authorising the opening of negotiations with Japan for an Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Japan in Union programmes and on the association of Japan to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027)(7),
–having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2023/1093 of 15May2023 authorising the opening of negotiations with the Republic of Korea for an Agreement on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Korea in Union programmes and on the association of the Republic of Korea to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027)(8),
–having regard to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Ϸվ and the European Commission of 20November2010(9),
–having regard to the question to the Commission on association agreements for the participation of third countries in Union programmes (O-000004/2024 – B9-0009/2024),
–having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
–having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,
General considerations
1.Acknowledges the potential to enrich the achievements of Union programmes through active and mutually beneficial cooperation with third countries that share common democratic values with the EU;
2.Recognises Horizon Europe as the world’s biggest collaborative research and innovation programme for the period 2021-2027;
3.Supports the association to Horizon Europe of third countries that have good capacity in science, technology and innovation and recognises that such collaboration contributes to the overall strength and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; encourages the Commission to seek and conclude other association agreements with third countries, as this increases the competitiveness of the EU on the global stage; stresses the need to ensure that all relevant association agreements uphold the Horizon Europe climate targets;
4.Underlines that the association of third countries to EU programmes is not a mere technical act, but rather a political decision concerning the associated countries’ relations with the EU and, specifically for Horizon Europe, the issue of scientific and academic freedom;
5.Acknowledges the rules set out in the Treaties, which must be upheld in compliance with the rule of law in order to preserve the institutional balance, and the role given to Ϸվ; believes that the principle of sincere cooperation must be respected, guaranteeing that all EU institutions assist each other in carrying out tasks deriving from the Treaties, including in order to ensure that greater consideration is given to the point of view of Ϸվ, as the direct representative of the EU’s citizens;
6.Questions the Commission’s approach as regards the conclusion of international agreements dedicated to the participation of third countries in Union programmes, which hinders Ϸվ’s exercise of its prerogatives within the procedures for the conclusion of the Union’s international agreements;
7.Urges the Commission and the Council to give full consideration to the role of Ϸվ when concluding any association agreements that follow this new structure, in accordance with the Treaties;
8. Emphasises that its ability to give meaningful consent to international agreements specifically concerning the participation of particular countries in Union programmes is impeded by the fact that such agreements do not provide for a structure that guarantees parliamentary scrutiny under a consent procedure for association to a specific Union programme;
Cooperation and association agreements between New Zealand and the European Union
9. Recognises the strong historical and cultural ties between the EU and New Zealand as well as the excellent state of bilateral relations between them, which are based on shared democratic values and many common interests; appreciates the excellent cooperation on trade, foreign policy, research and innovation and in multilateral forums;
10.Highlights the important role of New Zealand as one of the EU’s key like-minded partners in the dynamic and strategically and economically important Indo-Pacific region; calls for deeper cooperation in areas of mutual interest, particularly in foreign affairs; underlines, in that regard, the ongoing security cooperation between the EU and New Zealand, particularly as regards operations and missions under the EU’s common security and defence policy; recalls that New Zealand adopted a position identical to that of the EU in condemning Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and supporting Ukraine by providing assistance and introducing sanctions against Russia;
11.Underlines, furthermore, the recently concluded free trade agreement between the EU and New Zealand, the intended purpose of which is to strengthen bilateral relations even further and to liberalise and facilitate trade and investment, creating significant mutual benefits and economic opportunities for businesses and consumers and including strong and binding social and environmental commitments relating to the Paris Climate Agreement; highlights the positive role that the European diaspora in New Zealand can play in further deepening relations between New Zealand and the EU;
12.Recognises that the EU and New Zealand have a long history of research cooperation; emphasises that New Zealand has an excellent record of participation in Horizon 2020, with 77 projects funded, and that New Zealand researchers have been able to participate in the two previous framework programmes for research and innovation, FP7 and Horizon 2020, showcasing the potential benefits of New Zealand’s association to Horizon Europe;
13.Welcomes the proposal to enhance the EU’s partnership with New Zealand through New Zealand’s association to the Horizon Europe programme, which will further strengthen cooperation in research and innovation and make New Zealand the EU’s most important regional partner in science and innovation; notes, however, the lack of provisions allowing proper parliamentary scrutiny of the future association of New Zealand to Union programmes;
14.Points out that in the agreement on the participation of New Zealand in Union programmes, the Commission and the Council give the Joint Committee established under that agreement the power to adopt protocols associating New Zealand to any Union programme, despite Ϸվ objecting to this prerogative, which de facto grants the Joint Committee implementing power on essential aspects; notes that the essential decisions being delegated to the Joint Committee include the scope of the association to individual programmes as well as essential provisions regarding the automatic correction mechanism;
15.Regrets that the Joint Committee is empowered to amend any prevailing association protocol, which may also include provisions related to reviews, audits and financial irregularities, through protocols; recognises that such amendments would occur without additional parliamentary involvement; recognises that by granting consent, Ϸվ would effectively give the Joint Committee an unrestricted mandate; points out that the Council is tasked with monitoring the Commission’s actions in the Joint Committee, but actually often neglects this duty and does not report adequately to Ϸվ, leading to a complete lack of oversight and scrutiny in such international agreements;
16.Emphasises its stance on association agreements related to Horizon Europe, as adopted in a statement accompanying the adoption of the Horizon Europe Regulation, stressing that any body established through such agreements should not bypass the need to seek Ϸվ’s meaningful consent; believes that essential aspects of a third country’s involvement in Horizon Europe should not be delegated to such a body;
17.Disagrees with this new structure for international agreements, which does not allow Ϸվ to exercise its powers in line with Article 218(6)(a) TFEU; believes that this is an impediment to the fulfilment of Ϸվ’s prerogatives, neglects the required institutional balance and therefore needs to be modified;
18.Recalls, in that regard, that Article 218(10) TFEU provides that Ϸվ should be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiating and concluding the international agreements referred to in that article and that, as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held, that rule is an expression of the democratic principles on which the EU is founded; stresses, in particular, the fact that the CJEU has previously stated that Ϸվ’s involvement in the decision-making process is the reflection, at EU level, of the fundamental democratic principle that the people should participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly(10);
19.Recalls, in this context, that the agreements in question are without precedent as they allow for the participation of a new type of third country and, for the first time, do this through a general agreement covering all Union programmes; emphasises that in the past, such participation would be arranged through an individual agreement for each Union programme and limited to a specific multiannual financial framework; emphasises that given the novel nature of these agreements, Ϸվ lacks relevant data or information that could be used to meaningfully assess their potential impact on the current generation of Union programmes or on future generations of Union programmes;
20.Considers, against this background, that Ϸվ should be able to meaningfully ensure the participation of the people in the decision-making process, given the structure of these international agreements, where the decision on association, including the scope of that association, to a given programme by a third country is only made in the future, often long after Ϸվ has consented to the conclusion of the initial agreement with that third country;
21.Recalls that its stance on the Commission’s approach should not be construed as an objection to New Zealand or to the well-established and strong cooperation that has always existed between this country and the EU;
Participation of other like-minded countries in Union programmes
22.Regrets that the draft agreement on the participation of the Faroe Islands and the proposed associations of Canada, the Republic of Korea and Japan follow the same structure as the draft agreement with New Zealand; requests that the Commission refrain from preventing the exercise of Ϸվ’s right of consent to any association to a Union programme and that association agreements with new partners only be entered into when Ϸվ has been able to exercise its right of meaningful consent;
23.Expresses concern about the fact that the recently agreed automatic rebate on the UK’s contribution to Horizon Europe in the event of ‘lower than expected’ UK participation in the programme has resulted in inconsistencies with the provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement to which Ϸվ gave its consent;
A way forward
24.Recalls that it should be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, in line with the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Ϸվ and the European Commission;
25.Calls on the Commission to provide it with regular, detailed reports on the implementation of the agreements, such as updates on such aspects as milestones achieved, challenges faced, success rates of proposals by entities from third countries, annual contributions of third countries, budget execution and audit results;
26.Urges the Commission to launch negotiations on an interinstitutional agreement that would lay down the general principles of democratic scrutiny by Ϸվ of the implementation of agreements on the participation of third countries in Union programmes;
27.Expresses hope that the Commission will clarify the situation, giving a pertinent and satisfactory reply to Ϸվ’s question for oral answer, in order for consent to be given; is willing to cooperate fully with the Commission and the Council to achieve this outcome;
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28.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
European Ϸվ position at first reading of 17April2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Ϸվ and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination (OJ C 158, 30.4.2021, p. 184).
Judgments of the Court of Justice of 29October1980, Roquette Frères v Council, Case C-138/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:249, paragraph 33, and of 24June2014, Ϸվ v Council, Case C-658/11, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, paragraph 81.
Multilateral negotiations in view of the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi, 26-29 February 2024
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European Ϸվ resolution of 8 February 2024 on multilateral negotiations in view of the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi 26-29February2024 ()
–having regard to the Marrakesh Agreement of 15April1994 establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO),
–having regard to the Doha Ministerial Declaration of the WTO of 14November2001(1),
–having regard to its previous resolutions on the WTO, in particular those of 25November2021 on multilateral negotiations in view of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference(2), of 29November2018 entitled ‘WTO: the way forward’(3) and of 28November2019 on the crisis of the WTO Appellate Body(4),
–having regard to the outcome documents adopted by consensus at the Annual Sessions of the Ϸվary Conference on the WTO on 7December2018 in Geneva(5) and on 10December2017 in Buenos Aires(6),
–having regard to the results of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in June2022 (MC12), which include an outcome document, a series of ministerial decisions and declarations, and an Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies,
–having regard to the results of the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Buenos Aires in December2017 (MC11), which include a series of ministerial decisions and joint statements on electronic commerce, on investment facilitation, on domestic services regulation, and on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs),
–having regard to the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment endorsed on 12December2017 and the Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender established on 23September2020,
–having regard to the Ministerial statements by ministers representing Members of the WTO of 10December2021 on plastic pollution and environmentally-sustainable plastics trade, of 14December2021 on trade and environmental sustainability and of 14December2021 on fossil fuel subsidies ,
–having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
–having regard to the Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in effect since November 2016,
–having regard to the Commission communication of 18February2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ and to its annex entitled ‘Reforming the WTO: Towards a sustainable and effective multilateral trading system’ (),
–having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
–having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade,
A.whereas the WTO was created to further the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, strengthen multilateralism and foster a fair, open, inclusive, rules-based and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, in order to improve the welfare of people around the world; whereas the overall objective of the EU’s trade policy is to contribute to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers, as well as ensuring the welfare of people; whereas trade is vital and a key instrument for supporting and complementing efforts to advance sustainable growth and improve standards of living, ensuring full and better-quality employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means of doing so in a manner consistent with countries’ respective needs and concerns at their different levels of economic development;
B.whereas a strong, open and inclusive multilateral trading system should play an even stronger role in reaching global goals on climate change and achieving net zero through, for example, the exchange of the goods, services and practices essential for clean-energy technologies and a circular economy;
C.whereas the rules-based multilateral trading system is currently under a great deal of pressure, subject to geopolitical tensions caused by the decisions of some WTO members and the unilateral measures taken by them, as well as an unjustified reliance on the security exception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by some of its members, which is already resulting in a more fragmented and less predictable context for trade policy; whereas 75% of trade still takes place on the basis of most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs which confirms the WTO as the backbone of the global economy; whereas the outcome at MC12 proved that the WTO can still deliver multilateral agreements and respond to emergencies;
D.whereas the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies agreed at MC12 is the first ever multilateral trade agreement with environmental sustainability at its core, establishing a binding set of global rules to help curb an estimated USD22billion per year in harmful subsidies provided by governments to the fishing sector, as mandated under SDG 14.6; whereas the agreement does not yet include disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, which represent more than half of all fisheries subsidies, on which negotiations are still ongoing;
E.whereas the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) adopted a Decision on 17June2022 providing flexibility in the framework of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to enable the production and supply of COVID-19 vaccines, while postponing the decision on the extension of the scope of these flexibilities to COVID-19 therapeutics and diagnostics; whereas the WTO TRIPS Council is holding negotiations regarding the extension of the TRIPS waiver;
F.whereas food security remains a challenge, as 258 million people were in crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 up from 193 million in 2021; whereas the WTO Uruguay round Agreement on Agriculture explicitly acknowledges the importance of considering food security in ongoing negotiations; whereas trade has the potential to enhance the availability of food in regions where it is limited, and it can also contribute to improved economic access to food by generating employment opportunities and boosting incomes;
G.whereas WTO members have proven their commitment to addressing food shortages and ensuring emergency food aid for the most vulnerable, both in the Ministerial Declaration on the emergency response to food insecurity, as well as the Ministerial Decision on exempting World Food Programme (WFP) humanitarian food purchases from export prohibitions or restrictions agreed at MC12;
H.whereas sustainable trade can help mitigate and fight against climate change;
I.whereas as of 11December2019, the WTO Appellate Body ceased to be operational, which brought to a standstill the functional, independent and impartial appellate stage; whereas at MC12, WTO members committed to conducting discussions with a view to having a fully and properly functioning dispute-settlement system accessible to all WTO members by 2024;
J.whereas for over 20 years the European Ϸվ, together with the Inter-Ϸվary Union, has played a crucial role in establishing a parliamentary dimension to the WTO through the Ϸվary Conference on the WTO;
K.whereas the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) will take place in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, from 26 to 29February2024;
1.Reiterates its full commitment to the enduring value of multilateralism and underlines that a modernised multilateral system to govern trade is essential; calls for a trade agenda based on fair and rules-based trade for the benefit of all, which contributes to sustainable economic development, beyond the mere definition of GDP growth and prosperity, thereby strengthening peace and security; emphasises that the WTO should promote the realisation of the SDGs, health, social, environmental and human rights and ensuring that multilaterally agreed and harmonised rules are applied by all;
2.Urges all WTO members to commit to a successful outcome of MC13; believes that MC13 should be the starting point for advancing and modernising the WTO to ensure it can play a role in addressing the challenges of the 21st century, including on issues such as climate change, food security, biodiversity loss, health, sustainability, and poverty reduction; urges all WTO members to step up their efforts to focus on tangible outcomes that show that the WTO can address current challenges; welcomes the guidance given by the Senior Officials’ Meeting on 22 and 23October2023; in particular, asks WTO members to conclude the second phase of the multilateral agreement on fisheries subsidies and to overcome the remaining stumbling blocks so it can finally adopt a comprehensive package of institutional reforms, including a decision that would lead to a fully functioning dispute-settlement system; reiterates that the role of the WTO Secretariat needs to be further enhanced;
3.Considers that it is now a matter of urgency to proceed to a substantive reform of the WTO and that this should be reflected in the outcome of MC13; welcomes all the work that has been carried out in this regard since the last Ministerial Conference; calls on WTO members to adopt a comprehensive package reviewing the monitoring, negotiating, deliberative and dispute-settlement functions of the WTO, in which due attention should also be given to the parliamentary dimension of the WTO, with a view to increasing the WTO’s effectiveness, inclusiveness, transparency, credibility and legitimacy;
4.Calls for a stronger and even more constructive engagement by all WTO members to restore a fully functioning dispute-settlement system as swiftly as possible that tackles, among other things, the excessive length of procedures; commends the work of the facilitator in steering the process that should lead to a consolidated draft text to be submitted to MC13; regrets, however, that no substantial progress has so far been secured; calls on members to engage in constructive and transparent discussions to reach an agreement on the dispute-settlement system at MC13; recalls that a binding, two-tier and independent process should remain the core objective;
5.In order to bridge the time until a fully functioning dispute-settlement body at WTO level is up and running again, invites members to consider joining the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA) to demonstrate their commitment to a fair and functioning dispute-settlement system;
6.Urges all WTO members that have not yet done so, to swiftly ratify the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, in order for the agreement to enter into force as soon as possible, for which ratification by two thirds of the membership is required; stresses the crucial importance of also reaching an agreement swiftly on disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, in order to avoid depleting marine biological resources and allow for their sustainable management; while respecting the needs for special and differential treatment in line with SDG 14.6;
7.Stresses the need to mainstream the development dimension of the WTO, including through the WTO reform process and through making the special and differential treatment principle better meet the needs of developing countries; regrets that the WTO has not yet fully delivered on its Doha Development Agenda; welcomes, the decision already taken on the extension of support measures to assist least-developed countries (LDCs) on the path to graduation from LDC status, in order to provide a smooth and sustainable transitional period for the withdrawal of trade preferences; reiterates its call for the special and differential treatment mechanism to be re-examined and revised with due involvement of all WTO Members in order to better reflect human development indices while protecting policy space for addressing unfair trade, and calls therefore on WTO members to revise the system; underlines, however, that self-assertion of development status as only criterion could lead to unfair trade;
8.Underlines the need to reinvigorate discussions on State support for industrial sectors within the WTO, including an update of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), with a view to increasing transparency and adapting the WTO rulebook on subsidies in order to respond to contemporary challenges such as climate change and to tackle the unfair practices of certain WTO members, and effectively address negative spillover effects such as overcapacity and carbon-intensive supply chains; takes the view that MC13 should launch a time-limited work programme to allow for deliberation on State intervention in support of industrial sectors, in order to provide recommendations for MC14;
9.Stresses the need to make progress in the agriculture negotiations in order to obtain credible results on issues such as a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security purposes, domestic support, market access, cotton, export restrictions and export competition, and strengthening the agricultural sector to respond to contemporary challenges, including rural livelihoods and environmental sustainability; emphasises the need to ensure fair competition and a level playing field for farmers; calls for better information sharing and transparency on agriculture policies and subsidies to help advancing negotiations and to support at WTO level a greater sharing of data on commodity trading and private stocks with the Committee on World Food Security; welcomes the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the WTO and FAO during 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 28) which will strengthen collaboration on among others agricultural reform, food security and climate change; highlights that the EU should advocate for higher sustainability criteria in line with the objectives of the Green Deal;
10.Underlines the need for an outcome on food security, including concrete actions to increase the resilience of LDCs and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries in their response to acute food instability;
11.Expects the WTO reform to create an easier path for open plurilateral agreements to be integrated into the multilateral architecture in order to ensure progress in areas not mature enough for the entire membership; reiterates therefore its call to WTO members to reflect on a way to develop a new system, with clear principles and a minimum of members that should participate in a plurilateral initiative, and on that basis establish a straightforward mechanism that allows the resulting agreements to be incorporated into the WTO structure;
12.Welcomes the conclusion of the negotiations on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement in order to create a more fair, transparent, efficient and predictable environment for facilitating cross-border investment and the participation of developing countries in global investment flows; supports the incorporation of this agreement into the WTO rulebook under Annex 4 on Plurilateral Trade Agreements, as established in Article X.9 of the WTO Agreement and considers that this can serve as a model for future plurilateral agreements;
13.Highlights the importance of multilateral and plurilateral rules on digital trade, as it currently accounts for 25% of total trade; strongly encourages the efforts to find a fair and permanent solution for electronic transmissions related to the moratorium, particularly bearing in mind the negative effects of a non-renewal, especially on women and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs); welcomes and supports the broad membership, ambitious negotiating agenda and progress made to date in the WTO plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce; highlights the importance of the free flow of electronic transmissions, which are fundamental to digital trade and reduce trading costs, increase consumer welfare as well as export competitiveness, and bring significant benefits, particularly to SMEs and developing countries; recalls its position that a potential agreement needs to guarantee fair market access for e-commerce-related goods and services in third countries, as well as the protection of consumer and labour rights, and facilitate business innovation; stresses that a potential agreement on e-commerce needs to comply with existing as well as future EU legislation and allow for sufficient policy space for digital regulation, in particular when it comes to issues such as data flows, data localisation, data protection, artificial intelligence and source code; calls on all partners to fully engage in and support efforts to conclude negotiations by MC13; stresses the need to bridge the digital divide by sharing best practices and enhancing capacity building;
14.Recalls the WTO’s commitment to MSMEs and recalls that MSMEs account for a substantial part of the global economy and have untapped potential in global value chains; urges members to continue to identify solutions that would help MSMEs increase their participation in world trade, while taking into account their specific needs;
15.Believes that the outcome of MC13 should provide an action-based agenda for trade policy supporting the 2030 SDGs and the Paris Agreement; strongly encourages WTO members to consider all possible measures to contribute to limiting greenhouse gas emissions in line with the UNFCCC and the conclusions of COP28, to enhance alignment with the Paris Agreement and climate neutrality, and to enhance cooperation in the WTO on measures adopted domestically; welcomes the constructive discussions that have taken place in the framework of plurilateral initiatives on Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reform, Dialogue on Plastic Pollution and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD); calls for the relaunch of negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA); encourages the WTO to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation between WTO members on carbon pricing methodologies; emphasises the need to advance the discussion on services and goods, including process and production methods, that help address environmental and climate challenges; recalls that any unilateral measures taken by members must follow WTO rules and the decision to employ GATT exceptions must be considered carefully; urges the EU to raise awareness about its sustainability legislation such as Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and deforestation regulation and explain the motivations behind it to make sure it is recognised as a genuine and non-discriminatory attempt to contribute to addressing global environmental objectives and to make trade more sustainable, including by providing more practical information on how the regulations apply in practice; welcomes the first ever ‘trade day’ at COP28 and the historic achievement at COP to move away from fossil fuels; expects the COP decision to be reflected in the work of the WTO;
16.Reaffirms the links between gender equality and inclusive development, and emphasises that women’s empowerment is key to the eradication of poverty and that simultaneously removing barriers to women’s participation in trade and addressing the adverse impacts of current trade rules on women in their multiple roles is critical for economic development; encourages all WTO members to sign the 2017 Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment and urges its signatories to deliver on their commitments; welcomes the establishment of the WTO Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender; congratulates the WTO for organising the World Trade Congress on Gender in December2022, the first international research conference on trade and gender;
17.Acknowledges that WTO members have agreed to discuss the scope of the TRIPS decision to cover COVID-19 diagnostics and therapeutics; calls on WTO members to take a decision by MC13 while keeping the incentives to innovate in mind; calls on WTO members to review their national laws and policies to ensure full incorporation of all relevant IP flexibilities protecting access to medical products;
18.Calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that Ϸվ continues to be closely involved in the preparation of MC13, and is promptly updated and consulted during the 2024 Ministerial Conference;
19.Calls on WTO members to ensure democratic legitimacy and transparency by strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the WTO and the parliamentary conference; commends the important work of the joint European Ϸվ and the Inter-Ϸվary Union (IPU) Ϸվary Conference on the WTO; stresses the need to ensure that parliamentarians have better access to all trade negotiations and are involved in the formulation and implementation of WTO decisions; encourages leaders to support a new narrative on trade whereby trade is seen as an enabler rather than as a hindrance to achieving sustainability, security and inclusiveness;
20.Calls on WTO members to enhance the exchange with all stakeholders, including civil society, trade unions, and business organisations, and to step up cooperation with other international organisations such as the International Labour Organization and more broadly the UN system; expects leaders to communicate more at every level about the benefits of rules-based trade;
21.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Director-General of the World Trade Organization, and the Inter-Ϸվary Union.
–having regard to its decision of 13September2023 on amendments to Ϸվ’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability(1),
–having regard to its resolution of 13July2023 on recommendations for reform of European Ϸվ’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption(2),
–having regard to its resolution of 1June2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(3),
–having regard to its resolution of 9March2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(4),
–having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-Russia relations, in particular that of 23November2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism(5),
–having regard to its resolution of 19September2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(6),
–having regard to its resolution of 17January2024 on European historical consciousness(7),
–having regard to its resolution of 1March2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine(8),
–having regard to the European External Action Service report of 23January2024 entitled ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats – A Framework for Networked Defence’,
–having regard to the Commission communication of 12December2023 on Defence of Democracy (),
–having regard to the Commission proposal of 12December2023 for a directive of the European Ϸվ and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (),
–having regard to the Commission communication of 3December2020 on the European democracy action plan (),
–having regard to the legal principle of the presumption of innocence,
–having regard to its Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Ϸվ,
–having regard to its resolution of 16September2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body(9),
–having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas foreign interference, information manipulation and disinformation constitute a serious violation of the universal values and principles on which the Union is founded, such as human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law; whereas trust in Ϸվ’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy;
B.whereas there is evidence of Russian interference and manipulation in many democracies, as well as of its practical support for extremist forces and radical-minded entities to promote the destabilisation of the Union;
C.whereas Ϸվ’s Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation, exposed in detail the Russian-led efforts and operations to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the EU institutions; whereas the European Ϸվ’s response to foreign interference has become more vigilant; whereas, however, more robust measures have yet to be taken and internal reforms must be adopted to ensure effective protection against undue external influence;
D.whereas Russia is using a wide array of hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its goals, as part of a larger strategy to undermine the proper functioning of European democratic processes; whereas the use of foreign interference and information manipulation, as a means to divide democratic societies, was the precursor of Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and has increased since then; whereas Russia’s spread of disinformation through both traditional media outlets and social media platforms, elite capture, its hacking of election candidates and cyberattacks have risen to an unprecedented level;
E.whereas the systematic falsification of history has been part of Russia’s information warfare for decades;
F.whereas the Kremlin has been operating an extensive network of agents of influence across the EU, who have affected electoral processes and policies on key strategic issues such as energy infrastructure; whereas these agents of influence actively target all areas of public life, particularly culture, historical remembrance, the media and religious communities, as well as politicians and their families; whereas dozens of investigations have proven links between prominent active or retired European political and public actors and the Kremlin;
G.whereas funding from outside the EU of political activities and politicians within the European Union before and after 24February2022, in particular from Russia, continues to be revealed; whereas this funding poses a risk for the integrity of democratic processes in the EU Member States and requires thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable; whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right and far-left parties and politicians in Europe and, among other things, allowed the party of Marine Le Pen to receive a loan of EUR9,4million from a Russian bank in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have on multiple occasions expressed a pro-Kremlin stance;
H.whereas Russia has established contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union’s institutions in order to legitimise Russian positions, support independence movements and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation; whereas MEPs from certain political groups, as well as some non-attached MEPs, have been spreading blatant pro-Kremlin propaganda in Ϸվ;
I.whereas there are also ‘Russlandversteher’ (Russia-understanding) politicians within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both their domestic and the European political scenes;
J.whereas reports by independent media outlets on 29January2024 presented concrete evidence asserting that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) from at least 2004 to 2017;
K.whereas her actions were described as including political advocacy on behalf of the Russian Federation, through the organisation of events, as well as the provision of information on the inner workings of Ϸվ; whereas the investigative report suggests that the MEP concerned requested payment at least once from her counterparts to cover the costs of services rendered;
L.whereas these allegations rely, among other things, on what are described as leaked email conversations between the MEP concerned and two case-handlers at the FSB’s Fifth Service, dating from 3October2005 and onwards;
M.whereas the MEP concerned has been well known for her pro-Russia stance and consistent spread of anti-Latvian and anti-EU narratives throughout her time as an MEP, including her opposition to the existence of Latvia as a sovereign country and her refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the MEP is further known to engage in highly problematic political conduct, among other things, through her participation in a referendum observation visit in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014, a visit to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in 2016 and her participation in pro-Kremlin propaganda TV shows in Moscow; whereas the MEP deliberately gave the impression that these trips were made on behalf of the European Ϸվ or the EU; whereas the MEP concerned organised and promoted events in the European Ϸվ with pro-Kremlin representatives from the Donetska and Luhanska regions before their illegal annexation; whereas her activities were allegedly often sponsored by Kremlin-funded front groups, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation; whereas the MEP concerned, along with other MEPs, organised public events and travelled to Lithuania to demonstrate in support of Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian citizen and former diplomat and politician who was convicted of espionage for Russia;
N.whereas newspaper reports have for a long time highlighted contacts and close personal relationships between secessionists in Catalonia, including authorities of the government of the autonomous community of Catalonia, and the Kremlin; whereas investigative journalists have reported that former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov met with the then-separatist leader, now sitting MEP, Carles Puigdemont, in Barcelona on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017; whereas through its cultivation of contacts and relationships, Russia aims to build political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union; whereas Court of Instruction Number 1 in Barcelona, which is in charge of the investigation into the Voloh case, which links, among others, the former President of Catalonia and his entourage with Russia, recently extended the investigation for six months; whereas representatives of a group of Catalan secessionists in Spain who have maintained relations with personalities close to the Kremlin, including the MEP concerned, are demanding an amnesty for their alleged crimes;
O.whereas the MEP concerned was excluded from her political group and now sits as a non-affiliated member; whereas the Member concerned gathered support from some other MEPs whose public positions on international issues are similar to hers;
P.whereas in the wake of the revelations, the President of the European Ϸվ immediately announced the launch of an internal investigation, including a referral to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members; whereas the investigation is currently ongoing; whereas the possible penalties under the Rules of Procedure include forfeiture of the entitlement to the daily subsistence allowance, temporary suspension from participation in all or some of the activities of Ϸվ and limitations on the right to access confidential or classified information; whereas the Latvian security service announced it will investigate the allegations;
Q.whereas the MEP concerned is not the only Member of the European Ϸվ to have engaged in activities including taking part in fake electoral observation missions in Russian-occupied territories and fostering confusion with official European Ϸվ missions; whereas several MEPs were sanctioned for this breach under the Democracy Support and Election Coordination group procedure; whereas these visits took place systematically in Russia and Russian-occupied territories;
R.whereas there have been reported cases of MEPs using Ϸվ’s resources to advocate and promote activities that are directly or indirectly linked to cases of foreign interference, for example in December2022, when the Belarusian state propaganda channel STV gained access to Ϸվ’s premises and the VoxBox video recording facility inside Ϸվ and, as a result, Ϸվ’s premises were used by several MEPs to create pro-Kremlin and anti-EU disinformation content;
S.whereas in 2016, Russia’s ruling party, Jedinaja Rossija (United Russia), signed a cooperation agreement with the Austrian far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), calling for increased cooperation between the two parties and stronger political and economic ties between Vienna and Moscow; whereas this agreement was signed in the presence of an MEP from the FPÖ, who, since then, has repeatedly called for easing EU sanctions against Russia and disseminated pro-Kremlin disinformation;
T.whereas the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has uncovered a large-scale disinformation campaign, allegedly orchestrated by Russia, on the platform X, formerly known as Twitter, aimed at manipulating public opinion; whereas reputable German media outlets have exposed the fact that an employee of a member of the German Bundestag belonging to the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party was identified as a contact person for the FSB;
U.whereas for a number of years, some MEPs have recruited and employed Russian nationals who are supportive of the Putin regime as trainees, accredited parliamentary assistants and group advisers and have not stopped doing so even after the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas in 2018 and 2019, Elizaveta Peskova, the daughter of Vladimir Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, was working as a trainee with an MEP;
V.whereas following the Qatargate revelations, in September2023, Ϸվ updated and significantly strengthened its internal integrity framework, among other things, through an in-depth revision of its Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct for MEPs and the relevant Bureau Decisions;
W.whereas 2024 is a crucial electoral year and several presidential, national, local and regional elections are due to be held in Member States, in addition to the European elections scheduled on 6-9June 2024; whereas the 2024 European elections are likely to be a special target for disinformation campaigns at local, regional and EU level;
1.Expresses its complete outrage and grave concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy; is appalled by credible reports which cast light on Russia’s efforts to foment divisions between European citizens by recruiting MEPs as agents of influence, as well as its efforts to systematically create a system of dependencies through European political parties which then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda and serve its interests; recalls that, by pursuing a long-term strategy of foreign interference, Russia is trying to undermine and ultimately destroy democracy in Europe; points to Putin’s efforts to completely dismantle any form of democracy inside Russia and underlines that this must be a warning sign not to be complacent with Putin’s long-term goals and hence to tackle these Russian interference attempts as a matter of extreme gravity; stresses that these tactics must be met with consequences; reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanction packages adopted against the Russian Federation and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force;
2.Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, including the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the terror that followed for the territories conquered by Nazi Germany and communist Russia, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy;
3.Expresses deep concern over reports that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the FSB’s Fifth Service while also serving as a Member of the European Ϸվ; stresses that an FSB informant having access to benefits and information as a Member of the European Ϸվ would be a severe threat to our Union’s security and democracy; stresses that it is imperative that the European Ϸվ, as well as the Latvian authorities, investigate this matter thoroughly in order to determine, without delay, the appropriate sanctions and criminal proceedings;
4.Stresses that the MEP concerned has been excluded from her political group for reasons related to her positions on Russia and Ukraine and is now unaffiliated; underlines that the vast majority of MEPs do not share her views and have overwhelmingly condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, its use of hybrid warfare tactics against European democracy and other aggressive and anti-democratic policy choices in recent years; notes, nevertheless, that a small number of MEPs have participated in actions jointly with the MEP concerned, expressing similar viewpoints and siding overtly with Russia;
5.Commits to provide its full support to and cooperation with the Latvian authorities in their investigation into the conduct of the MEP concerned; calls on the competent authorities to investigate whether the MEP concerned is liable for prosecution under national criminal law and remains ready to provide its full support and cooperation therefor;
6.Welcomes the referral of the MEP concerned to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members; commits to enforce its applicable internal sanction framework in full; notes that the alleged facts pre-date the recent adoption of the reform of Ϸվ’s integrity framework; considers that rules by themselves would not have prevented the MEP’s alleged reprehensible conduct; remains nevertheless ready to further evaluate and fine-tune the functioning and sanctioning of Ϸվ’s integrity framework, which was strengthened in the wake of Qatargate;
7.Supports the ongoing investigations, but highlights the need to respect due process, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reiterates that political choices cannot be criminalised and that MEPs must not face further restrictions on the expression of their opinions when exercising their legitimate mandate;
8.Points to other cases of MEPs knowingly serving Russia’s interests; underlines that the activities of these MEPs are undermining the security, credibility and democratic resilience of the EU; expresses deep concern over the links the MEP concerned may have entertained with other MEPs and firmly denounces any internal coordinated attempts to advance the Kremlin’s political agenda within Ϸվ; considers it imperative to immediately conduct a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference by Russia and of other kinds of malicious interference in the work of the European Ϸվ;
9.Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022; stresses the seriousness of Russia’s connections with parties and politicians in the Union and its extensive interference in secessionist movements in European territories, such as in Catalonia;
10.Reiterates its outrage about the regular revelations of large-scale Russian funding of political parties, politicians, officials and movements in several democratic countries in an attempt to interfere with and gain leverage in their domestic processes; acknowledges that the overwhelming majority of Member States have full or partial bans on foreign donations to political parties and candidates; expresses its concern about Russia’s connections with several political parties and politicians in the EU; recalls that even in cases where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent it and have offered support to their allies by taking out loans with foreign banks (such as in the case of the National Front party in 2016), providing purchase and commercial agreements (such as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17May2019 about the FPÖ party and by Buzzfeed and ֲ on 10July2019 about Lega per Salvini Premier), and facilitating financial activities (as reported by the British press about the Leave.eu campaign);
11.Is extremely concerned about the alleged relations between Catalan secessionists and the Russian administration; notes that Russian interference in Catalonia, if confirmed, would be part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity; expresses deep concern about the large-scale disinformation campaigns that Russia has pursued in Catalonia, as well as the alleged intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with the pro-independence movement and the regional government of the autonomous community of Catalonia; calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States; deplores all attacks on judges investigating any interference activities; calls for the cases of the concerned Catalan MEPs to be referred to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members;
12.Strongly condemns the recent incident in Slovakia, whereby the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in a provocative move, released a statement during the pre-election moratorium questioning the integrity of the Slovak Republic’s electoral process; expresses its concern about the visible and direct role played by Russian diplomacy in Slovak public and political life since the parliamentary elections in September2023;
13.Strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on the platform X, with the intention of manipulating public opinion in Germany;
14.Notes with concern that X has ceased to follow the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation; is concerned about the widespread disinformation and illegal content on the platform;
15.Reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Ϸվ, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;
16.Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets exposing the fact that an employee affiliated with the AfD party and associated with a member of the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the FSB, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape;
17.Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation and interference are not just foreign policy and security issues, but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole, insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23January2024 and recommends closer cooperation with NATO in this area; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body;
18.Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy; considers that the allegations regarding the MEP concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture within the European Ϸվ; calls for the highest level of political and administrative attention to be given to the recommendations for reform of the European Ϸվ’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13July2023 and calls for the full implementation of the measures proposed, including mandatory and regular security and integrity training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; calls for stricter scrutiny of the organisation of events, of the invitation of external guests to Ϸվ and of access to Ϸվ’s communication platforms; calls on national authorities to follow procedures and a common timeframe whenever they are asked to give security clearance to MEPs and Ϸվ staff, as well as for any security screening related to the EU institutions; is of the firm opinion that Ϸվ resources, such as the sponsoring of events and trips, the granting of access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups’ or MEPs’ communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes; reiterates its call for stricter rules for trips taken by MEPs that are paid for by foreign countries and entities; believes that similar rules should be drawn up for trips taken by accredited parliamentary assistants or political group staff;
19.Reiterates its strong commitment to continuing to carry out serious and concrete reforms in the European Ϸվ in order to show zero tolerance for corruption and corrupting political interference and to protect European democracy;
20.Reiterates its support for the establishment of an independent ethics body as soon as possible, in line with its resolution of 16September2021; calls for all EU institutions to raise their ambitions regarding the establishment of this body;
21.Calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia, pursuant to the Council decision of 3June2022 concerning restrictive measures(10);
22.Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system; urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; underlines that criminal investigations into spying charges are the competence of the Member States; highlights that, in almost all Member States, Russian spy networks have been uncovered; invites the Member States to strengthen their efforts and cooperation, including to neutralise attempts to acquire sensitive technology from EU companies to fuel Russia’s military capabilities; welcomes the fact that several EU countries have launched special investigative committees devoted to countering Russian influence;
23.Condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians, among others, by providing them with lucrative jobs in companies linked to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU; calls for MEPs to be banned from performing paid side jobs or activities on behalf of organisations or individuals included in the Transparency Register, or on behalf of non-EU countries, in order to limit potential conflicts of interest and foreign interference;
24.Notes that laws are essential to fight against corruption and criminal behaviour but cannot in themselves prevent criminal and unethical actions by individual MEPs; underlines that all political groups in the European Ϸվ bear a certain responsibility to monitor the actions of their Members, and therefore reminds all groups to quickly act in the event that they are made aware of any behaviour raising doubts about the integrity of any of their Members; calls on all MEPs and groups to fully cooperate with the relevant national and EU authorities in this context;
25.Believes that free and fair elections are at the heart of the democratic process and therefore urges the EU institutions and Member States to take decisive action to ensure that solely the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, without foreign interference by malign actors, with a particular focus on the preparations for the European elections of 6-9June2024; calls for the Member States and EU institutions to implement resilience strategies for the elections and underlines the need to strengthen permanent monitoring efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political processes across Europe;
26.Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism;
27.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 153, 3.6.2022, p. 128).
Further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado
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European Ϸվ resolution of 8 February 2024 on further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado ()
–having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela,
–having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,
–having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
–having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 29January2024,
–having regard to the statement of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States of 28January2024 on recent events in Venezuela,
–having regard to the Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, signed by the Maduro government and the Venezuelan opposition alliance, the Unitary Platform, in October2023 (Barbados Agreement),
–having regard to the first report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, published on 16September2020,
–having regard to the Venezuelan Constitution,
–having regard to the final report of the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Venezuela of 22February2022 entitled ‘Regional and municipal elections 21November2021’ and the statement by the President of the Electoral Observation Delegation of the European Ϸվ, Jordi Cañas, of 23November2021 on the regional and local elections in Venezuela in 2021,
–having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas Venezuela’s 2024 elections could represent a turning point from a corrupt autocracy towards a return to democracy if all the points of the Barbados Agreement are respected; whereas civil and political rights continue to be violated in Venezuela, which has engendered years of instability and violence; whereas around eightmillion people have been forced to leave the country;
B.whereas there have been systematic restrictions on public information, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to peaceful assembly, particularly for dissidents of the regime, trade unionists, human rights defenders and the most vulnerable members of society;
C.whereas on 17October2023 in Venezuela, the Maduro regime and the Unitary Platform opposition alliance signed two agreements, known as the Barbados Agreements, which covered matters including the promotion of political rights and electoral guarantees for all, and the release of political prisoners; whereas this agreement covered important topics such as allowing international observers to participate in the electoral process; whereas the agreement was signed to serve as a first step to ensure free and fair elections in Venezuela;
D.whereas on 22October2023, María Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35% of the votes in the primary elections;
E.whereas for several months, María Corina Machado, members of her campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing – civil society organisations, lawyers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other political players in the democratic opposition to the regime have been targeted by arbitrary and politically motivated attempts to disqualify them from holding public office; whereas among those targeted is Henrique Capriles, who has run for president twice in the past and whose disqualification was also confirmed in the same statement of 26January2024;
F.whereas the process to reinstate María Corina Machado lacked basic elements, as she neither received a copy of the allegations against her nor was afforded the opportunity to respond to the allegations; whereas the regime’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) published a summary of its decision, which has no legal basis, on its webpage; whereas the Venezuelan Constitution stipulates that individuals cannot have their political rights restricted by administrative decisions, nor be barred from holding public office by such decisions; whereas the regime’s TJS was therefore unable to pass a constitutionally sound judgment in this matter;
G.whereas on 6December2023, Roberto Abdul, a member of the commission that planned the primary elections for the opposition to the regime, was arrested for alleged treason; whereas at the same time, arrest warrants were issued for Henry Alviarez, Claudia Macero and Pedro Urruchurtu, members of the Vente Venezuela party, for alleged crimes including treason, conspiracy and money laundering;
H.whereas these arbitrary decisions are inconsistent with the commitment by Nicolás Maduro’s representatives to hold a competitive Venezuelan presidential election in 2024 and go against the recommendations of the EU EOM; whereas the administrative authorities’ ongoing arbitrary disqualification of opposition electoral candidates severely restricts the right of Venezuelans to choose their representatives;
I.whereas in its resolution of 13July2023 on the political disqualifications in Venezuela(1), Ϸվ already strongly condemned the political disqualifications of candidates by the Venezuelan regime; whereas this resolution specifically condemned the arbitrary and unconstitutional 15-year disqualification of María Corina Machado and other prominent political figures and deplored the fact that the recommendations of the last EU EOM had been completely ignored;
J.whereas the Maduro regime denied the Chief Observer of the EU EOM entry to Venezuela to present the final report for the regional and municipal elections that took place in 2021, because the EU EOM had been expelled from the country;
K.whereas on 22January, the regime, through the attorney general, issued fourteen arrest warrants on trumped up charges against individuals including human rights defender Tamara Sujú, journalist Sebastiana Barráez, former mayor of Caracas Antonio Ledezma, political leader Leopoldo López, former interim President of Venezuela Juan Guaidó and former mayor David Smolansky, for treason, magnicide and for simply exercising their freedom to express their opposition to the regime;
L.whereas the Venezuelan Ϸվ, which is controlled by the Maduro regime, has been preparing a new law on the financing and performance of NGOs in order to limit civil society’s ability to get organised and defend its rights;
M.whereas on 31January, Maduro backed a call from the regime-controlled National Assembly to develop a proposal, starting from 5February and in dialogue with various sectors, for an electoral schedule for the presidential elections, expected in the second half of 2024, but still without a definite date;
N.whereas the electoral roadmap contained in the Barbados Agreement remains an opportunity to resolve Venezuela’s long-standing political, economic and humanitarian crises and to conduct competitive, free and inclusive elections in Venezuela; whereas the persecution of the candidates of the opposition to the regime severely breaches the political rights and electoral guarantees signed in the Barbados Agreement;
O.whereas the regime has also been making changes to the National Electoral Council (CNE) to hamper the electoral process and quash any prospect of a return to democracy; whereas in June2023, three principal rectors of the National Electoral Council stepped down, forcing the resignation of two remaining rectors; whereas the regime’s National Assembly appointed a special commission composed of representatives of the regime, including the wife of Nicolás Maduro, to elect new rectors from among individuals of the regime;
1.Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office; recalls that the process to reinstate her lacked basic elements, as she neither received a copy of the allegations against her nor was afforded the opportunity to respond to the allegations;
2.Strongly condemns the attacks against, alleged forced disappearances and arrests of and arrest warrants issued for members of Maria Corina Machado’s team and other representatives of the opposition and civil society, as well as human rights defenders and journalists; strongly condemns the Maduro regime’s interference in the electoral process;
3.Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;
4.Reiterates that actions by Nicolás Maduro and his representatives, including the persecution of members of the democratic opposition to the regime and attempts to impede candidates from competing in this year’s presidential election, are a clear breach of the agreements signed in Barbados by representatives of Nicolás Maduro and the Unitary Platform with a view to holding a competitive Venezuelan presidential election in 2024;
5.Underlines that the statement by the regime’s TSJ is unconstitutional and illegal, since it stems from arbitrary and politically motivated allegations, and that the procedure that was followed did not comply with the law; considers, therefore, that the decision by the TSJ, appointed by the regime, has no legal grounds and that María Corina Machado remains eligible to run for the elections;
6.Believes that these actions constitute a clear attempt at dictatorial political persecution, which violates the civil and political rights of the Venezuelan people, and that these predictable actions, particularly given the regime’s track record, once more shatter any prospect of free and fair elections;
7.Recognises the efforts of the opposition to the regime to organise primary elections as a democratic solution for Venezuelans domestically and abroad; urges the Venezuelan authorities to provide the conditions to ensure fair, free, inclusive and transparent elections;
8.Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians, and start implementing the Barbados Agreement, including by upholding the electoral roadmap’s principles and paragraph one of the agreement, under which the parties are bound to ‘recognise and respect the right of each political actor to choose their candidate for the presidential elections freely’, which would entail ensuring that the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, can participate freely in a competitive and truly democratic presidential election in 2024;
9.Recalls the appalling social, economic and humanitarian conditions that have prevailed in Venezuela for years, which Venezuelans have been enduring for too long; condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the killing, constant repression, systematic torture and violations of human, civil and political rights of the Venezuelan people and human rights defenders; urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop persecuting, repressing and violating the civil and political rights of its political opponents and the Venezuelan people, as well as to revoke the arrest warrants for political opponents and to free political prisoners;
10.Condemns the abuse of the legal framework to restrict the defence of human rights and freedom of association, and is particularly concerned about the draft law on the control, regularisation, operations and financing of non-governmental and related organisations;
11.Notes the importance of allowing all Venezuelans, both in Venezuela and abroad, to participate in the elections by updating the permanent electoral registry and the electoral registry abroad, as provided for in paragraph 3(2)(e) of the Barbados Agreement;
12.Strongly condemns the interference in the designation of the members of the CNE and calls for an independent nomination procedure for new CNE appointments;
13.Fully supports the International Criminal Court and UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission investigations into the Venezuelan regime’s extensive crimes and acts of repression and calls for the EU to support the investigations, currently being considered under the Rome Statute, into the alleged crimes against humanity, in order to hold those responsible to account;
14.Remains strongly committed to supporting dialogue between the parties and to the Venezuelan people’s aspirations for a democratic future; calls for the EU to work with the international community and all peaceful democratic stakeholders across the political spectrum in Venezuela and to leverage all mechanisms at its disposal to encourage a return to the principles in the Barbados Agreement;
15.Urges the Member States to maintain the sanctions imposed on the Maduro regime; insists that sanctions should be stepped up until there is a clear and permanent commitment, in line with the Barbados Agreement, to uphold basic democratic standards, the rule of law and human rights; calls for further targeted sanctions through the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) against the judges of the Supreme Court of Venezuela who were involved in attempts to ban María Corina Machado from holding public office and against the members of the Venezuelan security forces involved in the systematic abuses perpetrated against government opponents;
16.Calls on the European External Action Service, the EU Delegation in Venezuela, the Member States and the international community to continue monitoring the situation in the country and to play a more assertive and visible role;
17.Insists that the EU must not consider sending any electoral observation mission to Venezuela until there are clear and credible guarantees that the Barbados Agreement and the electoral roadmap are being respected in their entirety, until opposition politicians who have been disqualified from holding public office are reinstated, until María Corina Machado is allowed to participate in the elections, and until the EU EOM’s 2021 recommendations are properly implemented;
18.Stresses that the elections and the election results will not be recognised if these conditions are not met;
19.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit participants, the Euro-Latin American Ϸվary Assembly, the Organization of American States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Venezuelan regime authorities.