MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIONon the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia
4.10.2024-()
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Reinier VanLanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Sergey Lagodinsky, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Mélissa Camara, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
See also joint motion for a resolutionRC-B10-0070/2024
10‑0083/2024
European Ϸվ resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia
()
Ϸվ,
–having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,
–having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15December2023,
–having regard to the Commission communication of 8November2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ () and to the accompanying Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),
–having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
–having regard to the statement by the High Representative with the European Commission of 28May2024 on the final adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence in Georgia,
–having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 12June2024 on the continued acts of intimidation, threats and assaults on civil society in Georgia,
–having regard to the statement by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of 15May2024 entitled ‘Georgia: UN experts condemn adoption of Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence’,
–having regard to the Venice Commission urgent opinion of 21May2024 on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence,
–having regard to the Venice Commission opinion of 22June2024 on amendments to the Election Code which abolish gender quotas,
–having regard to the Venice Commission follow-up opinion of 22June2024 to the joint opinion on the draft amendments to the Election Code and to the Rules of Procedure of the Ϸվ of Georgia,
–having regard to the Venice Commission opinion of 25June2024 on the draft Constitutional Law on Protecting Family Values and Minors,
–having regard to Resolution 2561 (2024) of 27June2024 of the Ϸվary Assembly of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Challenges to democracy in Georgia’,
–having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],
–having regard to Rule136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas the past months have seen significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, which have been characterised by the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the UN, the Venice Commission and the EU, concurrent with attacks on civil society and independent media, prolonged mass protests and deep political and societal tensions and polarisation;
B.whereas on 14May2024 the Georgian Ϸվ adopted the law on transparency of foreign influence at third and final reading; whereas this law targets civil society organisations and independent media by requiring non-governmental organisations and media that receive over 20% of their funds from abroad to register as an ‘organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations will be subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties up to GEL25000;
C.whereas the law was adopted in a procedure which, according to the Venice Commission, left no space for genuine discussion and meaningful consultation, in open disregard for the concerns of large parts of the Georgian population; whereas the restrictions set by that law to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association and the right to privacy are incompatible with the strict test set out in Articles8(2), 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR and Articles17(2), 19(2) and 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as they do not meet the requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society, and they are also incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article14 of the ECHR;
D.whereas the Georgian Government has so far refrained from strictly implementing the law, but the law is expected to significantly affect the activities of civil society organisations and independent media outlets that very often rely on foreign funding to exist and operate; whereas the threat of this law has already instigated a muzzling of Georgia’s vibrant civil society, which is at the core of Georgia’s democracy and contributed greatly to the context of the decision on Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country;
E.whereas this legislation comes at a time of increasing and ongoing attacks against civil society in Georgia in a seeming effort to narrow civic space by starving independent groups of funds; whereas the adoption of this law, modelled on the foreign agent legislation in Russia, is not taking place in a geopolitical vacuum, but represents a trend in the broader region;
F.whereas on 17September2024, the Georgian Ϸվ passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which aims to ban reliable and appropriate information about sexual orientation and gender identity;
G.whereas the Georgian Ϸվ, in recent months, adopted several amendments to the legal framework for elections in Georgia that change the manner in which the chairperson and the non-partisan members of the Central Election Commission are elected, along with last-minute amendments to the Electoral Code;
H.whereas Georgia’s politics has been historically marked by systemic corruption and oligarchic influence, which continue to impact the independence and democratic organisation of political movements;
I.whereas in August2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze confirmed that his Georgian Dream party plans, if victorious in the upcoming parliamentary elections, to ban all political forces that oppose it, referring to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’;
J.whereas the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS and the EU Member States have released statements urging the Georgian Government to refrain from adopting legislation that could compromise Georgia’s progress on its path to EU membership;
K.whereas a plethora of international organisations and high-level officials have called on the Georgian Government to withdraw these harmful laws, including the Venice Commission, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, the UN Resident Coordinator in Georgia, the Ϸվary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the European Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House and the US Agency for International Development;
1.Expresses its deep concern about the democratic backsliding in Georgia that has occurred to an ever greater extent throughout this year and especially ahead of the parliamentary elections on 26October2024; points to a broader package of laws proposed and adopted by the ruling Georgian Dream party in recent months that violate the right to freedom of expression, censor the media, science and the arts, and are incompatible with international human rights standards in a way that will have a significant impact on the lives and well-being of the residents of Georgia;
2.Deplores, specifically, the adoption by the Georgian Ϸվ of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ after it had voted down the earlier veto by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili; expresses its concern that the law passed its readings in the Georgian Ϸվ in the absence of opposition members of parliament;
3.Emphasises that this law will render the work of civil society organisations and independent media in Georgia effectively impossible as a result of costly and time-consuming administrative burdens, possible legal prosecutions, and the reputational damage inflicted by the ‘foreign agent’ label; stresses that, although they receive international funding, these organisations do not pursue the ‘interests of a foreign power’ but rather strive every day to uphold the human rights and democratic hopes of Georgia’s citizens and to provide them with unbiased reporting on the developments in their country;
4.Shares the concerns raised by the Venice Commission about the adoption of amendments to the legal framework for elections in Georgia and the Electoral Code, agreeing that these changes to the Electoral Code will have a major impact on the stakeholders’ perceptions of and trust in the impartiality and fairness of the election administration;
5.Calls on the Georgian authorities to take full account of the concerns and act on the recommendations contained in the Venice Commission opinions on the adopted and proposed laws;
6.Condemns comments by the ruling Georgian Dream party concerning its intention to ban all opposition parties and the polarising rhetoric that refers to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’; notes that such intimidation seriously undermines the political process and the freedom of expression, and contributes to an environment of fear; calls on all political actors to refrain from using rhetoric that further fuels the extreme polarisation, to cease the spread of false information during their campaigns for the upcoming elections and instead to commit to upholding the truth;
7.Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the government targeting civil society organisations and reputable international donors who pursue the support of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia; expresses its concern about the increasing number of reports of intimidation, threats and physical assaults on civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia; reiterates its call to cease all attacks on civil society and independent media, and ensure a genuine enabling environment for all civil society and media in the country;
8.Recalls its support for the granting of EU candidate country status to Georgia in 2023, this having been assigned in recognition of the tireless efforts of Georgia’s civil society and the overwhelming aspirations of EU membership held by the vast majority of Georgian people, and on the understanding that nine recommendations would be implemented; emphasises that the recent adoption of several pieces of legislation directly contradicts the EU’s nine recommendations on which Georgia’s EU candidate country status was made contingent; highlights further that there has been little to no progress on any of the nine recommendations;
9.Stresses that the targeting of civil society organisations and independent media in general and the legislation on foreign influence in particular are indisputably inconsistent and irreconcilable with the norms and values of the EU and with any EU membership aspirations; recalls that the Commission is scheduled to present its 2024 enlargement package later this month, which will include an assessment of Georgia’s implementation of the steps on which the country’s candidate status was made conditional;
10.Notes that addressing outstanding problems regarding public administration, interinstitutional relations, good governance and corruption, and implementing the necessary reforms of the justice system during the EU accession process, are also part and parcel of ensuring that Georgia’s society and democratic institutions will be able to avert foreign interference and democratic backsliding in the long term;
11.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to investigate the consequences of the democratic backsliding that these laws represent for their donor role in Georgia and to communicate this possible impact to the Government and Ϸվ of Georgia;
12.Considers, in accordance with Article29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article215(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, given that the rule of law is a principle of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and the law on foreign influence violates the Council of Europe’s rule of law standards as interpreted by the Venice Commission, that the Council may adopt a decision regarding targeted sanctions;
13.Calls on the authorities to ensure free, fair and credible parliamentary elections and to strive without delay towards depolarisation and societal reconciliation for the benefit of all Georgians; stresses that human rights and Georgia’s democracy must be respected and urges the Georgian authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure that all respected civil society organisations involved in election observation can observe these elections without hindrance or interference in their work;
14.Reiterates its continued support for the democratic ambitions of the Georgian people and their wish for a future in the EU; stresses that independent polls consistently show that over 80% of Georgians wish to join the EU, which is one of the highest proportions in the candidate countries; recalls that in previous years Georgia had been a front runner in adopting reforms in line with its society’s long-standing aspiration to join the EU; recognises that it is still possible to consolidate Georgia’s democratic future as an EU candidate country with a young, engaged generation of leaders, as was exemplified by the spontaneous protests against the foreign agent law that took place during 2024;
15.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Prime Minister and Ϸվ of Georgia.
- [1] OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: .