Budgetary control
Each EU institution and the Member States scrutinise the EU budget. The European Court of Auditors and the European Ϸվ perform detailed checks at various levels. Each year, Ϸվ scrutinises the implementation of the budget with a view to granting discharge to the Commission, the other EU institutions and the decentralised EU agencies.
Legal basis[1]
- Articles287, 317, 318, 319, 322and325 of the (TFEU);
- (see in particular TitleII, Chapter7, on the principle of sound financial management and performance, and TitleXIV, on external audit and the discharge);
- on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources, PartIII;
- Rules of Procedure of the European Ϸվ, TitleII, Chapters6 and 7, Rules99, 100 and104; TitleV, Chapter2, Rule134; AnnexV.
Objectives
Ensuring the legality, accuracy and sound financial management of budget operations and financial control systems, as well as the sound financial management of the EU budget (economy, efficiency and effectiveness), and, with regard to the role of the European Court of Auditors and the European Ϸվ, ensuring that these objectives are achieved (performance criteria).
Achievements
A. Control at national level
Initial control of revenue and expenditure is carried out to a large extent by national authorities. They have kept their powers, particularly on traditional own resources (1.4.1), an area in which they can carry out the procedures required to collect and verify the amounts concerned. Budgetary control is also exercised by combating irregularities and fraud (1.4.6). The operational expenditure of instruments falling under shared management, such as the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund (which together make up the Structural Funds), as well as the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) is also scrutinised in the first instance by the Member State authorities.
B. Control at EU level
1. Internal
In each institution, control is exercised by authorising officers and accountants and then by the institution’s internal auditor.
2. External: by the European Court of Auditors (1.3.12)
External control is carried out by national audit institutions and by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), which submits detailed reports each year to the budgetary authority in accordance with Article287 TFEU, i.e.:
- The ‘statement of assurance as to the reliability of accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions’ (known as the DAS);
- The annual report on the implementation of the general budget, including the budgets of all the institutions and satellite bodies;
- Specific annual reports on the EU agencies and bodies;
- Special reports on specific issues (performance and compliance audits);
- Opinions (on new or amended laws that have a significant impact on the EU’s financial management);
- Reviews that cover policies and management topics, analyse areas or issues not yet audited or establish a factual basis on certain topics;
- For the2019, 2020 and2021 financial years, the ECA published a report on the overall performance of the EU budget. It stopped publishing this report from the2022 financial year.
The ECA also regularly draws up reports on borrowing and lending operations and the European Development Fund (EDF). The last EDF covered the2014-2020 period and it was then integrated into the EU budget with the2021-2027 multiannual financial framework[2].
3. Control at political level: by the European Ϸվ
Within the European Ϸվ, the Committee on Budgetary Control is responsible for preparing Ϸվ’s position and in particular for:
- Scrutinising implementation of the EU budget and of the EDF;
- Preparing the decisions on discharge, including the internal discharge procedure;
- Closing, presenting and auditing the accounts and balance sheets of the EU, its institutions and any bodies financed by it;
- Scrutinising the financial activities of the European Investment Bank (1.3.15);
- Monitoring the cost-effectiveness of the various forms of EU funding in connection with the implementation of EU policies;
- Appointing members of the ECA, considering its reports;
- Looking into fraud and irregularities in connection with implementation of the EU budget, adopting measures to prevent fraud and irregularities and bring prosecutions in such cases, and protecting the EU’s financial interests in general;
- Relations with the ECA, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor;
The discharge procedure
Once a year, on a recommendation from the Council, Ϸվ grants discharge to the Commission (and other institutions and bodies) in respect of the implementation of the budget for the year n-2, after having examined, among other things, the annual activity reports of the Commission’s DGs (and of other institutions), the Commission’s annual management and performance report, the evaluation report (under Article318 TFEU, this report focuses on the results achieved by EU programmes, taking account of the recommendations made in earlier years by Ϸվ and the Council), the ECA’s annual report and the replies from the Commission and the other institutions to Ϸվ’s questions (Article319TFEU). This process is known as parliamentary scrutiny of the implementation of the budget, and it is aimed at ensuring compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, as well as sound financial management. The Committee on Budgetary Control prepares Ϸվ’s stance on the abovementioned reports. The resulting discharge decisions are accompanied by a resolution, which contains Ϸվ’s observations and recommendations concerning the implementation of the budget.
The Commission and the other institutions are required to act on the observations made by Ϸվ in its discharge resolutions (Article319(3) TFEU and Article262 of the Financial Regulation).
As a general rule, Ϸվ considers the discharge reports at a part-session before 15May (Article260 of the Financial Regulation). Thus, other than in exceptional circumstances, the votes on granting discharge are taken at the May part-session or, in the event of a postponement, at the October part-session. If a proposal to grant discharge is not carried by a majority, or if Ϸվ decides to postpone its discharge decision (in the spring), Ϸվ informs the institutions or agencies concerned of the reasons. The latter are required to act without delay to remove the obstacles to a discharge decision. The Committee on Budgetary Control then submits a fresh report, within six months, containing a fresh proposal to grant or refuse discharge.
Although the TFEU refers only to discharge for the Commission, for reasons of transparency and democratic oversight Ϸվ also grants separate discharge to the other institutions and bodies and to each agency or similar entity (discharge provisions for the decentralised agencies and public-private partnerships are set out in their founding regulations). Ϸվ has refused to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council since2009, due to the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure. Finally, Ϸվ’s discharge decisions and resolutions concerning the implementation of the EU general budget, Section I — European Ϸվ, are addressed to the President of Ϸվ.
Role of the European Ϸվ
A. Development of powers
From1958 to1970, Ϸվ was kept informed of decisions on discharge given by the Council to the Commission in respect of its implementation of the budget. In1971, it secured the power to grant discharge together with the Council. Since 1June1977, when the Treaty of 22July1975 entered into force, it alone has the power to grant discharge, once the Council has given its recommendation. Through its relevant committees, Ϸվ also holds hearings of Commissioners-designate, and the Committee on Budgetary Control holds hearings for Members-designate of the ECA, the candidates shortlisted for the post of Director-General of OLAF and the members of the OLAF Supervisory Committee. These posts cannot be filled until the hearings have been held. It should be noted, lastly, that the Director-General of OLAF is appointed by the Commission, after consulting Ϸվ and the Council, and that the members of the OLAF Supervisory Committee are appointed by common accord by Ϸվ, the Council and the Commission.
B. Use of the discharge
Ϸվ may decide to postpone discharge where it is dissatisfied with particular aspects of the Commission’s management of the budget. Refusing to grant discharge can be regarded as tantamount to requiring the Commission to resign. This threat was put into effect in December1998: following a vote in plenary to reject the discharge motion, a group of five independent experts was established, which reported on accusations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism against the Commission. The Commissioners then resigned en bloc on 16March1999.
With regard to the implementation of the EU general budget by the Commission, Ϸվ introduced two new features during the discharge procedures for2011 and2012: verification of the lawfulness and regularity of expenditure, which go hand in hand with a performance evaluation (Article318 TFEU); an evaluation report on the EUʼs finances based on the results achieved, and the provision stipulating that a discharge decision may be ‘counterbalancedʼ by reservations concerning particular policy areas. In the discharge procedure for2019, for the first time in four years the ECA had to issue an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditure underlying the accounts. However, in its first report on the overall performance of the EU budget, the ECA found that satisfactory procedures were in place. Ϸվ upheld the ECA’s suggestion that the Commission’s information quality should be further improved, and emphasised that result and impact indicators are better suited for performance measurement than input and output indicators.
During the2019 discharge procedure, Ϸվ also examined shortcomings in the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s (Frontex) budgetary and finance management, and found the agency’s explanations insufficient. Ϸվ decided to postpone Frontex’s discharge from spring2021 to 21October2021, when the plenary voted in favour of granting the agency discharge, but put EUR90million – or around12% of the agency’s total budget – under reserve. These funds can only be released if Frontex fulfils certain conditions, namely recruiting20 missing fundamental rights monitors and three deputy executive directors who must be sufficiently qualified to fill these positions as well as setting up a mechanism for reporting serious incidents on the EU’s external borders and a functioning fundamental rights monitoring system. During the subsequent discharge procedure (for the2020 budget) Ϸվ postponed its decision on Frontex’s accounts because it felt that Frontex had not met the conditions Ϸվ had set in October2021. Additionally, the agency still had to address the findings of an OLAF investigation into harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks, and to report on its progress to Ϸվ. In the latest discharge procedures, Ϸվ’s concerns have focused on the control requirements of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, high error rates for spending programmes, transparency in the use of EU funds (including information on final beneficiaries), access of non-governmental organisations to EU funds and reinforcing the control and monitoring framework for tracking EU funds in unstable or conflict zones.
As stated above, the Commission, the other institutions and the decentralised agencies must report on the action taken on the observations made by Ϸվ in discharge resolutions. Member States must inform the Commission of the measures they have taken in response to Ϸվ’s observations, and the Commission must take them into account in its own follow-up report (Article262 of the Financial Regulation).
Ϸվ’s specialised committees also help to ensure that EU funds are spent efficiently in the best interests of the EU taxpayer. The members of the Committee on Budgetary Control have, on a number of occasions, held discussions with representatives of the equivalent committees in Member State parliaments, with national audit authorities and with representatives of customs agencies.
For more information on this topic, please see the website of the Committee on Budgetary Control.
Diána Haase